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Contents

University-industry partnership. A key to Sustainable Development in Algeria: "Return to an experience"

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Abstract

Nowadays, the economics and social changes that the world is undergoing lead the organizations to adapt their strategies, to cope with the reality of this unstable environment. Due to this, the companies have realized that the achievement of objectives no longer depends on the acquisition of new technologies solely, but by the combination between research and companies which has become a real need to promote economic and social development. This paper presents an experience of conducting a research in an Algerian company that tries to implement a competency-based pay system in her strategy. This experience allowed us, to mobilize investigative techniques in order to apprehend and to answer the questions raised in our research. In the paper we will discuss how the survey was conducted in the company, what research techniques were used, the importance of applying the results of the study, and the need to establish a partnership between the universities and the economic institutions to achieve the sustainable development.

Keywords

Company, Research, Sustainable development, Innovation, Industry partnership.

Introduction

The essence of the strong relationship between the university and development cannot be denied. This is why many specialists and decision makers in the field of education and economics tackle with interest the importance of the role that the university can play in the achievement of social progress and economic development, especially in light of the rapid pace of changes in the individual's environment ; including technological development, speedy services and openness to foreign markets that help them adapt to their environment and contribute to the settlement of their problems and their societies.

Thus, the role played by the university is growing with the complexity of the social movement and developments taking place in it. This role is no longer limited to the provision of knowledge and scientific information to students, as active members of the society, but exceeded and expanded to include many aspects where the university has become a large and influential contributor. Therefore, the university had to come out of its isolation, to open its doors to industrial companies and to participate in the community's life and activities and not to remain confined in the classrooms and research laboratories as the research and development carried out by universities and higher education institutions play an essential role in the research and development system of any country that seeks to advance and progress. This requires close cooperation between the universities and the various companies in order to identify the capacities of scientific and technical universities on the one hand, and to identify the needs of the various institutions of society in general, and productive institutions in particular, on the other hand. It also requires coordination among them to achieve common goals and objectives that benefit all parties.

The Algerian university, like all other universities in the world, plays an important role in the achievement of sustainable development. However, some obstacles prevented its ability to keep abreast of contemporary developments in promoting the creative energy of students and the development of scientific research despite the fact that decision makers being aware that human resources and scientific research contribute to the improvement of the economic situation of Algeria, especially as the country is experiencing an economic crisis due to the collapse of oil prices and the Algerian oil exports falling dramatically : from 60.3 billion dollars in 2014 to 27.1 billion dollars in 2016. The decline in the first six months of 2017 continued, amounting to 18.7 billion dollars (In this regard, it is noteworthy that Algeria largely relies in its budget on the hydrocarbon taxes). It also lost more than half of its foreign exchange earnings which fell from $ 60 billion in

2014 to $ 27.5 billion at the end of 2016 (The World Bank, 2016).

The crisis in Algeria has repercussions at various levels, including the labor market. In general, unemployment rose in April 2017 to 12.3 % compared to 10.5 % in September 2016. However, unemployment among graduates reached 17.6 % in 2017 and had a profound and significant impact on the economic policy of the Algerian Government (Office National des Stistiques-ONS, 2017).

In light of this crisis, scientific research plays a pivotal role in favor of industrial and economic development as the world knows several changes, including the low prices of hydrocarbons, the liberalization of trade, the laws of the World Trade Organization, globalization and technology resulting in the emergence of a highly competitive environment where only the competitive shall survive. This can only be achieved through scientific research and universities' adaptation with these variables in order to reach a solution to the crisis. Therefore, the question is: What is the reality of the Algerian University-Industry partnership? What are the reasons requiring this partnership? What is its importance?

1. The Algerian University: History and Reforms

The system of higher education in Algeria dates back to the colonial era when the Higher School of Medicine and Pharmacy was established in 1859, then the schools of law, sciences and literature in 1879. The assemblage of these schools in 1909 gave birth to the University of Algiers managed following its predecessor in France. Later, major schools (agriculture- polytechnic) and annexes to the University of Algiers came into existence in 1950 in Oran and Constantine (in particular with the plan of Constantine in 1958). The Algerian university system for Algerians only started after independence in 1962. The mass fabric developed enormously thanks to the democratic education and demographic explosion, as well as to the training, by state and many public institutions, of a large number of cadres and qualified people (between the sixties and the mid-eighties). Today, there are over twenty cities with universities or higher schools accommodating more than 300,000 students. On the eve of independence, Algerian students amounted only to 500 students studying in Algeria or abroad. (Ramaoun, 1998).

Since its independence, Algeria's higher education sector has undergone many reforms in line with the development of the world and the challenges it faces both locally and globally in terms of developing higher education institutions and making them open to their social and economic environ-

ment and to enable them to contribute to the development of the country and the advancement of the national economy (Zorguane, 2012):

- The first period (from independence until 1970): the Algerian university used to be dependent on the colonial system, both in its forms of education and contents, in a state of alienation from Algerian society.
- The second period (1970s): this period witnessed the first reform known as the 1971 reform which was established to cut off the link to all the inherited methods of training and programs and to amend them so as to meet the reality of the country and the needs of development of manpower. This reform was initiated in order to connect the university to the labor market and to create the largest possible number of cadres at the lowest costs.
- In the eighties, the Algerian University witnessed a huge quantitative development in the number of students (100,000 students during the academic year 87-88) marking the beginning of the crisis, which is today a challenge to the Algerian University, in addition to the emergence of the phenomenon of unemployed graduates. During this period, the relationship between the university and the industry was characterized by sluggishness, driving the Ministry to adopt the university map project for the planning of higher education for the prospects of the year 2000 based on the needs of the national economy.
- The 1990s witnessed a huge explosion of knowledge on the one hand and political unrest in Algeria on the other hand. This was reflected on the various aspects of economic and social changes geared towards the market, hence the emergence of several studies to evaluate the system of training, to review the policies of training and to amend the programs as well as efforts to prepare university teachers, in addition to the emergence of several studies to evaluate the system of university training (Zorguane, 2012).

Despite the fact that higher education in Algeria has made progress and reforms aimed at remedying the situation and achieving integration between the programs and the training- based and developmental trends, these reforms have often been diagnosed by many diligent scholars in this field as having failed since they did not meet the needs of the Algerian society because they were inconsistent with the reality and the problems of the Algerian university. In addition, these reforms lacked adaptation and application, especially with regard to the quality of training because they devoted, all along these years, the principle of quantity on the quality. Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of graduates and unemployed, which also resulted in a lack of supervisory staff both in terms of quantity and quality, a weak capacity of absorption and funding, as well as

other indicators of deeper phenomena, which in essence constitute a number of important problems facing the Algerian University (Rakad, 2014).

In order to face these problems, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research launched during the academic year 2004/2005 a new system of higher education known as the LMD (License, Master, and Doctorate). This system aims at keeping up with international universities in the context of a global project that calls for competition in knowledge acquisition. This reform also addresses the imbalance suffered by the classical system, both at the level of facilities and organization of institutions and at the pedagogical level.

This system aims to[1]:

− Improve the quality of university training;
− Harmonize the system of high training with the rest of the systems of training in the world;
− Propose various training tracks and adapt them to the economic needs
− Facilitate student mobility and guidance;
− Promote students self-conducted action;
− Install procedures to accompany students in their work;
− Valuate the gains and facilitate their transfer;
− Develop training across the various stages of life, in addition to the initial training;
− Open the university and training to foreign's.

All these reforms carried out by the Algerian government in the institutions of higher education, the university in particular, indicate the importance of the university and scientific research in being the largest supplier of qualified human capital. However, the university cannot meet the needs of scientific institutions if not closely related to these institutions. This requires a scientific policy that makes the university aware of the needs of the production and services sector.

2. The Role of the University in Achieving Sustainable Development

The first definition of sustainable development was given in 1987. It is defined as "economic development and standard of living that does not

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[1] http://www.univ-mascara.dz/fsecg/index.php/ar/2017-03-05-20-30-05/2017-03-05-20-44-03 Consulted the 02nd/11/2017 à 11h00

impair the ability of the environment in the future to provide the necessary food and life for the population and seeks to meet the needs of the current generation without depleting the needs of future generations" (Brundtland Report, 1987, p. 40).

Sustainable development seeks to reconcile the three economic, social and environmental dimensions by building productive capacities and available techniques by supporting scientific research, adopting different approaches to the achievement of human beings basic needs and to raising their standards of living and well-being. Hence, scientific research represents the most important pillars of progress and the elements of its success and ability to achieve sustainable development and its response to transformations in society and external influences.

On the other hand, connecting scientific research with institutions and organizations is considered as a strategy that aims to improve the teaching process and to linking the universities to the progress and development processes in society. It especially aims the consolidation of the links between universities and various industrial sectors, considering

scientific and university research as one of the pillars of the course of development and the progress of the national economy. This explains the huge budget allocated by the developed countries to this sector where scientific research and the university are essential pillars in the progress and prosperity of nations. As mentioned earlier, Algeria is experiencing an economic crisis due to the severe collapse of the oil prices in the international market. Since 2014, Algeria has become under the weight of this crisis, and in order to get out of it the government has to adopt policies that help in finding alternative solutions to the national economy likely to boost it through the research and studies carried out in various fields. Here, the important role to be played by the university and its different cadres, laboratories and its branches in finding solutions to get out of this crisis is reflected by creating cooperation between the university and various sectors of industry in order to promote the economy of Algeria and realize the recovery of the other economic sectors. However, the Algerian government has to promote its economy away from the hydrocarbons sector, considering that universities and scientific research centers are a reference for governments to find solutions to intractable problems, especially with increasing interest in creativity and innovation. Moreover, in 1993 UNESCO established the university-industry partnership program UNISPAR in order to promote the universities in developing countries and to encourage them to increase their participation in the industrialization process in their countries. These programs aim to strengthen partnerships and linkages between universities and industry, including small and medium enterprises, to pro-

mote innovation and engineering science education, consolidate cooperation between the North and the South, mainstream gender equality, promote maintenance of all areas related to technology development, in addition to the development of human resources, including the training of engineers in the areas of transfer of research results and maintenance of equipment and other related fields[2].

The studies and reports published by the World Bank have proved the importance of university-industry cooperation and integration. This was confirmed by many universities in the world. Each developed country has its own experience in partnership between its academic and industrial institutions. Although England used to be pioneer in industrial revolution, and therefore the model in how to link its universities to industrial institutions, however Germany is characterized by the transfer of the academic institution to the productive institution where the top floor in the building of the productive establishment is the laboratory of the university professor. On the other hand, America had its own experience in Land Grant Colleges, University States and University Civic (Mahmoud, 2008).

In Algeria, the relationship between higher education institutions and industrial establishments remains at the limits of wishes, which may entail awareness of its importance, necessity and enthusiasm for its establishment. While the results of field studies indicate the formality of this relationship, where it stands at the limits of participation in the organization and implementation of some training programs, and in the provision of some advice or explanation and research of the causes of some of the transient problems. As for those issues related to the essence of the development process, especially those that require participation in research and development issues, there is almost no participation around them. (Bouziane, 2010).

Following is my experience as an academic researcher within an Algerian company specialized in the production of fruit juice where I tackle the importance of cooperation between the two parties by describing the research stages to, finally, conclude the importance of conducting field research and the need to establish a university-industry partnership in order to achieve sustainable development.

3. University-Industry Partnership: Concrete case

I was enrolled as a first year PhD student, sociology of organizations,

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[2] http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/university-industry-partnerships/ Consulted the 01st /12/2017.

and to obtain a doctorate, every student is asked to choose a particular research theme of his interest and that motivates him and study it. Since my interests are focused on issues related to human resources management, I opted for a theme that is an extension of the one I had addressed for my Master's degree.

Since I am a full-time researcher at a research center, finding a company where I could conduct my field research hasn't been difficult, since the institution I opted for had already dealt with my research center. The network of relationships is important in this type of situation. Howver, after the signing of the agreement between the research center and the institution I opted for - from the private sector - another challenge before my research began since private institutions are known for their privacy policy and, therefore, difficult access.

In social sciences data is mainly collected through the long interactions between the researcher and the environment he studies (Olivier de Sardan, 1995). This interaction enables the researcher to understand the phenomenon he is studying by collecting the most information to understand, explain and analyze it in light of the theoretical approach he adopted.

I adopted the qualitative approach that uses in order to obtain the data on the phenomena under study, all the means and tools that help to collect and classify them and to extract the results from them, i.e. the means and tools according to the nature of the research because what fits for some research doesn't fit for others.

Therefore, my study seeks to describe the wage policy change management in the company (Y) and how the competency-based wage system was adopted whereas it was based on the position. My study also seeks to identify the most important actors involved in this process on one hand, and to interpret the staff attitudes towards this system and analyze their strategies on the other hand.

I consider that the nature of the theme refers to the assessment of reality, because studying the positions and describing the procedures don't need quantification. This allowed us to rely on a set of techniques which I deemed suitable to serve the purpose of the research and which can lead us to the desired results. Therefore, I opted for direct observation, interviews and questionnaire.

In addition to these techniques, I have also used in my research data collection through the internal documents of the company. These included the company's handbooks, manuals on the rules of procedure, collective agreements and the organizational structure of the company.

The field research started following the identification of the objectives of the study, the sociological approach, and the sample of the study which

consisted of all the socio- occupational categories in the company. After the interview manual was set up and the questions of the questionnaire formulated, I used to go to the organization two days a week - sometimes three days - to conduct interviews and record them in order to ten transcribe them faithfully, correctly and plainly to subsequently analyze them and use some verbatims of the interviewees to strengthen and clarify the analysis.

My presence in the research field allowed me to discuss and talk with the employees of the company in an informal setting, away from the interview manual and questionnaire questions (off the record). Indeed, the interviewees feel very comfortable in the absence of the phonograph, so they tell me what they do, like and dislike about their company as well as about their future prospects. This type of discussions helps the sociologist understand and analyze the phenomenon under study as well as understand human behavior within the organization. In addition to this, wandering within the company in different departments, offices and factory - as well as the organization's courtyard - enabled me to have an idea about it and about the private sector which has long been considered difficult to study in Algeria by several students and researchers. The opportunity offered to me in this company drove me to use every observation and information in order to achieve the objectives of the study and to disclose the advantages of the private institution in Algeria.

There are many things researchers face during their research, especially those on how to obtain a large amount of information. As "every sociological investigation is itself special and unique, and that the methodology itself is a more or less predictable response to a series of obstacles I am likely to encounter in the field of research" (Paugam, 2008, p. 78), I have been first faced with an obstacle, as the workers of the company think that I am a journalist and therefore they are cautious when answering and it was very difficult to get them understand that their answers serve only scientific research and have nothing to do with politics or their relations with their superiors. Thus I had to turn off my phonograph to reassure them and, hence, rely on my memory and write down the information on my notepad as soon as I finished talking with them. However, I didn't encounter this problem during the interviews with the executives because some of them were interested in the interview questions which were directly related to their interests as they were concerned with the application of this new wage system under study. Therefore, their answers were practical and rich of information. However, the questions of other socio-occupational categories were related to their positions on this new wage policy, hence, the difference between these two categories in answering questions.

This experience I went through in the juice production facility was very

rich and useful at the scientific, professional and personal level as it has shown the need for university-industry partnership in order to reach reliable results that serve the two parties. As a matter of fact, the combination that can be generated from between the social sciences and the companies contributes to innovation and to promoting economic development. Relying on scientific research data and results and avoiding random decision-making and measures give the latter credibility, efficiency and stability which can have positive impact on the social development and progress.

The need to present the results of the study to the persons in charge of the organizations is very important. The sociologist can reveal elements that were concealed from the heads of the companies. Indeed, they have different views, each through his own perspective. Therefore, the combination of these two perspectives allows to give a complete picture of the problems faced by the company and to find solutions if the two parties worked in an integrated manner to achieve this goal: the sociologist providing his analysis and diagnosis of the problem, and the company taking this into account to provide mechanisms and appropriate possibilities to solve this problem based on this diagnosis.

The presentation of the results of this study was an important stage to prove the importance of field and academic research carried out by researchers and academics in this field, and to use them instead of placing them in library shelves and using them as references to theoretical research.

In the framework of a seminar organized by the research center where I work, professors, researchers and heads of institutions were invited to discuss organizational change by presenting various field experiments to researchers and academics. I was among those who presented the results of their study in the presence of the managers of the company that adopted a new competency-based wage system of where I conducted my field study. When given the floor, I tried to adapt my presentation to the seminar main lines and to combine between the academic and the practical because the invitees came from different disciplines. The mere fact that the researcher presents the results of his study to the heads of the institution where he conducted his research is considered a moral motivation for him to continue the research because he feels that his studies weren't in vain, especially that the research theme included the positions and attitudes of the workers towards this new wage system. Such themes make many organizations guard against the social sciences, making dialogue between the workers and the researchers difficult because they affect their perceptions and attitudes.

The organization of such seminars, where the academics can present the results of their research before decision-makers, brings the university and the industry closer and opens up areas for cooperation that serve economic

and social development on one hand, and encourages academics and re-searchers to demonstrate their qualifications and give live examples to their students about what is going on in the institution on the other hand.

Conclusion

Establishing university or research centers - industry collaboration, by opening channels of cooperation, coordination and communication between different universities and development sectors, creates a dynamic of know-how exchange and experience sharing that serves the interests of both par-ties as the companies use university competencies to ensure its continuity by creating the spirit of innovation and initiative-taking that give the com-pany competitive capabilities that distinguish it from other institutions, while the university benefits from this field experience to adapt its educa-tional programs to the requirements of companies, increase the employabil-ity of its graduates and link its objectives to development plans. Therefore, it is important for universities to have a vision for the future by creating new training courses via the integration of students into enterprise devel-opment curricula. The university, for instance, can be part of a regional plan for the development of vocational training (Fellag, 2005), and this university-industry interaction helps support and fund projects by institu-tions that recognize the importance of scientific research for development and innovation.

The private sector today in Algeria is the focus of economic and social development because of its advantages and potential to play a leading role in various economic and social fields. Through my field research in the 'Y' juice company, I realized the importance for this sector to open up to re-searchers as a pillar of development and as it plays an important role in providing employment and training and in enhancing competitiveness at the local level.

Methodologically, my research allowed me to use various techniques to collect the data required by the research from the preparatory, the field and the final stage (analysis and writing). These techniques showed us the im-portance of field study in answering and interpreting research questions and concluding facts in an objective manner, especially when used methodical-ly and systematically.

Personally, this experience has allowed me to build and expand my net-work of contacts, to know new people belonging to various fields - differ-ent from my own. It also allowed me to exchange views that will foster constructive debate on various social issues.

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Migration and Integration Policies on Social and Labor Market standpoints inside the European Union

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Abstract

This paper aims at shedding light on integration measures for immigrants employed at EU level. The focus of the discussion accounts for an integrated top-down and bottom-up series of approaches toward the management of the present migration flows in Europe. The first section portrays the inner status categories of the flows. The second paragraph glances at integration, as it is provided by the country of destination to mostly non-Europeans. The third section discusses the dynamic forces of migrants inside the EU labor market, followed by the evaluation of the "integration-labor market" nexus towards welfare sustainability. A specific fragment of the analysis includes policies adopted by some countries in the context of social and economic integration on a city level and evaluates bad and good practices. The last section guides toward the disarticulation of common beliefs in the agenda of migrants and labor market. Indeed, labels influence both the consideration and the perception people have of the others. The inner dynamics of integration inside the Union are a direct consequence of the label given to that cluster of people, which broadly goes by the name of "immigrants" where mastering the language of the destination country and being able, and allowed, to find a job are of chief importance.

Keywords

European Union, Integration, Labor market, Mediterranean, Migration.

1. Migrant generation: a theoretical frame of reference

Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, non-nationals, foreign born and economic migrants- the confusion on the issue is significant. Perpetual misinformation, or lack of information, represents the main driver of the level of integration on social, political and economic layers. Hence, it results climacteric to begin with a comprehensive differentiation among rights and duties to which different groups of peopleare subjected to, moving from their country of origin towards a host territory. On a broad point of departure, migrants are all those people who move from a country to another[1] whereas a refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951).

On the other side, the definition of economic migrants is a subcategory of migrant and focuses on the reason inducing an individual to begin a journey to another country in the hope to improve his (and the family's) economic conditions[2].

On a geographical perspective, the mostly defined picture of reference is the one among internal migrants-changing place of residence by remaining in the same country or region-, international- changing place of residence to move in a different country-and Mediterranean migrants- changing place of residence to move in another country andarrive in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea ("Mapping Mediterranean Migration", 2014)[3].

By putting together these two perspectives on immigrants, we can proceed with the chances and normative status of different individuals who decide to migrate; an apparatus that deeply influence the integration measures decided by member states, and by the Union in its integrity.

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[1] A general definition, which accounts for both the system of the United Nations and the European Union. For further information see: http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/glossary_en and https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms. Last consulted in March 2018.
[2] http://www.macmillandictionary.com. Last consulted in March 2018.
[3] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24521614. Last consulted in March 2018.

2. Integration in the host community

Immigrants integrate into the host community if their levels of human capital, above all education and labor market experience, are advanced (Kogan, Kalter, Liebau & Cohen, 2011). The individual right to realize a life project, considering mobility an element of evolution, wellness and cultural integration is of key importance for every human being. At the same time, migration is an economic process and a typified feature of the capitalistic society. It proves its ability to both ensuring the sustainability of the level of welfare in the country of destination, by acting on the productive base, and providing for the development in the country of origin.

The European Council recognized the need for a common policy on asylum and immigration at the Council of Tampere (1999). It acknowledged its promising ability to foster the integration of immigrants and avoid racism, xenophobia or any other form of discrimination. Moreover, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[4] has observed the impacts of migration in three economic leading domains- economic growth, the public purse and the labor market. On economic growth, migrants help increasing the working-age population, they enhance human capital development of destination countries with their skills, and they are instrumental in technological progress. Aggregate GDP is projected to grow because of migration extension of the workforce. However, the impact of migration on per capita GDP growth is not immediate since it will be determined by "the contribution of migrants to the economy of the hosting countries"(EU Investment Bank, 2016, p.7). With reference to the demographic aspect, net migration influences short-term population growth in the country of destination and the age pyramid of receiving countries appears to be concentrated on a younger age structure of the population.

The way the intertwined call for social and economic integration in the destination countries is possible to reach has its roots in the knowledge of the language of the host community. The language is, indeed, a contract of humanity in the sphere of immigration. This aspect has two sides, which exemplifies the nature of immigration for hosting societies. The European countries of the Union provide refugees and asylum applicants with free language trainings and, sometimes, with vocational trainings. Mastering the

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[4] For further information see: http://www.oecd.org. Last consulted in April 2018.

language is the essential factor towards the process of integration in the host community. The testimony of Khaled (Boelpaep, 2017) in Germany clearly expresses what asserted until this moment. Khaled, an Afghani refugee in Germany, is now able to understand "*what people say*" and […] he has started to see his life pursuing a proper path.By attending German classes at the centers in the city of O. he has started his process of inclusion and integration in Germany. At the same time, the case of Italy is crucial. The peninsula is endeavoring to manage the flows, especially the ones from the Mediterranean[5], by implementing language courses and guiding newcomers to choose legal framework of action over illegality. Examples are clear in the number of cultural mediators hired by NGOs, workshops towards the research of job and different vocational trainings. The aforementioned are all steps, which result possible after starting to master the language.The community of Salerno results predominant in the integration measures applied for non-Europeans and, especially, for all Mediterranean migrants, no matter the status of international protection they are granted. Explanation of the beginning, process and conclusion, together with UNHCR's opinion is also a good testimony of positive practices. One spokesperson in Salerno shared the following considerations back in July, during one of the biggest summer arrival on the shores in the city:

I have been all over Italy as a member of the UNHCR to report the living conditions of immigrants […] and despite the measures, which still need further implementation, the way organizations manage the reception of people and how they guide them towards the world of job is remarkable[6].

Notwithstanding, measures in Italy and in Germany need to be revised with reference to the public they are directed to. Indeed, they 'exclude while integrating'. For instance, only certain groups of people have the 'right' to take part to the trainings while others do not have access. A scenario that could create social clashes and national struggles on the delivery of immigration policies in his integrity.

Pre-departure measures of integration, as a collaboration with the countries of origin should be part of the framework, when the agreement on the measures is possible, and should be implemented thanks to microanalysis city's level

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[5] In November 2017, the IOM assessed 155.856 arrivals by sea and 2.961 deaths in the Mediterranean, considering migrants who took the Libyan route to reach the shores of Italy.
[6] From a conversation of the author with a member of the UNHCR mission in Salerno, July 2017.

tools of integration, which create a dialogue between public and private interests on the management towards integration and increasing mobility.

Some pre-departure measures include:
i)   Open-access information tools, most of which are provided thanks to on-line platforms;
ii) Language trainings and careers guidance workshops;
iii) Counseling and individual-oriented job skill-matching orientation (Desiderio & Hooper, 2015).

Pre-migration dispositions and opportunities to fit in the job gaps of the foreign labor market structure are managed by the origin country of the future migrants- a fact that may lead, and as a fact has led, to misaligned interests with the receiving society. They follow the tread of a public opinion with a deeply founded interest on the matter of migration, with a support of 74%[7] from EU citizens and a severe call to the Community for acting at all the civil society's layers.

Moreover, the multi-layered structure of the decision-making process among local, national, regional and international bodies has induced these measures of pre-departure to be largely criticized and, thus, resulting in unprofitable confronting tools to the immigration labor market lacks to be covered and in situation of advantage for origin countries towards their developmental process.

Anyway, some promising practices have been undertaken by countries like Germany or Portugal, which actually can bring about a cyclical sharing perspective. Radar-private agencies looking for skilled workers have employed their means to fill in the gaps of the internal labor market by embracing a development-sensitive attitude. This approach has proved to be a workable measure of migration-labor policy but has ignored the public sector to move towards the same. As a positive aspect, on the other side, the approach has implemented regular policies of filling in job lacks inside the country of destination and has invested on foreigners to improve their skills for a possible coming back of migrants. Another tactic employed concerning the pre-departure measures for migrants, this time coming from the public sector, has been the one adopted by Spain thanks to the stipulation of recruitment

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[7]According to the Eurobarometer of the European Parliament. The fieldwork was concluded in April 2016, 27,969 persons of 15+ years old were interviewed. See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20160630STO34203/survey-people-reveal-their-priorities-for-the-eu. Last consulted in December 2017.

procedures and promotion of migrant workers, especially with reference to countries of Latin America. However, this measure can easily be applied to African countries and their citizens coming to Europe. Indeed, the language is not an obstacle in the creation of agreement between the countries since: i) most of the Western Africans have some knowledge of Spanish, French or English (they speak at least one language of the Union); and ii) favorable relationships based on mutual interests can take roots among the European countries and the sending countries.

In addition, it appears of chief importance to stress that being often bilateral agreements, the ones forged as part of the pre-departure integration measures of the labor market, they have showed deep-rooted flaws in the management of the all immigration issue at EU level. Indeed, the community as a whole would profit of the flows more than the way the single national countries are trying to achieve, by starting to put in place recruitment labor market tactics, which foresee a division of needs for labor skilled migrants in all the territories of the Union. Tactics, or better strategies, because they imply a long-term view of events, which could also be applied to prevent some of the irregular flows.[8]

The adoption of approaches based on pre-departure measures, by means of bilateral structural cooperation among countries, is fundamental, together with the need for educational training and market surveys to be adopted on wide spectrum. However, the European Union always faces the same indecisive community role as supervising all the external policy issues, no exception made for the labor market integration of immigrants.

3. The dynamic forces of migrants inside the labor market of the European Union

"Migrants from both within and outside Europe bring their labor, skills and knowledge to the countries they settle in" (King & Lulle, 2016, p. 117).

This quotation incorporates and calls the attention to the win-win dynamics of migrants across Europe and, broadly, to the international migrations. It is

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[8] In this framework, by adopting the word *prevention* of illegal flows, the author refers to the flows of economic migrants. Indeed, as mentioned before, if the labor market opportunities where made available with those eager to improve their economic status, and willing to come to Europe to accomplish what said, the boats of migrants would maybe not be so crowded, together with the application of a useful program of visa waivers.

now time to scrutinize the in-depth facet of labor market for immigrants, equally as a potential and as a flaw, accounting for contrasting sides.

The imperative of "staving off the illegals" has been constituting the pivotal axis of the EU's integration policies. Thus, in the so-called "Post-Zero Immigration Era", the European Union has endeavored, in its profound need of labor migrants, from regions other than its own; to implement stronger measures of control against illegal migration, together with matters normally correlated to the illegal flows, according to the widespread belief of common talked politics, namely terrorism and crime. This aspect was part of the pledges made by the European Commission (2005), when the historical and relational position of the European Union was hardly comparable to the contemporary one. The European Commission has recently studied the fiscal dimension of people's movements with results to be considered as positive, especially in the dichotomy of benefits of integration- fiscal costs to be predominant in the medium term. A vison shared by the International Monetary Fund.

However, this specific typology of policy has caused to the process of integration for Third-country nationals remarkable negative consequences. As a matter of fact, already in 2010, Hansen and Hager (2010), in their analysis on the European Social Rights and Migration Policy observed the drawbacks of exacerbating the EU's attitude towards minorities and, especially, toward the Muslim community of foreigners in Europe. The trail the new generation of migrants coming to Europe has been pursuing is a literal struggle to meet the labor demand, by offering their services to the Union. In doing so, they cross the sea and lose their lives in the waters of either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic Ocean, more and more often.

Concerns on the integration of newcomers in the European Union face an oxymoron made up of endeavors, which go in different direction, according to whom is in charge at EU level of compelling efforts to foster integration and the persistent glitches to immigrants' labor market integration. There is space for divergence between European countries integration policies and immigrants' integration inside the twists and turns of the labor market. To evaluate the degree of equality on both rights and responsibilities for immigrants, the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)[9] is scrutinized. On the other side, to grasp the extension of immigration policies in the European integration policies, the reference goes to the European Union

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[9] http://www.mipex.eu. Last consulted in March 2018.

Labour Force Survey (EUFLS). The main tools employed to integrate labor migrants inside the territory of the Union have dwelled on training programs, pre-departure courses and counselling on-going meetings for newcomers. The dynamics of labor market inside the Union for immigrants are extrapolated by interweaving the statistics of these two tools of measurement. For the debate on integration policies, the Migrant Integration Policy Index accounts for eight policies areas: access to nationality, anti-discrimination, education of children, family reunion, health, labor market mobility, permanent residence and political participation. On an overall international scale in all the eight areas of employment there is no country who has reached a favorable level of integration for immigrants, with Sweden, Portugal, Finland, Belgium, Germany and Spain as the only EU countries presenting a slightly favorable score, as in Tab. 1.

It is fundamental to notice that the degree of integration differs if EU or non-EU citizens are taken into consideration. In fact, considering that nearly 4% of the residents inside the EU are coming from territories out of the Union, the same have on average experienced in the past and continue to experience more difficulties in their full participation in the labor market. A distinction between Western Europe and recently experienced European countries on the topic of immigration and integration is also visible, with the former ability to improve the management of proper measures to be applied. Anyhow, difficulties to tackle labor mobility issues inside the Union are widespread and ambitious, joint, integration policies can unlock trails of communication for both origin and destination countries; in the hope for a better migration development agenda between the north and the south of the world and pillaring on labor market.

Tab. 1. Level of integration for migrants in Europe (2014)

Country	Overall score[10]
Austria	48
Belgium	70
Bulgaria	44
Croatia	44
Cyprus	36
Denmark	59
Estonia	49
Finland	71
France	54
Germany	63
Greece	46
Hungary	46
Iceland	46
Ireland	51
Italy	58
Latvia	34
Lithuania	38
Luxembourg	60
Malta	39
Netherlands	61
Poland	43
Portugal	80
Romania	45
Slovakia	38
Slovenia	48
Spain	61
Sweden	80
United Kingdom	56
Europe 28	52

Source: Author's elaboration with data from MIPEX, as in 2014.

[10] The overall score is based on a cluster distinction among levels of integration as follows:
LEGEND: 0 - Critically favourable;1-20 - Unfavorable; 21-40 - Slightly unfavorable; 41-59 - Halfway favorable; 60-79 - Slightly favorable, 80-100 - Favorable.

The question arises spontaneously on the reason why regulating labor migration is still an issue in Europe, purely considering its own internal necessities. One may argue that the lack of far-reaching projects in the history and capabilities of the European Union, politically speaking, is also observable in this subject. A system of bodies organized and powerful as the ones constituting the European Community first, and the Union then, should, however, be able to put forward responses to alleged crisis, as the one of immigrants and also willing to strive for equality on economic, social, political layers, as its individual national member states claim in their respective systems and as the Union entire existence in the world order exemplifies.

Moreover, as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017) has pointed out in a recent report, workers should be informed about the working conditions, possibilities and rights in the European countries of destination before the arrival. In addition, migrants should benefit from the services provided by local and civil society organizations in order to be kept informed and protected inside the EU labor market, in the aftermaths of the beginning of their migration process.

4. The avoided integration-labor market nexus towards welfare sustainability

Europe's workforce needs migrants and migrants need Europe. The mutual bilateral relation here referred has been largely debated, and, yet, often discarded by policymakers. Indeed, disregarding economists' opinions on the long-term benefits brought about by immigration on the labor market scenario, the common belief that "immigrants steal natives' jobs" and "reduce their salaries" persists (Sommerville & Sumption, 2009).

The obscure topic of migrants' integration inside the labor market does not negatively affect either the short-run prospects of those nations, which receive different flows of people or the long-period projections of the same; allowing for both the distributional effects, the fostering result toward employment, the power to make natives more productive and the average balanced impact immigration has on workers' wages.

Workers' different skills constitute the point of departure of this investigation[11]. In consequence:

i)   The competitiveness among job seekers and those who already are part of the work framework is to be perceived only in the situation where workers possess the same competencies; anyway, as the labor supply of immigrants is usually of lower skilled jobs, the "steal attitude" does not see the light.

ii)   It is true it could occur that migrants are endowed with the proper means to play a role and apply for the same jobs as nationals but this scenario remains a remote one.

iii)   The different skills among natives and foreigners generate a major specialization roadway for the economy of the countries of destination and, later in time, they are supposed to rise wages.

Having at disposal these assumptions, one could easily argue that the circumstance proclaiming immigrants to be directly substitutable to natives as workforce is to be deemed as not corresponding to the truth.

On the contrary, a positive aspect for European labor market migration policies is to come. Evidence has been revealed in connection with the United States familiarity to immigrants' flows, witnessed in the last century, as adequate in number to both statistics and academic, accountable reference for the European Union. In "How Immigration Affects U.S. Cities", David Card (2007) asserts there is a growth of average remunerations by six percent, in a situation where a 10 percent rise in the immigrant share of the labor force is visible. The author also finds out the delta of wages among low skilled and high skills workers to be around four and five percent with the same increase in the level of immigration (ten percent) in the US cities. Indeed, all labor economists, even those adopting different methods of analysis, agree on the inequality gap as to widen with immigrants' work. Anyway, there are other more determining factors influencing the equality-inequality dichotomy in each single state, moving from education, trade, social status unbalances, and gender discrimination to IT changes and so on. As much as the employment rate is concerned, Card, with reference to the late 1980s in the US, saw a decrease in the nationals' employment rates of one to two per cent, up to five per cent in cities with massive inflows. This author is known for having used a cross-city

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[11]   For further information see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.html; www.emn.europa.eu; http://ec.europa.eu/immigration;www.integration.eu. Last consulted in April 2018.

comparison method whereas other who used a national-based level, as George Borjas (2003), have arrived at different conclusions on the same topic, less positive, especially about the reduced wages of natives' when a country experiences a 10 per cent immigration inflows, which can lead to a 9 per cent decrease.

Hence, the adaptation to the new environment is here crucial to succeeding opportunities and advantages for both sides of the analysis, namely: citizens and immigrant workers, in a possible "reducing the gaps scenario". To link the above made discourse on the methods casted-off to investigate the profits and the drawbacks of the dynamics of immigration labor market, it will be now paid attention to the research conducted by Dustmann and Frattini (2013) on recent employment gaps among the two-diverse cluster of individuals, protagonist of the current analysis. These researchers investigate 15 Western European Countries and scrutinize the probability percentages of being hired for both individuals of the two different groups. Their findings compose a variation in numbers between Northern and Central Europe, and Southern European Countries. For instance, in the first two areas of Europe the delta between migrants and natives on employment is between 8 and 15 per cent in favor of natives'; whereas the picture changes for Southern zones of the old continent where the gaps decrease and ranges swing between 0 and 6 per cent.[12]

Besides this first general framework, one should also focus on single countries of destination to better grasp the internal space-difference on wages and the reactions of national policies to this specific context. Researchers have referred to France and Germany as countries where the gaps on the employment rates are deeply unbalanced for non-nationals. In this area, mostly African and Eastern European immigrants struggle to find a place to occupy in the labor market (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz & Manning, 2007). The other difference to be pointed out regards the contract hold by the two clusters of people. Indeed, as much as the natives may reach out a non-temporary contract of work, only temporary and not steady typologies of job are offered to most of immigrants. This seems to be the prevalent situation in both Italy and Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes & De la Rica, 2007). Moreover, only nationals or EU citizens enjoy equal opportunities in the access to labor market for jobs inside the sphere of the public sector and, additionally, non-EU are not receiving

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[12] The same percentages are to be applied also for Ireland and the UK.

either education or training to be more likable in their potential access to the world of job[13].

Pitying for those millions of people whom for many, and unquestioned reasons, flip a coin and come to our countries is not the solution. It is undeniable that their sufferings and pains are something that Western Europeans born after the fifties see as not likely to touch again, but it is also true that our humanity does not have to dis-advance just because we (Western Europeans) do not see us in them. Giving them opportunities in the same portion as to other people, who may hold a European passport, has to become the European attitude, by adopting the immigration-labor market-integration nexus. Despite the word integration has unquestionably raised discontent among communities on the idea that it is actually conceivable to make someone feel safe and, most importantly, home in a country different from the one he/she has grown up in; the person who writes believe that this word: "Integration" has a way more far-reaching shores and that can be the sprint solution both from a communication and an economic perspective towards the issue of immigrants' work. Indeed, if it is related to how we all can, as members of the human race, inhabit each other, the profits will be undisputable. Integration could also function as a positive disruptive tool of tackling the labor market paradox inside the EU- by providing a legal framework and follow-ups access to different levels of societal needs and harmony.

Proofs that practices of integration and labor market make a difference in the needs of the European Union to fill in the voids of the labor market and to immigrants' to be the actors of the same process, is given by researches and studies. In "Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany: An Analysis Based on Local Labor Markets", Pischkej and Velling (1997, pp. 594-604) claim the scarce impact immigration causes on wages in the case of Germany. The analysis made a steady reference to different periods of the country's history. When the country was the protagonist of shortages on the labor market and had to react by driving attention to an active recruitment policy; when the country started to be willing to push immigrants back, at the brink of the oil price crisis and the fear of recession took foot in the country, until the final unification in one single German state.

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[13] http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings. Last consulted in December 2017.

The same results have been showed during the eighties and nineties by other authors like Bauer (1997). In addition, even on other countries' perspective, scholars have been dwelling with evidence on positive or negative impact of immigration on wages reduction, but the available indications have reported not significant influence (Addison & Worswick, 2002). One may here seal the whole matter in question- keeping in mind that these results refer to a pre-crisis period, during which the phase of globalization was not entirely mature and the dynamics of productivity and labor markets were different- by mentioning a report made by the UK House of Lords (2008), which realized how both the expenses and the benefits to the local population are minor. In addition, the only part of the residents' population truly affected by the immigration, concerning economic and labor opportunities, is the one of former immigrants who arrived in the European destination state before the most recent flows, mostly because they apply for the same jobs. Notwithstanding, there are many other sections of the market, which can only profit from inflows, especially of non-EU citizens:

i)   The production of good and services is easier and less expensive with immigrants in the scenario and this fact can lead to the increased production of the latter ones and to the spreading and selling of the same to different world region. It will make the country of destination more competitive in the international trade;

ii) Non-EU nationals[14] contribute to the growth of some sectors of the economy often disregarded by local population, known as "3D": dirty, dangerous and difficult. They are for example: construction, house holdings, manufacturing, cleaning, etc.;

iii) Labor from immigrant will be used in contrast with always new, alienating labor-saving technologies and the labor will benefit from human-based activity in the long term by allowing a cheaper cost of the goods produced by the firm, compared to increased ones in the circumstances where high technological machinery would have been used;

iv) The very fact that immigrants now live in the country increase the demand for goods and services and, therefore, the demand for the labor necessary to process these goods and services;

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[14] The analysis refers to No-EU Nationals in this context since the data available at EU level is limited apropos different sectors of immigration.

v)   Immigrants are willing to move where the demand for labor is higher and in this way, they allow all the sectors demanding for improvements to be supplied with the labor workforce needed. They also contribute in a way to the restart of the economy on a national level by being available at changing their place of work from one region to another (Sommerville & Sumption, 2009). The impact immigrants have on the growth and development of the cities and various urban space is of key importance. Examples are traceable in the comparisons between some European cities and Middle Eastern realities, as in the case of the city of Amman[15].

Tab. 2 is the expression of the segmentation by sector of employment for foreign-born workers[16] in Europe, divided for countries of destination.

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[15] From a Panel discussion in Amman made thanks to the German- Jordanian University and the Freie Universitat of Berlin and corroborated by the author's personal reflection on cities in times of migration.

[16] In the cluster of Foreign-born are also included citizens of other EU countries experiencing a period of mobility.

Tab. 2 - *Foreign-born workers by sector of employment, percentage of total foreign-born employment (2012)*

Countries	Agriculture and fishing	Mining, Manufactur-ing and Energy	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade	Hotels and restaurants	Education	Health	Households	Admin. and ETO	Other services
Austria	0.7	17.1	12.2	13.9	12.7	4.2	9.8	0.6	7.1	21.8
Belgium	0.9	13.2	7.4	12.3	7.2	5.3	11.7	1.4	14.7	25.9
Czech Republic	1.1	29.6	9.1	16.9	3.6	4.9	6.4	0.3	7.2	20.8
Denmark	2.8	14.7	2.6	10.4	9	9.7	18.3	0.9	8	23.6
Estonia	1.4	27.3	7.7	12.5	1.7	10.2	6.8	-	6.4	26
Finland	2.4	16.5	6.3	12	6.6	7.2	13.3	0.3	8.2	27.1
France	1.4	11.1	11.9	11.7	6.8	5.2	11.5	5.2	11.1	24.1
Germany	0.6	25.4	7	12.7	8.9	4.5	11	1.2	7	21.9
Greece	11.1	13.8	16.5	13.9	13	1.9	4	13.2	3.7	8.9
Hungary	3.9	18.9	7.9	19	5.9	11.6	8.8	-	7.9	16.2
Iceland	4.3	20	4.4	14.5	10.8	9.4	11.1	-	8.9	16.6
Ireland	2.2	15.1	4.3	15.6	13.2	5	14	1.2	6.8	22.5
Italy	4.4	19.7	13.1	9.8	9	1.8	4.9	19.2	5.5	12.6
Luxembourg	0.2	6.4	9.2	8.8	5.3	4.1	8.7	3.4	26.4	37.6
Netherlands	1.4	14.9	4.3	12.9	6.8	6	16.2	0	9.9	27.6
Poland	4.2	11.2	7	17.3	4	12	5.6	1.6	8.2	28.9
Portugal	2.2	12.9	8.2	14.2	9.9	9.3	7.8	5.2	11.6	18.8
Slovakia	4.3	20.6	4.9	15.4	2.2	7.2	11.5	1	10.5	22.3
Slovenia	1.6	29.4	17.8	6.5	5.6	5.4	6.5	0.1	5.8	21.4
Spain	6.8	8.8	8	14.7	16	2.6	5.1	14.7	6.1	17.3
Sweden	0.6	12.6	4.6	10.3	7.3	11.8	18.4	-	8.2	26.3
UK	0.7	10.4	5.6	12.9	9	8.4	14.6	0.4	8.1	29.9

Source: Author's elaboration from OECD (2013), data from Labor Force Surveys (LFS).

Besides the mentioned positive aspects, the situation of the migration-integration relation, with reference to the labor market indicators at an EU levels is represented by Fig. 1. It focuses on the activity rate, expressing the number of active individuals (or labor force) aged 20-64 as a percentage of the total population with reference to citizenship:

Fig. 1- *Evolution of activity rates of the population (aged 20–64)*, by groups of country of citizenship, EU-28, (%), (2008–2016)

Source: Eurostat, 2017.

As displayed, the Non-EU citizens' curve is both the line at the bottom, explaining the persistent occupational level of Non-EU nationals as the lowest, and the only one to experience a decrease in number since 2010. Indeed, non-EU citizens' activity rate was 68.7 % in 2016 in comparison to citizens of other Member States' whose activity rate reached 81.9%. This appears to be the evidence, if one considers the availability of resources and data collectable with those immigrants who are already part of the national and European economies.

Eurostat has also provided a description of the condition of integration of international migrants inside EU 28 with reference to 2014.

Tab. 3 - *Integration of international migrants*, EU-28 (2014)

	Non-EU born	Native born	Gap	Large gaps in
Employment rate, total (15-64)	57	65.2	-8.2	SE(-18.2); BE(-18.1); NL(-17.0); DK (-15.9);FI(-15.2)
Unemployment rate, total (15-74)	18.9	9.6	9.3	BE(16.7); SE(13.0); ES(12.4); FI(12.2)
Female unemployment rate, (15-64)	49.4	60.4	-10.8	BE(-23.7); SE(-22.4); FI(-22.4); NL(-20.5)
Female unemployment rate, (15-74)	19.5	9.7	9.8	BE(15.8); FI(13.8); SE(13.6)
Youth unemployment rate, total(15-24)	38	21.6	16.4	LU(42.7); BE(22.0); SE(21.1)
NEET, young people neither in employment nor in education and training(18-34)	27.1	15.6	11.5	LU(21.7); BE(21.2); SI(21.0); FR(15.9)
Housing overcrowding rate % of population (20-64) living in a household with insufficient number of rooms	24.5	17	7.5	AT(32.4); EL(24.3); IT(23.8); DK(21.3)
Housing cost overburden rate % of pop.(20-64) living in households where the total housing costs exceed 40% of disposable income	23.4	10.7	12.7	ES(31.4); EL(28.8); BE(19.5); IE(18.0)
Mean income(1000 EUR), over 18	17.4	18.4	-5.50%	ES, EL(-39%); IT(-32%); AT(-31%); BE(-30%)
Mean income-females(1000 EUR), over 18	17.7	17.9	-1.10%	EL(-41%); ES(-36%); IT(-32%); BE(-29%)
People in low working intensityhouseholds% of pop. (18-59) living in a household where yearly working time were below 20% of full time potential	17	11.4	5.6	BE(22.6); FI(16.9); NL(15.5); SE(13.3)
Severe material deprivation rate % of pop. > 18 with inability to afford 4 out of 9 necessary items for leading an adequate life	14.7	8.2	6.5	EL(31.1); BE(18.1); IT(16.6); ES(14.4)
At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate % of pop. > 18 either at risk of poverty(<60% of nat. median income); or severely materially deprived or living in a household with a very low work intensity	40.1	22.5	17.6	BE(37.9); EL(34.7); ES(30.4)
At risk of poverty rate for children by nationality of parents (% of pop. Below 18)	36.4	19	17.4	SI (45.2); SE(37.2); EL(37.0); LT(36.5)

Source: Eurostat[17]

[17] See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics&oldid=381062. Last consulted in December 2017.

Bearing in mind that the level of income is lower with reference to foreign born, including other EU countries, by 5.5% compared to native born population, more evident differences are notable in Tab. 3 apropos Non-EU born where the employment rate witnesses a -8.2 gap in favor of native born population. The percentage points of gap are higher for female employment (-10.8 percentage point) In addition, the level of possible social exclusion and at risk of poverty index is doubled for international migrants compared to native born.

In consideration of the dynamics structuring the current European labor market, policymakers are in the path of following the creation and implementation of services tailored to immigrants' precise needs. These services range from general orientation, guidance to vocational and language training. Nonetheless, the issue remains that the majority of the programs and policies have a focus on specific cluster of immigrants, and broadly comes to hamper the enjoyment of the same opportunities by other foreign-born.[18]

"Employment is a key part of the integration process" (European Council, 2004) and a tool to unlock foreign-borns' skills towards developmental circles of both destination and origin countries. Moreover, deterrents to this labor market- integration issue for Non-EU remain the papers and documentation file, which have been the major developer of incongruences and black-market undercurrents since long time in history.

Vocational and language training have come handy only recently. Policymakers are now glancing at different endowments of immigrants as the true sources of integration for both economic sustainability and as a way to ensure a permanent level of welfare in their states. Notwithstanding, the difference based on granted status for immigrants truly changes the rights and duties to which people have access. The same trainings have been directed in one direction more than another as to reduce migrants of a real understanding of the labor market and the unclearness of the European societal contexts continues to remain largely spread.

According to Data Source EU Labor Force Survey of 2008[19], there is a huge discrimination on both possibility of initial integration and further employment towards non- Europeans. Non-Europeans, only when they are of second generation, are slightly favored in the research and integration inside the labor

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[18] http://www.migrationpolicy.org/. Last consulted in December 2017.
[19] http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. Last consulted in December 2017.

market. In accordance with the "segmented assimilation model"-barriers of different nature, mostly with discrimination and cultural roots shape the degree of integration.

Anyhow, the integration, which is deeply influenced by the central asset of employment and documents necessary toward the granting of status allowances, are in the hands of single states. Hence, the role of the Union, despite the pledge for common policy towards migration is once more fragmented.

4.1. Local enquiry on cities' integration practices for migrants

Bottom up, local (with emphasis made on a city level) opportunities for the integration of migrants are displayed in this paragraph, in comparison with the previous mentioned pre-departure, top-down available policies and "improvement-led" measures. Indeed, integration programs for newcomers have had regional and city levels of availability, guided by communitarian dispositions to implement integration policies, as respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality included in the TEU.

Services have been variegated, based on numbers of immigration and policymakers decisions on how to manage the fluxes. In this context, cities are good providers of additional integration services, which can orient and further improve the integration of the newcomers. This methodology can become a successful one by giving knowledge and resources, as well as economic assets and EU funding, to the local dimensions of the member states.

The implementation of bottom-up policies at a local level of the society may bring about a defined structure of the top-down layer and thus the general strategies and policies towards immigration may present good and always better results. The integration of newcomers in the labor market can be framed centrally on the results to be achieved and the general rules to be followed, but a certain space of action should reside at city's level, smoothly depending on the context. The local leadership on the integration issue has a good example in the Berlin's "ARRIVO project",[20] or other local activities on the German soil, which guide the willing companies to hire refugees. In this regard knowledge

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[20] For further information see: http://www.arrivo-servicebuero.de/startseite.html. Last consulted in January 2018.

exchange networks of collaboration among the EU and the local level appears crucial, as well as the accessibility of providing cities with the proper financial tools to better deliver the integration of the labor market newcomers' workforce. Additionally, employers' engagement in the process of integration within the structure of the cities may be considered as a path to foster the same process by allowing companies to evaluate the projects carried out and draw a pro-cons list.

The impact knowledge of investments, undertaken by local employers towards the improvement of the labor market for both migrants and natives, might represent a good practice towards hiring and training a specific cluster of the workforce. Other local and regional actors could replicate the practices and the EU may start to engage in the coordination of these bottom-up tactics, to become a proper mediation of not only bottom-up tactics but also of top down strategies, in a way for immigration labor market shortages to be adequately balanced and filled in. Another point in favor of this approach, toward the sharing of the approach may be found in the online support platforms to be employed at different international layers. Hence, they could symbolize an identity EU project to be further improved.

Germany has also developed "The IQ Network- Integration durch Qualifizierung or Integration through Qualification"[21]. This Network allows different players at distinct layers to improve the management of the general labor market integration system. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs created it in 2005 with the backing of the European Social Fund and it has developed since then becoming an instrument of labor market policy of the federal government. It is arranged to create and support structures for labor market integration, including employment services and distinct economic players. At the same time, it aims at guiding new arrivals to follow pathways of integration in the host country, by providing vocational, language and general integration courses. The projects has experienced colorful measures of adaptation in the German territory with innovative perspective practices.

Forums of recording, evaluation and sharing of practices and projects at variegated ganglions of both the civil society and the political power could create an expanding positive solution to the ongoing labor market lacks in the broader perspective to tackle correspondingly the issue of immigration from an EU standpoint, developed from the bottom.

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[21] http://www.netzwerk-iq.de/network-iq-start-page.html. Last consulted in January 2018.

5. A journey toward the world of job:reflection on the integration of irregular migrants and its comparison with regular migrants

Migrants with "Irregular status" reflect a true challenge for destination countries. The main pillars of this demand are visible in the followings action-reaction patterns:

i) the movement of people is associated with the paradigm of human security and as a consequence the most vulnerable part of the human society is affected by discrimination, mostly children and uneducated women and men;

ii) the perceived disadvantages and the reality of the imitations in the labor market rights for migrants is exacerbated by societal traps which fed up the system of the black economy;

iii) the legislation for discrimination procedures in the labor market sector complies with the spread of unequal footings.

However, obtaining fair work and engaging in a satisfactory job career are chief episodes in the lifecycle of each single person (Kogan, Kalter, Liebau & Cohen, 2011). And yet, leading to a certain or a total devaluation of human capital is the first hitherto accepted response EU bodies and leaders, as well as citizens, consent to the future of migrants crossing their continents to reach Europe.

With reference to the Spanish case, it is key to remind how that the bulk of people arriving from the center of detention of foreigners, mostly known with the acronym CIE (immigrants' detention centers), since neglected in the job scenario, start by looking for a future in an illegal, black market labeled way. It is a matter of fact, often taken as tacit agreement from the set of the non-governmental organization, that individuals under the international protection umbrella start taking up jobs without contracts. This issue should not be merely considered as migrants' fault but as national and European policies' liability. Indeed, given the impossibility they are obliged to, migrants earn their tomorrows in places like cargo structures, open-air markets, house-based caring. Places where the controls are known to be lower and where the governmental and state eye seems outsight. Moreover, the sense of disorientation of the three months, allowed period in a welcoming center to the recipients of protection, creates a higher degree of uncertainty and loss to the same group of people. During these three months, they will continue to work on illegal basis for their survival and the one of the family left in the country of

origin. As for the next phase, the migrant will demand for asylum, just as a way to foster his future plans, and often even if not having the characteristics to apply for it. It could also happen that the person will give up any form of legal framework job research and thereafter moving, mostly to a different country compared to the one of landing, to find a job in the black market. The situation is deemed to continue for all the necessary years to have the residence in a European country and violating most of the normative of both the single nation state and the Union as a whole.

The tangent of the processes is that the moving, the transfer of the individual does not only create an imbalance in the control of the flows that escape the nation's statistics. Indeed, it is against the law to leave the country of arrival to move inside Europe if the migrant is a recipient of international protection or has the status of asylum seeker.

The bureaucracy to all this process and to all the procedures in the world of job for migrants is exhausting and truly without a beneath logic capable of tackling not only the moral and crisis duties of the European Union but also the economic, maybe most interesting features for the top-down school of approaches, ones.

The chances given to migrants and to their real integration in the European countries lacks major steps of suitability to the conditions of those people coming to the old continent's shores and to the policies put in place by the administrative apparatus all over the Union. Among the variety of conditions that define and allow the access to the labor market, the single nation state has the last word. The whole illegality spectrum could be as much as volatile as the rules governing the world of job.

Authorizations for entering the labor market are more often-temporary ones which do not provide a time spanning renewable period of documentation and lead to higher and obscurer percentages concerning the management of illegal labor market.

In the present work, it is believed that cutting and contrasting illegal labor market percentages illustrates a method of tackling the overall migration uncontrollable crisis of illegal arrivals in an optic of smoothed integration. Quoting Georges Tapinos (1999), Professor at Institut d'études politiques of Paris:

Numerous assessments are made, however. But many of these are just "guesstimates" which cannot be relied upon as statistical tools in proper scientific investigation.

Anyway, the pros and cons of the illegal migration are on the balance of the employer and the illegal employee. The pros benefitted by the employer are the advantage possessed to pay for the service made by the employee at a wage that is far under the minimum requested by the social structure of a country and the fact that he does not pay any contribution to the State. In this framework, the absence of negotiation power of the illegal migrant is clear and the employer uses the absence of regulation to circumvent its duties as member of the community. On the other side, the employee who does not have much of a choice since undocumented and struggling to life, accept what is offered and persist in the status of illegal, for far more than a short temporary span of time.

The underground economy is for most migrants the only way to find a job. The higher minimum wage perspective blooms at the docks of the employers who start to care more about how they can evade the system than how they can regularize immigrants they illegally hire. The same process undermines the security of job for nationals and for those who seek legal job dynamics and foster the rate on unemployment. The difference comes definitive here and the wages relative aspects are to be judged as not acceptable.

The need for a common agreed documentation for labor and job activity should arise from the all set of conferences and meeting among the policies institutions, bringing about a comprehensive analysis and using statistical measures, implementing, in this way, further controls of the broad-ranging system of illegal migration flows. In truth, illegal migration could help the whole exploration of economic balances and underdevelopment issues, as well as unemployment rates. Contrasting these percentages becomes a necessity. This precise obligation could not only originate in the hand of the employers who morally understands the lacks the present system has but also, and deeply, from the European institutions who could, with this accurate system, generate advantaged on the economic sectors, as well as on the common policies of integration. The two terms go hand in hand and need to be incorporated in the organism of the freedom and unity the Union admits creating, but this time by widening its Schengen fingerprints.

The immigration crisis sea is characterized by a liable and subtle river of sharing interests where dealing with the assumed emergency has become a fight against newcomers, a judgment and mistreatment of their illegal status. Nonetheless, it is here believed that wandering on the causes of the illegality badge is part of the solution. Indeed, the mark immigrants are identified with, once they arrive in Europe, is here considered the major cause of the security

related anxiety of EU leaders. The inference about the barring of illegality is not accompanied by solid researches on the issue since the latter ones do not deliver definite numbers of the phenomenon. For instance, only the delta between arrivals and contributions paid, in each single member state of the Union, can persuade us to conjecture about how arrivals in Europe, when resulting in non-recognition of the status and in any available accreditation documents, they become irregularities, complaints, lack of understanding, or commitment, to be understood by the competent European institutions. Hence, the hurdle is the reaction. By denying work permits, the sole ideal expectation concerning them to live legally in Europe or, on the contrary, the belief that immigrants will decide to go back to their countries of origin soon, considering what they have pass through to reach Europe, is chimerical. This evidence poses consequent fertile soil for the European Union to nourish and states, or more properly reminds, that blaming the NGOs for their rescue activities in the Mediterranean is not the solution to the flows of immigrants or to their integration in the labor market, and that neither the calls for better management of the frontiers are.

The perspective of contributions (social service) should encourage EU countries to take up the baton for immigrants favorably keeping in mind that this action will favor their citizens' future. European commanders in chief should not end the race because they are scared the baton is too hot it could burn their countries out. On the opposite, they should continue running and won the race against inhumanity and disbelief all together. Among the questions that ensue on the topic of labor market, ranging from i) are immigrants a true resource for the national member states' economies? ii) How could they sustain a country to improve if they do not pay the contributions? Some tip-answers are henceforth provided:

• Economic picture of the member state: the consideration that immigrants disadvantage the employers' willingness to hire nationals because they provide cheaper, and not legally binding workforce, has an intrinsic dual reality and a not-unrepairable controlling strategy to be employed. Due to be said that the current glitches are not a mere economic factor; they reside in the normative system. The totality of questions becomes known because there are lacks, which are driven by enactments. In this setting, activism and the spread of knowledge of legal means, by all levels of the civil society, can lead to a lower degree of corruption, to the recognition of the legal status for immigrants and to the truthful allowance to have a legal job. The latter has to respect the same

binding requirements of minimum wage as for nationals and the controls on the efficiency and effectiveness has to be often accomplished in order to guarantee the regularization of the status and the respect of the directives. Thus, the differences on the salaries will only be based on competencies and not on nationalities. Employers will not underpay immigrants purely because they will not fight for their work-related rights since they will be endowed with the genuine information to ask for and be protected by the law. In addition, the urgency to fill in the empty job positions with natives' workforce will be respected, in a future where the demand and supply of work will be prized, not to discard the creation of new jobs that the flows naturally bring with them in the destination countries (as in the case of mediators, social workers, drivers- which comprise a quite variegated level of education and training)[22].

- Development progress in the destination country: Long-term goals, emphasizing circular migration will bring about development thanks to the skills acquired and the entrepreneurship in the immigrants' country of origin. A long run perspective, which has to be endorsed by short-term goals of management cohabitation.

- Result: In this way, a system of insurance and contributions for both the pension development will emerge and together with a lower percentage of integration struggle for newcomers. It will later transpire a first solution of the economic migrations and a pump for circular migration; advantaging for both host and sending countries.

In conclusion, the key to immigrants' labor market scenario of illegality may be simpler that what commonly thought, holding on two pillars for the construction:

- Granting the legal status
- Implementing the regularization by controlling and sanctioning the violations.

Not to forget, since it is part of the dominant discourse of the European elite, the immigrants' level of criminality could be wiped out. Indeed, as it was pointed out with reference to the US, an historical country of immigration, the legal status brings about profound changes on the life of newcomers and lowers the level of criminality since the strive for a better life is already began, thanks to the recognition of being a human being who can legally work (National

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[22] This is the case of most of the European countries where structures to welcome immigrants and to provide social, educational, vocational trainings and services are increasingly emerging.

Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931)[23]. Owing to the fact that shadows of labor mobility from third country nationals inside the European territory are still not visible- as an example, refugees are now not allowed to be matched with work internationally, despite the interest of the private sector arises on daily basis- solutions and temporary measures should refer to legal status permission as human dignified capacity, to be both recognized and protected.

Regularity and irregularity are indeed two side of the same coin, a coin that possesses the escutcheon of the member states and of the European Union in its integrity.

The existence of directives which sanction employers profiting of illegally-staying migrants' labor represent one of the main pillar of the EU policy on decision for entries. Indeed, since the *Directive providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country national* (European Parliament, Council of the European Union, 2009), employers have been fined if they hire or take advantage in certain measures of the precarious situation of irregularly staying migrants. This directive has positive as well as negative impacts on the overall dissertation of immigration policies and labor dynamics. First of all, analyzing the positive aspect of the prohibitions, the social security service and the public finances do not lose out because of not documented and declared immigrants' labor services of irregulars. The directive affects the behavior of employers who are not giving importance to look for their job resources on irregular bases, with the hope of not paying to them the contributions and avoiding the overall system of social security and national labor protections. On the other hand, what happens is a mistrust for all the newly arrived non-nationals who are not conscious of the legislation and whose hope is to come to Europe, find a regular job and survive. Indeed, the possibilities for this group of people continue to see reductions in the availability of positions to be hold and, actually, the permission to work legally in the national territory of a European state is becoming more and more a utopia.

The situation could easily fit the platonic hyper-uranium world in the experience of migrants who have not received a rejection sentence and who can stay in the member state territory but, despite the temporary allowance, are not granted valid job temporary permissions. For instance, the dual relationship

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[23] See: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/44540NCJRS.pdf

between employer and employee has been negatively affected with reference to the immigrants who cross the sea toward Europe without being part of some of the EU directives. Indeed, among the main features of integration, conceived as a process and as a result, Heckmann (2005) describes four layers of integration, which should be equally evaluated.

1) Structural integration: being and feel part of the host society. It involves the participation in the labor market, in the economy of the destination country, in the educational system, in the social and health services and in the political life;

2) Cultural integration: transmission and sharing of community and local knowledge to newcomers, mostly the language as the pivotal aspect of cultural adaptability;

3) Interactive integration: social and network relations of the member states by enlarging the layers of the social capital;

4) Identification integration: when belonging to the host society becomes part of the integration pattern.

Fig. 2 - *Indicators of Integration: Final Report* (2004), UK Home Office, Development and Practice Report 28, London.

Source: Ager & Strang, 2004, p. 3.

As the four domains of integration constructed by Hackmann display, the process is in the direction of mutual comprehension of interest from an individual perspective to a collegial one, bearing in mind the differences of the future opportunities of the same phenomenon. Ager and Strang have showed a similar analysis (Ager & Strang, 2004). They depicted the indicators of integration framework, about refugee integration but applicable in all migration related issues. They divided the domains into 10 by four levels, as in Fig. 2.

Migrants' lives have a multi-faceted structure of bipolar existence towards the integration in the new societies and the strive for keeping steady their origins, in the hope of coming back one day with better means individually and at a society level.

The researches mentioned up to this point may lead to the assertion that integrating into the labor market of the host country represents for immigrants the first piece of the involvement-house, to be later followed by finding housing, generate and develop a network of social nature, filled with cultural layers, and possibly transforming the world integration into a processed personal and community dimension of that individual who has left his home in search of a place to survive and find a second opportunity in a less defined, difficult to create, familiar atmosphere.

On the delivery of the Italian report of the National Social Insurance Agency (INPS) the President of the Agency, Tito Boeri, declared that without immigration the National Social Insurance Agency will fall apart (INPS Report, 2017)[24]. This assertion, in line with the direction of the study presented, make an evaluation of the contribution of workers in the fiscal and national insurance contributions system of the Mediterranean country taken as example, Italy. Going through the report, delivered in June 2017 by the INPS, the immediate result of the immigrant related labor market dynamics is visible in the 2002 and 2009 changes due to the regularizations of illegal migrants thanks to two acts of amendment (Italian laws: Acts of amendment, 2002, No. 189; Italian laws: Acts of amendment, 2009, No. 102). Itis revealed how the regularizations have led to a both positive and durable effect inside the structure of the national labor market. For instance, the acts have played the role of directing the immigrant population on a contribution-regularity

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[24] See:
https://www.inps.it/docallegatiNP/DatiEBilanci/rapportiannualiinps/Documents/INPS_XVI_Rapporto_annuale_intero_030717%20. Last consulted in December 2017.

pathway. This precise instrument of the public bodies has also negatively struck the black market. It has further cleared up the picture on the favorable overcome of the binomial identification: "Migrants-illegal" that, for this widespread publicly affirmed connotation, must be exploited against the state directives and without accomplishing to the salaries minimum requirements.

The Italian case on the evaluation of the phenomenon on a national insurance contributions scenario could stage a more fertile territorial public opinion consensus and distend the tensions between employers and employees in order to foster a regular, and legal, path of migrants' workforce. Indeed, it represents a beneficial factor for the economy of the single state where the laws are respected and goes in the direction of properly employing the potentialities of the multiculturalism and labor shortages, as insights for the migration development hump not to be taken for granted but to be trained.

In conclusion, the acknowledgment of the means at disposal would benefit both the receiving and the sending countries and would epitomize a first constructive step towards the immigration- labor market- integration problem-solving process.

The degree of success concerning the practice of integration is a ladder of liabilities shared among governmental and non-governmental apparatus. A proper look at valuable, and good, practices currently in use in some EU countries, still just towards some cluster of people, could, and should, be spread in Europe. Their employment should be seen, as it is- a way to foster economy and the level of welfare and should not forget about the most shared features of us all- being migrants and being humans.

From the taxonomy to the rights of migrants' workers, declined in clusters, and, finally, on a common EU policy on labor market- reaching the shores of a broader debate on integration, information and policy employment in the territories of the Union- it is possible to conclude that different canalizations inside the European Labor market, based on status recognition, have fragmented the potential of people's international movements and that programs, like the German ARRIVO project or the IQ Network- Integration durch Qualifizierung or Integration through Qualification", should embrace non-nationals in their totality, where both language and vocational training are of crucial momentousness.

Europe is dealing with migration flows today and it will most likely endure to see an increase of the arrivals in the next future. Cooperation accords inside each nation state, comprising the public, private and civil society sector (with

duly and competent informed workers), and partnerships among destination and sending countries, with the employment of pre-departure measures (when possible) and of local (and city) strategies are to delineate a path of positive impacts and interchanges for all the parts of the agreements.

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Beyond aesthetics of pity. Italian media representation of migrants and emotional audience[*]

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Abstract

Public debates on migration oscillate between two conflicting claims: on the one hand, compassion and protection, on the other hand, rejection and fear. Both representations are more focused on emotional reactions (Castells, 2009) than rational reflections (Habermas, 1962, 1992, 1996a,1996b, 1999).

The media hyper-simplification concurs to a social representation of migration that is currently distorting real-life experiences to such an extent that the spectacularization of migrants brings about problems in terms of their negative self-representations. Furthermore, information about migrants reported by media is usually decontextualized (Marletti, 1995; Faso, 2008; Ghirelli, 2005; Maneri, 2001; Musarò, Parmiggiani, 2014), worsening this state of affairs. Media do not encourage the audience to give evaluations about specific topics, thus framing an agenda of issues to reflect on, so that the presentation of a topic does not cause prejudice or influence a course of action, but favour its contextualization (Shaw, 1979). Consequently, the complex phenomenon of migration is concealed in many degrees and ways by the Italian media system.

Starting from this assumption, we argue that these kinds of representation do not allow the audience to understand the complexity of the question, indeed feeding populism and influencing European and national policies to manage migration. In particular, emotional representations conceal the central issue of the potential breaking of fundamental rights claimed in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Ambrosini, 2015).
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Keywords: Media representation, Migration, Audience, European integration

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[*] The three authors planned the paper together but A. Cava wrote the paragraphs "Marginality represented: the Italian case", "Conclusive remarks"; M. Parito wrote "Introduction", "The crisis of the European Union and the challenge of migration", "Between insecurity and suspicion"; F. Pira wrote "Media deontology", "Social networks", Spectacularization, fear and emotion".

Introduction

The enormous increase in migratory flows towards Europe since the last months of 2013 has brought the issue of migration in the public debate through the *frame* of the crisis and emergency. But,the movement of people towards the areas of the world, such as the European countries, with high standards of wellbeing and safety, are certainly not a novelty; with economic problems, migration can be considered, "the other crisis" in Europe, and even its "most important chronic problem" (Giddens, 2014, p. 123). The economic-financial crisis had already caused fear, uncertainty and mistrust in European citizens, so the increase of migratory flows has activated reactions against the European Union and the public debate focused on some of the founding elements of integration process such as the Schengen treaty and the rights foreseen by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The management of migratory flows challenges the issues of multiculturalism (which is affected by the fear of Islamic–fundamentalist terrorism) and of social solidarity (which is affected by the weakening of the welfare system), both founding principles and values of European integration. The need to manage forced migration from a European viewpoint and not exclusively from a national one acknowledges the concept of reciprocal interdependence: the number of people who realize they live in a context of *de facto* integration is rising, nevertheless, a lack of culture in the concept of «solidarity among strangers» (Habermas, 1999) does not facilitate the pathway of common solutions.

Considering this scenario and using a normative approach, this paper proposes a reflection regarding the sensitive issue of migration and its central role in the European integration. The migration issue, indeed, involves values and principles at the core of European Union, in the way stated in The *Charter of the Fundamental Rights.* We argue that the media representation regarding the migration, focused on the opposite emotional rhetoric of pity and rejection, denies the recognition of rights and risk not allows the public to understand the complexity of the question, fuelling instead nationalistic populism. We argue that the representation of migratory flows which emerges through the media contributes to public debate and could negatively influence European and National policies on migration. The paper

hypothesis is explored using a constructivist sociological approach and data from surveys and previous researches. In the paragraphs 1 and 2 we will explore the link between migration issue and the crisis of EU; in the paragraphs 3 we will analyze the media representation of migration in Italy; in the last paragraphs we will focus on the responsibility of the newsmedia in the building of the migration issue, considering, in particular, the impact of the spectacularization and the tendency to use emotional frame.

1. The crisis of the European Union and the challenge of migration

The issue of migration intercepts a crucial and unresolved issue in the process of European integration: how should a collective identity be intended and constructed in order to be considered European. Dealing with migration obliges political and institutional actors to think about the issue of borders (inside/outside) and the relationship with the other (us/them), so it is not only a question of establishing how to manage the umpteenth "emergency" but of deciding which European Union one wants to build, what its finalities are, what its collocation in the era of globalization and the cosmopolitan society is (Parito, 2012). The migrations contribute to the erode the traditional borders among languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation States; challenging national identities and the autonomy of the political institutions contributes to the decline of sovereignty of the nation-state (Castels, 2009). The countries which place greater emphasis on a common culture at the base of the myth of nation building have the most difficulty in facing migration.

The *Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union* establishes a system of rights and principles and at the same time defines a symbolic nucleus of values which qualifies the identity of the Union and its position on the geopolitical global scenario. The Preamble states that «the Union is founded on the indivisible and universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity», in addition, «the enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations». In addition, the European Commission

intervened with a Communication on October 19, 2010 (COM/2010/573) which states that «the action of the Union on the subject of fundamental rights extends beyond internal politics» and that the Charter also applies to its «external action». It reformulates the way of interpreting migration, as Rodotá writes (2012, p. 28): «another place has truly been created, another space has been created, another idea of borders has emerged, spatial and temporal». The explicit reference to the "others", to the "human community" in its entirety and to the "external" relevance of its action expands the responsibility of the Union beyond its borders: «expanding horizons is coherent with a cosmopolitical projection of solidarity, from which the consistency and the concrete opportunity which it offers to universalism can be deduced. The issue of the migrants immediately regards how to show solidarity towards them, which can be seen more extensively within the perspective of the rights of persons having freedom of movement» (Rodotá, 2016, p. 91).

Nevertheless, since the end of 2013, the increase of migratory flows towards the Mediterranean shores of the Union has triggered a public debate and a managing of migrants which often goes in the opposite direction from that stated in the Charter of Nice. The focus on the rejection of the migrants has caused a fracture between the recognition of fundamental rights within the borders of the "Fortress Europe" and outside the same borders, revealing the contradictions between formulation and procedure, between the intended Union and the real Union. The containment barriers which some governments have raised on the borders of Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Austria in order to obstruct the mobility of the refugees along the Balkan route and the debate concerning the suspension of the Schengen Treaty have not only denied recognition of fundamental rights to not-European citizens, but have also opened a debate on the principle of freedom of movement among member States which is central to the project of a united Europe.

The nature of the migratory phenomenon toward the European countries has changed over time. It has taken on peculiar forms in relation to the characteristics of the people arrived and the motivations which have driven them to move; in addition, the ubiquity guaranteed by the media is an important element (Giddens, 2014). The flow of persons is a significant phenomenon of

globalization and of the modernity which links with the opportunity and expectations promoted by the simultaneous circulation of symbolic flows (Appadurai, 1996). The intertwining of culture, value systems, lifestyles becomes an experience which more and more people face daily.

For the purposes of this article, it is useful to underline that the definition and the classification of the migrations do not respond to objective criteria but are social constructions: «they are the result of the state policies, introduced in response to economic and political objectives and to the attitudes of the public» (Castels, 2009, p. 45). The interpretation of the migratory phenomenon reflects the system of the expectations and of the interests of the society of destination, which establishes who can be included in this category of persons and with which form of recognition, desirability, safeguards (from the seasonal worker to the illegal immigrant to the refugee).

In the social construction of migration, the media system has a significant role, contributing to forming the public representation of the "other" as well as the agenda of the issues and the problems perceived by the citizens and brought to the attention of public decision makers. The media system and the political players participate in the process of the social construction of the migrant giving origin to forms of labelling (extra-communitary, refugee, clandestine, etc.) which conditions the citizens' perception of migrants (Boomgaarden e Vliegenthart, 2009; Gemi,Ulasiuk and Triandafyllidou, 2013).

The concept of mobility also has a markedly constructive connotation: «to define a movement requires drawing a line and agreeing that it has been crossed. *Where* the line is geographically and administratively drawn is substantially a social and political construction» (Massey, 2002, p. 47). The right to cross that line is generally established by the States, with various forms of regulation which make the right to migrate one of the less equally distributed rights among the various areas of the world. (Wihtol de Wenden, 2015).

European integration has defined an innovative and at the same time contradictory scenario. The project united Europe has made the borders between its States fluid, to the point of allowing the annexation of Countries with different Histories and cultures and by encouraging mobility by the citizens of the member States. The

Schengen Treaty has created a single space in which to circulate, removing borders and barriers and actively stimulating the transnational circulation of its citizens. But border control has been moved to the outside and defended rigorously: «it could be defined as the paradox of Europe of the moving borders: while the borders between Europe and non-Europe are made *mobile*as in no other continent in the world, as an actual novelty on the world history scene, while at the same time in order to assure the borders, social integration is so to say, reontologized and transformed into a modality of exclusion» (Beck & Grande, 2004, p. 228).

The movement of persons towards the areas of the world with higher standards of wellbeing and safety make up one of the central dimensions of globalization and the modalities through which these flows are articulated are connected to geopolitical, demographic, environmental, economic, social and cultural changes. The circulation of the symbolic flows is also involved, and was aided, firstly by the electronic media (Appadurai, 1996), and then by digital and interactive technology. It influences the configuration of the migratory flows impacting the representation of the different parts of the world and of itself, of the system of expectations and opportunities. The profile of the people who have moved toward Europe in the last twenty-five years has therefore changed: first the immigrants looking for work , then their families and children for reunification, more recently, students and, above all, asylum seekers (Wihtol de Wenden, 2015).

From an economic perspective, the analysis of the causes of international migration and its impact on the wealthy nations hypothesizes an increase of flows caused by the divarication of income, nevertheless, the Unchr data seems to suggest a different scenario. In the last years, 15 conflicts have exploded or exploded again, 8 of these in Africa, causing millions of refugees who in part flee toward Europe. The Unchr (Global Report, 2016) reveals that in 2016 in the world there were 65.6 milion people forcibly displaced, the highest number since the UN started collecting this data; the number is even higher in 2017: 68,5 million (Global Report, 2017). The growth was concentrated between 2012 and 2015, driven mainly by the Syrian conflicts along with other conflicts in the region (Iraq, Yemen) as well as in sub-Saharan Africa (Unchr Report 2016). The

UN updated *World Populations Prospect*, which analyses the situation until 2017, reveals that the demographic asymmetries among countries will probably continue to generate international migrations but the movements of refugees are profoundly influencing the migration numbers faced by some Countries, in particular those involved by the Syrian crisis.

The Unchr estimates a strong increase of refugees towards Europe in 2015 and 2016; but if in 2016 Europe hosted 10,2 million of people, including 6,6 asylum seekers and refugee, the 2017 was a year of transition and relative stability (Global Report 2017).

Considering the arrivals by sea, the comparison in the years, shows the phenomenon (Unchr Operational Data Portal): in a timeframe starting in 2008, the lowest number of arrivals were in 2010 (9,654), the highest in 2011 (70,412). In 2014, were registered, 216,054 arrivals, quadruple the number of the previous year, which had turned the reflectors above all on the tragedy of 3,500 dead or missing during the sea crossing. In 2015 there were 1,015,078 arrivals, to which 3,771 missing or dead must be added. It is an unprecedented increase: which justifies extraordinary attention. The migration became an "emergency" issue, with politicians, institutional players and citizens split placing attention or on the humanitarian aspects or on the fear of the foreigner. Since 2016 there was a degrowth: the arrivals by the sea were 362,753 and in 2017 only 172,301, (but missing or dead were, 5,096 in 2016 and 3,139 in 2017), anyway the migration issue remains strong in the public debate.

Faced, first, with the impact of the exceptional flow of arrivals via sea, and, then, with citizen's concern fed by national-populist actors, the reaction of the European Union and of the member States has been slow, often insufficient, characterized by a combination of ambiguity and contradiction which derives from the way in which the process of communitarization of the migratory policies has come about. Until the end of the '90s of the past century, in fact, the European policies on immigration were based on the idea of the "European Fortress" and on the attempt to contain the flows (Zanfrini, 2007).

The managing of arrivals in the last years seems to be, more, an attempt by the governments to contain national public opinion, than,

a willingness to take effective action. It is useful to remark that the exceptional number of arrivals via sea does not mean a total increase of migrants towards Europe: the *World Population Prospect* of the United Nations estimates a migratory flow of less than half (4,123,000) for the period of 2010-2015 as opposed to that of the preceding five years (8,495,000). The European institutions and the States repropose the attitude which had already come up with respect to the economic-financial crisis: "decide not to decide" (Beck 2012a,2012b; Habermas 2012, 2014); or they address just some episodes or single aspects of the problem where it is possible to reach an easier agreement, without solving the whole problem.

The migratory policies repropose the issue of the relationship between the supranational structure and the resistance of the member states that try to keep their sovereignty, in particular regarding sensitive issues which involve public opinion. As Sayad noted (2002), national associations, or sometimes even nationalistic ones, which characterize the «State thought» and a social, economic, cultural and political way of looking at immigration lead us to see the immigrant as an intruder who disturbs the social order by confusing the separation between that which is national and that which is not and undermining the integrity, the purity and the mythical perfection of this order.

2. Between insecurity and suspicion

During periods of crisis, people who feel their lifestyles threatened can falling back on local and national identities and migrant become another source of tension. Eugen Weber noted: «the dissatisfaction and widespread fear can focus on the Others who are then accused of taking jobs from the people, the food from their mouths, jeopardizing the safety of the streets, wasting money paid in taxes. In this environment neighbours become enemies and the occasional episode of nationalism is transformed into xenophobia of us against them (…) The rights of man are only those which someone grants to someone else (…) Democracy often expresses the prejudice of the majority and not only its better sentiments and aspirations» (Weber, 2013, p. 3-4).

Especially during periods of malaise, the local communities address intolerance and annoyance on migrants and unit against the outside threat. The migrants are observed through the lens of "us" which defines "the other", often implicating an interpretation of the phenomenon as a problem (Dal Lago, 1999). In this situation, the risk of the ethnic-cultural fracture, beside the political-civil one , raise, with the spread of forms of national-populism (Martinelli, 2013).

In many countries immigration is among the main worries of its citizens. According to the Eurobarometer (Standard, n.84) survey carried out in September 2015 (the year with a huge rising in arrivals), it represents the main concern at national level involving a total of 47% of citizens surveyed, immediately following unemployment (49%). The comparison with the data from June 2013 shows the extent of the perception of the problem: in fact there was an increase of 33%. In two years, the issue of unemployment, of "social inequality", "of the public debt", of "the entrance into the workforce for young people", of "insufficient development" underwent a decrease in interest, whilst there was a significant increase only in "immigration" and "terrorism" with an increase of 15%, it was a fundamental issue for 26% of the sample. In 2016, immigration fell to 36% among the concerns of the citizens of the 28 countries of the Union, however it remained the second most deeply felt problem together with "social inequality (36%) and followed "unemployment" (45%). In the 2017 (Eurobarometer Standard, n.88), immigration is again considered the most important issues facing the Eu (39%), before terrorism (38%) and economic situation (17%).

According to Bauman (2015), in a fluid society, flagellated by the fear of failure and of losing one's place in society, the migrants represent «collateral victims» of the forces of globalization, once they are turned into nomads without a home, the truth behind the fragility of our comfort and the security of our place in the world is revealed: the principle unforgiveable sin of the migrants is to be«walking dystopias».

The perception of national public opinion regarding the extent and impact of migration makes up an inescapable restriction which governments and political players must take into account in order to define policies of intervention. National politicians and institutional

players negoziate between themselves and with the European institutions with a constant eye to the need for electoral consensus, but there is the risk that, fears and uncertainty on the part of the citizens feed the growth of national-populist movements and parties. There is the risk that migratory policies and interventions end up being divergent with respect to the system of principles and rights defined by the Charter of fundamental right of the European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon.

The climate of fear and uncertainty erodes the credibility of the refugees. If it was once easy to be supportive of dissidents of the oppressive regimes of the recent past, the same support is not set aside for those who flee the war in Syria: «those who seek protection are suspect, guilty, until proven otherwise, of trying to enter the global North by way of the service entrance of humanitarian protection. Even when the reasons for openness prevail, heroic political opposers to oppressive regimes are not being welcomed, but rather seen as traumatized victims. Victimization erodes the rights of the persons welcomed (…) The treatment of refugees by a society that aspires to a certain standard of democracy oscillates between repression and compassion » (Ambrosini, 2015).

3. Marginality represented: the Italian case

The research carried out in Italy leaves no doubt as to the portrait of immigration presented (Belluati, Grossi, Vigllongo, 1995; Faso, 2008; Ghirelli, 2005, Brighetti, 2006; Maneri, 2012; Calvanese, 2011). The look in the eyes of the immigrants is almost totally blank, crushed by the focus on concepts of legality, deviance, safety, criminality, clandestinity.

[…] terms like emergency, invasion, disembarkation, criminality, desperation, and terrorism are constantly found in reference to immigration. The vocabulary used refers to military and "law enforcement" language (blitz, fight, intervention, evacuation, search) as well as to a "water" image of migration (flow, wave). These also vary according to the issues discussed: if, when we speak of arrivals and disembarkation the term clandestine is reiterated, on the "internal front" many recall deviance and social marginality (drugs, prostitution, safety, overcrowding, ghetto, degradation) (Solano, 2014, p. 112).

Apocalyptic tones from which unjustified anxiety and a political and social climate that translates into intolerance for the foreigner. In his research, Maneri (2001), for example, fully examines the media activation which takes on the character of moral panic, in other words, emotional waves in which an episode or a group of persons – the immigrants in this case – are defined as a threat to the values of a society. The so-called tragedies of the Mediterranean and the arrivals on the Italian coasts have catalysed the attention of the media, of public opinion thus feeding a distorted image of the new arrivals.

Solano's monitoring (2014) of the news stories regarding immigration published on the Ansa website – the principle Italian news agency – in 2010, show how the most recurring issue is "arrivals and disembarkation" (20.8% of the total), followed by "immigrant crimes" (18.2%).

The issues which could be acknowledged negatively by public opinion ("arrivals and disembarkations", "immigrant revolts", "immigrant crime active subjects" and "expulsion and clandestinity"), which implicitly suggest a vision of immigration as dangerous and problematic are equal to 51.7% of the total number of news stories, without counting the declarations and the stories that report political issues which often give an alarmist vision of the phenomenon. Regarding what happens to the foreigners when they are already within national borders, the dimension of the emergency is diminished in terms of its problematicity (criminality, social marginality, degradation).

The problematicity of the interaction between media and immigration emerged in Italy with all its force in the Spring of 1997: for the first time the "Albanian emergency" resounded from medium to medium as an echo feeding itself. TV News and the Press start to describe an "invasion" which jeopardized the public order; emotional reactions to the crimes and problems connected to the Albanian presence were stoked (Carzo & Centorrino, 2009). The violence and misery represented induced anguish, fear and dread of seeing one's world turned upside down. And then *pietas* vanished leaving indifference and refusal of immigrants in its place (Cava, 2011).

Since that distant 1997 not much has changed. Gariglio, Pogliano & Zanini (2010) reconstruct thirty years of history of our collective

imagination through the analysis of the photojournalism of immigration. A discouraging scene emerges: in the 80's the story of poor workers was told with compassion; in the 90's we moved on to spectacular mass arrivals described with tones of desperation and threat; the new millennium should then have started to narrate of the pathways to integration, but the normality of immigration doesn't make headlines and we continue to prefer extreme icons which label the immigrant as victim or delinquent, and the stereotyping continues to feed on the same image repertoires. On the contrary, the increase in the number of people of different religions and of minors of foreign origin in the schools seems to have magnified fear, danger and increased the number of problems to be solved. To these same results add the national research on immigration and asylum in the Italian media directed by Morcellini (2009): the image of immigration provided by the means of information appears to be frozen and motionless, anchored to the same narrative styles. Desperation and the absolute misery seem to be therefore the icons of immigration (Binotto & Martino, 2004) and this type of visual rhetoric made up of men and women who are always on the edges, whose human rights seem to be constantly denied, risks producing cognitive shortcuts which damage the migrants' lives (Pogliano & Solaroli, 2012).

It is known that media coverage has the ability to create fascination, expectations and beliefs regarding the issues concentrated on.

With respect to immigration, inadequate language and content define a rather controversial scenario in Italy. After all, the media do not push to assign value judgements on certain topics, but provide the *agenda* of the issues which will be evaluated according to the content (Shaw, 1997).

In 2012 The National Institute of Statistics in a report on migrants in Italians' everyday lives, revealed how 60% of those interviewed think that the attitude of the Italians towards immigrants is suspicious, when not openly hostile (7%), or indifferent (16%). Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of those interviewed considers it effectively difficult for immigrants to find their place in society (80.8%) if not impossible (2.4%) while only 16.8 % easy. The tendency to be suspicious and disinclined is not unilateral though,

since the attitude of the immigrants towards the Italians is prevalently described as suspicious (53.2%), indifferent (20.9%) or openly hostile (9.6%).

Many are the Italians who associate the presence of the immigrants in Italy to a worsening of some aspects of the quality of life, such as the degradation of their neighbourhoods(79%), an increase in criminal activity (72.3%) and the problems with public order and violence (48.4%). 62% of those interviewed consider the immigrants who live in Italy today to be too many, over 40% believe that they distract the attention of the politicians from the problems of the Italians and evaluate negatively the impact that the constant arrival of new immigrants has on the demographic balance of our country. As regards the religious aspects about 40% state to agree strongly (17.8%) or sufficiently (22.9%) in thinking that cohabitation of different religions is a danger for our country. About the same percentage (41.1%) declare to be against the opening of a mosque near their home. The consequences that worry Italians the most who express an opinion against, regard above all the problems of safety and public order that would arise (28.3%): in addition, this opinion reflects a sort of revenge towards the "Muslims who are intolerant and would not allow the construction of a Catholic church in their Countries" (26.6%). In third and fourth place are, the possible increase of immigrants in the area (18.3%) following the opening of the mosque, and more generally, the loss of the identity of our country which is Catholic so that «the immigrants have to conform to our religion»(16.3%), followed by a general intolerance for different cultures, expressed by the statement, «their religion and culture are different from ours» (7.8%). Finally, the opinion of the interviewees with regard to the use of clothing that covers the face for religious reasons worn by Muslim women: the vast majority of responders thinks that they should not be allowed to use it in Italy (80.7%). A significant 19.2% however thinks that the use of the hijab should be allowed in Italy as well.

These numbers shows how only too often, when we speak about immigration we lose sight of the story and the actual dynamics of such a structural phenomenon for the economy and for European political construction, rather preferring a reconstruction with a strong emotional impact.

The reason why interviewed people responded that way is probably related to data about actual and perceived number of immigrants.

Italy is one of the countries with the lowest number of immigrants among those considered by Oecd but the number of immigrants alleged by the people is much higher (Charter 1).

Charter 1

Actual and perceived number of immigrants

Estimated and actual share of immigrants in total population

■ Perceived   ■ Actual

Note: Data for 2011. Respondents were asked to estimate, on a scale of 0 to 100, the percentage of the population in their country that was born abroad.

Source: OECD 2011

We have an actual immigration and an immigration we create into the imagery. Italians don't know the number of immigrants and they are sure that they are way more than they actually are (Ambrosini, 2015b). The numbers doesn't really matter, the perception is really important.

In this way immigration is no longer a geo-political number to reflect upon but only a problem to be contrasted therefore betting on the fear of invasion and degradation (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012).

This aspect is decisive today more than ever in light of the close symbolic association between immigration and insecurity and the media attention focused on Islamic fundamentalism. In the last few year a collective fear of Islam has grown and settled. Sociologists Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed (2016) define under the expression "islamophobie" actions and emotions of prejudice against Muslims or suspected ones. The vision of Islam through international events shown by the medias clouds the image of real Islam. Muslims representation shown by the media creates and promotes stereotypes about this complex cultural universe. The concern generated by public strenghtening of Islam is developed overtime into a compact feeling made of mistrust, rejection and fear (Massari, 2006; Bruno, 2008).

These discursive practices end up influencing how the public approaches suffering, another aspect, which as we have seen, is connoted with the identikit of the "media immigrant" portrayed in a pitiful way. A desperation made up of violation of human rights, of extreme poverty. The marginalization of these outcasts finds in the refugee, identification or expulsion centres, the preferred Italian media space.

This emotional construction defines the interaction between migrant and host society. A wonderful essay by Musaro (2014) investigating the shipwreck on the night between the 2nd and 3rd October, 2013 off the coast of Lampedusa in which more than 360 people lost their lives, questions the very cognitive and emotional levers which induced public opinion, the media, and the institutions such as the EU or the Italian government at that time, to invoke respect for human rights while cracking down on legislature concerning immigration to the point of criminalizing the "irregulars"(De Swert, Schacht &Masini, 2015). A short circuit therefore between compassion and a compulsion for safety (Bruno, 2015). Concerning this very issue Cuttitta underlines the prevalent stories which oscillate between safety rhetoric and humanitarian rhetoric describing how an island – Lampedusa –can be transformed into a border and this border a proscenium. In this case two processes interface: the borderization and the spectacularization. In reality, the island of Lampedusa has for some time appeared as the incarnation of the idea of border in the mind of both Italians and Europeans.

[…] if we only try to list the main issues which in the last few decades have enlivened the debate concerning the control of immigration and of the borders (on an academic as well as a political front), it would appear evident that Lampedusa is a more than privileged observatory of the phenomenon in question. Whether it is to evaluate the real volume of irregular immigration via sea or the number of people who lost their lives in an attempt tocross the European borders; whether to study the changing clandestine voyage routes or the developments of the collaboration between the countries of destination, countries of origin, and countries of transit in controlling migratory movements; whether to verify the conformity of control policies with the obligations on the subject of human rights or to put a spotlight on the subjectivity of migrants; whether to analyse the paperwork concerning asylum and humanitarian protection or the nature and functioning of detention centres; whether we face the issue of the criminalization of clandestine immigration or that of the *multi-level governance*of migration:whatever the perspective adopted, Lampedusa is an ideal field of research to observe the meeting (and the dynamics which arise from it) between those two specular phenomenon which are migration, on the one hand and the control of the territorial borders on the other (Cuttitta, 212, p. 187).

In the last few years the "emergency frame" has moved from common criminality to the spectacularization of the control policies at the borders(Boltanski, 2000; Hőijer, 2004) and the dramatization of Islamic terrorism (La Rocca & Torvisco, 2017; Marzo & Tramontana 2017).

An example? The medias favorite topic about immigration concerns the illegal landings on our shores: easily shown during the summer or during shipwrecks, it's often introduced alongside issues such as security, criminality and presence of illegal immigrants. That brings us to imagine the sea as the way in of irregular migrants […] Yet, according to the Ministry of the Interior, one out of eight illegal immigrants (12 percent) come through the sea, most immigrants reaches Italy by plane on tourist visas. Therefore when we think about illegal migration we should bear in our mind the image of Rome's or Milan's Airports , not Lampedusa's port (Musarò & Parmiggiani, 2014, p. 12).

The exceptional nature which until now has characterized the stories of the lives of the immigrants has become the daily routine of the description, causing what could be defined as the aesthetics of pity (Chouliaraki, 2006; 2012). And the aesthetics of pity cannot but produce a sentimental public used to this "hypervisibility of pain". Dal Lago (2012) invites us to contextualize the behaviour of

those who witness the spectacle of pain. Tracing a path which brings order to the modulations endured by the sight of atrocities over the course of History, and comes to define the indifference of today's public towards cruelty.

4. Media deontology

Following what has been described until now the terminology which is reiterated with insistent frequency when defining the frame of immigration is still: emergency, humanitarian crisis, criminality, terrorism. All these elements are pieces included in the identification of the frame which has prevailed in the perception of the European public, fear. The 2017 Report on Social Security and Insecurity in Italy and in Europe highlights: «The European insecurity agenda confirms what emerged in 2016: an alignment of the narrative on global challenges, especially on the issues of immigration and terrorism . In 2017, the first item of the insecurity agenda in Germany, with 54%, is immigration; as well as in France where terrorism occupies, with 19%, the top position in the ranking. [...] Even in the countries of the Mediterranean area - Italy and Spain - the themes of global insecurity are at the top of the ranking. So, the 2017 detection confirms a convergence of the European media storytelling on the same areas of global insecurity» (Demos&PI, Osservatorio di Pavia, Fondazione Unipolis, 2017). In this context, the recovery of the central role of the information system, of its mediation and interpretation of the fact has become an urgent necessity.

The advent of the Web and the radical transformation of the communication flows from linear to reticular is what has caused a crisis in the institutional information system, which constantly tries to pursue the audience, to construct a more *marketing oriented* news rather than a *factual oriented* one. In this way the crisis of values which has involved society as a whole, seems to have contributed to enormously fragilizing that collective European identity which reference is made in the first part of this paper. This is what has generated the strongly individualistic and self-representative connotation of society. The collective instances are transformed into individual and pseudo corporative, referring to Bauman's vision of one's own "safe garden" (Bauman, 2015, p. 86).

The imperative - not to be excluded - causes that the critical consciousness is often threatened by the prevailing of the need to be accepted and live in a condition of apparent security. This is why the deontological issue must have a central role in the storytelling of immigration and terrorism.

In the Italian media system – as we have seen – the narration oscillates between the accountability of disembarkations and a portrait of a society facing from years of an economic crisis which shows no sign of abating. The thousands of migrants are represented as potential rivals to benefit of the few resources and services of a weakened social assistance system.

Now the primary task of the information system is that of revealing fact reality and not of making real that what is plausible, because it is exactly from how reality is interpreted that depends the ability of each person to understand events. Lippman (1922) underlined how knowledge is the result of individual research and of the will to acquire information.

> Knowledge doesn't come from the conscience, but from the environment the conscience deals with. When men act based on the principles of research and investigation, they go to look for facts and to gain wisdom. When they neglect this, they withdraw into themselves and find only what they have inside. So they elaborate their prejudices instead of expanding their knowledge (Lippmann, 1922, tr.it. 1999, p. 395).

When this principle fails, the risk of manipulation becomes more evident. As Gili (2001) states: the media influences the individuals, their way of interpreting reality and forming an opinion.

> The complexity of the influence of the media is in the fact that they always present – often in an inextricable way – the two dimensions of informative and legal credibility: on the one hand they inform us about the world, on the other they always propose a "vision of the world", of the ways to present and considering events, people, problems (Gili, 2001, p. 77-78).

The possibilities to manipulate information have become more subtle and difficult to be pinpointed, because they are often based on images rather than on words. We are convinced that the lens does not lie, so we tend to attribute a truthfulness to the image which sometimes does not have; as the technology which allows us to

access to thousand information is the same that we can use to manipulate images, to construct a narration based on a realistic imaginary.

Migration presents multiple critical aspects: a high level of complexity of narration, the same news if not accurate and in-depth can cause an altered or partial vision of the worlds. It is fundamental to define the geopolitical, cultural, social context and also to employ an appropriate and correct terminology in the description of individuals and situations of evident drama.

The Italian press system is regulated by a professional Association authorizing the professional practice. Over the past twenty years it has adopted different self-regulation instruments in order to provide a set of ethical rules to guide the news making process. One of the last codes endorsed in order of time is the Charter of Rome, approved in 2007 which invites Italian journalists to:

pay close attention in treating information concerning asylum seekers, refugees, victims of human trafficking and migrants on the territory of the Italian Republic or elsewhere and in particular: a) to adopt the appropriate legal terms in order to give the reader and the user strict adherence to the reality of the facts, avoiding the use of improper language; b) to avoid the spread of imprecise information […]; c) to safeguard those seeking asylum, the refugees, the victims of human trafficking and the migrants who choose to speak with the journalists, adopting the necessary precautions regarding their identity and images in order not to allow their identification and expose them or their families to reprisals […]; d)to consult experts and specialists whenever possible in order to provide the public with the information in a clear and complete context which also takes into account the causes of the phenomenon (Charter of Rome, 2007).

The drafting of the deontological code represents, in the intention of its promoters, the necessary instrument of intervention in order to respond to the evolution of the social and cultural framework, to provide professionals with rules that allow them to correctly manage the organizational process, news making, which is at the base of the production of information and avoid involuntary distortions or manipulations. The news relevance take in account of some elements such as: its negativity, drama; the dimension and number of people involved; all these contributes to the news making and its spreading across the media. This process reinforce the spectacularization of the events leading a growing personalization of

the political and social processes and an evident fragmentation of the reality represented.

In the information production process the world must be modified to be adapted to the logic of the media and at the same time to answer to the public's expectations. By consequence the events are decontextualized, isolated from their meanings and causes in order to be arbitrarily recontextualized in a new *frame*– the media format – on the base of association and relations that are totally external to the events (Altheide, 1976, p. 24-28). This particular structure of information does not allow individuals to understand the development of the events, the previous, the context, the possible scenarios, and also prevent from understanding their logic and direction (Gili, 2001, p.191).

The immigration issue perfectly accords with Gili's claim, to the point that the same Charter of Rome systematically verifies the level of application of the rules it contains and, in the fifth Report published in October of 2017 (Osservatorio di Pavia), outlines point by point how the migratory issue is represented through TV and the press.

The first element which emerges from the 2017 report regards the increase of alarmist news: «In creating titles and in the political-editorial choices on migration issues , in the way of selecting and hierarchizing, even more than in the way of making up and offer the news. [...] they are often served to the reader as exotic "dishes". Non EU-news on non EU people. With the result of consolidating the idea that immigration, and immigrants, are not a structural fact, that must be governed, but a permanent emergency that must be stopped. In this way the common sense of prejudices is strengthened and the soil on which the bad plant of xenophobic prejudice and hate speech germinates». The migration issue occupies the agenda of the Italian press throughout the 2017; the analysis carried out on the first pages of 6 Italian newspapers (Corriere della Sera, Il Giornale, l'Avvenire, l'Unità, la Repubblica, la Stampa) and local and national press titles from January to October highlight some elements.

- The migratory phenomenon confirms its centrality on the front pages of newspapers, even if we register a slight decrease compared to the same period of 2016.

- Top news in 2017. The management of migratory flows (44%) and the crime and security (16%). Both these macro areas double in percentage compared to the previous year.
- In 2017 there is again a significant increase in the use of alarmist tones: almost 20 points more than the previous year, from 27% in 2016 to 43% this year. 4 titles / news on 10 have an anxiogeneous potential. The remaining 57% is divided between the reassuring component, 5%, and neutral, 52%. It is interesting to note is the erosion of reassuring titles that they are reduced of 50%, from 10% in 2016 to 5% in 2017.
- The words of immigration: the protagonists of 2017. Migrant and refugee, without surprise, stand out among the terms most present in the titles, respectively used 2.455 (17%) and 1,322 times (9%). With a little surprise, the fourth word most used by the Italian press in its titles was Ong (623 times, 4%) (OdP, 2017).

Migrations and migrants have had an high relevance in the prime time editions of the TV news programs of the 7 Italian generalist networks (TG1, TG2, TG3, TG4, TG5, Studio Aperto and TgLa7).

In 2017, the news regarding the phenomenon of migration in TV news have increased: 3,713 news in 10 months, (+ 26%) compared to 2016.

2017 confirms the hypothesis of the existence of a correlation between the narrative frame of the phenomenon and migrants' perception of citizens. The peaks of insecurity recorded between 2007 and 2008 (because of the combination of immigration and crime), seem to return: from January up to November of this year there is an increase in the fear sentiment of Italians towards migrants and refugees (43%, ten points more than in 2015), related to the increase of news on crimes and the migration flows from Africa coasts.

The attention on the issue of migratory flows increases: almost 1 news of 2 concerns the management of arrivals in the central area of the Mediterranean sea. Also the dimensions of crime and security grows: almost ten points more than in 2015. In contrast there is a significant reduction, of a third, compared to 2016, of news on migrants reception.

One aspect continues to emerge from the report with compelling force, relative to the subjectivization of the migrant. Despite the issue's constant presence in the daily newspapers and major news programs, the migrants remain in the background, they are almost never the subject but the object of the story. They only have a voice in 7% of the stories.

2 times more than in 2016. But still invisibles, if we consider that, on the whole of all journalistic reports, including those not related to the migratory phenomenon, they are interviewed only the 0.5%.

The impact on the public shows us a strong weakening of the ability to inform and provide instruments to interpret reality. The fears of the individuals continue to grow, to the point that the X Report on Safety in Italy and in Europe (2017) shows that in third place in the rank of citizens' uncertainties is «the affirmation of alarmism with respect to immigration, to globalization and to the threat to identity (17%)». This of course reverberates on social media which become the sounding boards of fear and emotion rather than of reflexion and proposals. Especially Facebook and Twitter, as shown by the Report on the Charter of Rome, appear more permeable to intolerance. The language used, the violent expressions, incite racism, xenophobia and hate. Here, the threat to one's own identity and the fear for the loss of security more frequently transforms into clashes, threats. A trend within the wider context of a general increase of violent contents which show how, from being places of potential aggregation, social networks risk becoming spaces for the proliferation of violent conclusions and false information able to overcome the truth of the facts.

5. Social networks

In the preceding paragraphs has been explained the primary role of the collective imagination in daily life. The collective imagination spread by the media represents a critical element so that Internet becomes a resource for the comprehension of the migratory phenomenon. The connections have transformed individuals from simple users of the content into generators of content, even though for the most part this doesn't take place through an act of original

creation, but through the act of making a comment and sharing which certainly add to and transform the content, but do not change the sense of the message. This happens in virtue of that dimension of a protected environment, the "safe garden", previously referred to, in which each person creates ties with the direct connected public (friends, followers etc.) and with the indirect public (friends of friends etc.) who contribute to defining the social identity of each person through the instrument of the virtual like. In this case the relational dimension of dialogue and debate fails, whereas an important role is given to a performative dimension in which each person constructs a representation, a product that must find a public. Parisier (2011) introduces the concept of *the vicious circle of the ego* with reference to Zuckerberg, who argued that with the advent of social networks individuals do not longer need to have a different image for their work friends or co-workers and for the other people they know, affirming that having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity. But as we are observing, the algorithms analyze the information we publish and the result is that: «Our identity conditions the media, and the media conditions our convictions and interests. We click on a link, thus means that we are interested in the topic, and so it's highly probable that in future we will read articles related to this subject, and this in turn will affects us. We remain trapped in this vicious circle of the ego and, if our identity has been misrepresented, strange phenomena begin to occur, like the reverberation of an amplifier» (Parisier, 2011, p. 102).

In this context, individuals are induced to show all of themselves in a process of mediatic exhibition (Cava & Pira, 2015) of their lives. So the individual identity is increasingly shaped on the one hand by the self representation we want to offer to our audience, on the other from the conditioning that social media algorithms can generate.

In this sense the consumer aspect prevails as Bauman recalls, causing a sort of "technological fetishism" according to which technology relieves us of the responsibility of making a choice and offers a scapegoat from moral impulses «silencing their moral conscience making them insensitive to the complete effect of the moral challenge, and overall, disarming them on a moral level when they find themselves making choices which require a certain dose of negation and self-sacrifice» (Bauman, 2006, p. 112-114).

This kind of moral disarming is what pushes people to unite around their fears rather than make choices that require sacrifices, as a result of the mechanisms of dissemination of contents that takes place as claimed by Jenkins, Ford & Green (2013) by activating a minority, a *peripheral participation*, against a majority of *voyeurs*, giving rise to a process of false participation.

This explains how the perception of uncertainty and fear when faced with immigration are constantly increasing, despite the reduction in crime and the fact that there is no direct correspondence between violent crime and migration.

Individuals have in some way lost the ability to elaborate reality substituting it with the social representation of the same.

We are witnessing a very specific phenomenon generated by the combination of the effect of the sounding board that the news, even partially, has through media and social media even if not supported by the facts, which emerge from the knot of the web that proliferate generating real cascades of information (Pira, 2017, p. 320).

6. Spectacularization, fear and emotion

Fighting fear requires management skills, managing information, having the cultural knowledge that allows us to understand. The Charter of Rome Report shows us how partial information prevails, in this way the representation of migration remains something else that strikes our collective imagination, evokes *pietas,* fear, dread, but doesn't raise questions, doesn't help us to overcome the barrier of the collective imagination on the immigrant and make him a real person. Above all it doesn't show us the interdependence that ties us to them, it doesn't explain that the increase in the economic gap between north and south of the world is the triggering factor of the migratory flows, that the economic exploitation which benefits our western society is the cause, that the same technology which has opened the door to almost infinite possibilities is the same one which reveals the gap and motivates the excluded to try to become the included. And yet, the spectacularization of the hundreds of thousands of people setting off, who face the sea on unlikely vessels causes the dread of "an invasion" which will change the landscape of our cities, which will

undermine our safety with the risk of terrorist attacks and fundamentalist Islam. Uncertainty is characterized by fear, fuelled by ignorance and by prevailing against rather than in favour of. The phenomenology of the migrant as a media representation, it is what, in Castells vision, determines the excessive anxiety in the climate which compromises learning abilities, «the situations which reawaken the fear are those which recall a more widespread public (Graber, 2007, p. 267). It is a case of reactions and events which threaten the survival, and these reactions mobilize cognitive resources which activate attention. […] The news, (and in particular the images) can be sources of stimulation equivalent to what was experienced» (Castells, 2009, p. 193). Therefore images with high rates of dramaticity and decontextualization, arouse emotions in the public and influence their decisions.

[...]today the sources of insecurity have moved "out" from our daily life, from our ability to control them. They moved elsewhere. "Outside" from our borders, also because the borders are no longer able to delimit our lives. And when tragic events that generate fear and anxiety occur within our borders, it is a matter of facts that they escape to our understanding (*Rapporto sulla sicurezza e insicurezza in Italia e in Europa*, 2017, p.9).

The emotional component tends to prevail in the elaboration of the information. This brings us back to the data of the Report. The exponential increase of news coverage dominated by the frame of fear, which represents a distortion of the presence of alternative frames that could lead to better understand an issue (Van Gorp B., 2009), seems to have permeated Italian society on the whole, debated between the urgency of hospitality and the need for security.

This attitude is amplified on social networks. The studies based on *echo chambers theory* demonstrate «users' tendency to promote their favoured narratives and hence to form polarized groups. Confirmation bias helps to account for users' decisions about whether to spread content, thus creating informational cascades within identifiable communities. At the same time, aggregation of favoured information within those communities reinforces selective exposure and group polarization» (Quattrociocchi, Scala &Sunstein, 2016, p.1).

In particular Facebook users show three tendencies:

1. To acquire information which are coherent with their belief system (*confirmation bias*)
2. to find people with similar attitudes (*echo chambers*)
3. to strengthen each other own opinion radicalizing them (polarization) (Quattrociocchi &Vicini, 2016, p. 132)

In spite of the pervasive presence of *misinformation* and *fake news* the connected social networks may represent an opportunity for the autonomous construction of meaning where the ability to exercise one's own objective responsibility which helps us to accept interdependence with the others and re-establish a sense of trust and openness can be restored.

We are in the midst of a period of profound and prolonged media change, which is impacting the ways messages are generated and circulated. The communications and marketing industries are now facing pressure to rewrite the rules around branding and strategic communication (Jenkins, 2015).

Jenkins identifies some key concepts on the basis of which it is possible to realize a new model of shared and participatory culture. Concepts that struggle to establish themselves at present because of the deviations that the media and social system generated by social networks.

The possibility of giving life to a *participatory culture* as the capacity of individuals and basic communities, including the ability to produce media and to promote or modify the messages(produced by the media, by advertising agencies, by corporate communicators), able to contrast the proliferation of *misinformation* and the instrumental use of information. The establishment of the principle of *transmedia branding* and the dissemination of key information and experiences across multiple media platforms with the aim of intensifying the relationship with the client, in response to *pervasive consumerism.*

Conclusive remarks

We have described the media representation of immigration by reconstructing the dynamics of the Italian storytelling. A *mediascape* made up of sufferance, desperation, poverty and fear derive from this. Such an emotional narrative construction favours the distancing from the Other-Foreigner, fuels safety concerns or provokes compassion which is included in what we have referred to as "the aesthetics of pity".

If the mainstream media nurture the collective imagination of a sentimental audience used to this "hypervisibility of pain", the social network space intensifies this criticality because we are before a reticular audience.

In these pages, we portrayed a static photography of Italian society on the issues of immigration. Until now we have described the immigrant as objects of storytelling crushed in crime, emergency and security. But we believe that there could be a different communicative framework for the representation of immigrant beyond this "pity paradigm": how can the immigrants speak?

As a conclusions, we propose a powerful operation of narrative decentralisation: let us turn our attention from the public who witnesses this particular construction of the Other-Immigrant to the immigrants as the media public.

Let's try to reflect on that normality of immigration which seems not to interest the discursive practices on immigration at all.

Let's change the perspective and think instead about the role that the culture industry can play in defining itineraries of integration. The cultural consumption can define the contexts in which a mixed and integrated culture is generated: conferences, exhibitions and museums, readings, web sites, the places in the city set aside for social gatherings (Giusti, 2015). It is a question of representing universal stories. The web from which the criticity of the preceding paragraph emerged, for example, could have a very strong role in the transmission of the identity handed down, the web pages represent a cultural offering which has an eye to the past and an eye to the future. We believe it is essential to rehabilitate the experience and cultural heritage of those who are the protagonists of migratory pathways. Internet could be one of the most immediate

chances of socialization, an instrument capable of generating knowledge to be shared with others.

In the restructuring of one's own social relationships and above all in the redefinition of one's identity in a different cultural framework, the media consumption space – both mainstream and digital media - is one of the central locations in building new biographic pathways for immigrants. In this sense the collective imagination driven by the media –polyvalent container of symbols, images and meanings – is oriented within a social reality made up of shared representations. It is well-know that the collective imagination plays a priority role in daily and collective life, in fact, it works as a fundamental element which takes part in the social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1997). For this reason we feel it is relevant to take into consideration the invisibility of the immigrant as cultural consumers when planning real integration pathways.

Such an approach would abandon the rhetoric of terror and the aesthetic of pity which we have discussed in this paper.

From the moment one actually begins to experience the move and have contact with another cultural reality, the test to be passed is seizing the meaning of that urban life, compare, mix, hybridize it with the cultural traits of the land of origin. Therefore cultural consumption is fundamental in the existential project of the migrant, it constitutes a necessary dimension in the construction of Self. It is part of a process of customization of a personal lifestyle. The choice of what to consume is, in fact, functional in order to realize the construction of Self on a daily basis.

Media consumption is correlated to relational practices. The media can keep the contact within the "migrant tribe" alive while its members interact with the society chosen as their destination.

Italy does not seem to have as yet responded to this "communicative urgency".

As a media consumer, the immigrant must be examined as a consumer of a cultural product that translates into a certain outlook on the world in their daily interactions made of media images. In fact, we are talking about social individuals and consumers who select and synthesize models of original, material and immaterial culture through the daily practices assimilated in the host country (Simeon & Stazio, 2007).

In this perspective, the media manage to help the *audience* gain power by representing and promoting new models of identity. Here we are expanding the limits of the connection between citizenship and immigration as traditionally viewed; in fact, we are not referring to the mere inadequacies of the category of citizenship exhausting the relationship between individuals, institutions and rights (Marchetti, 2009). Rather, we are referring to the type of citizenship expressed through the use of "mediatic grammar" able to make the immigrants become protagonists of the public arena where information almost becomes a fundamental human right in the expression of the concept of citizenship. For example, why not put an end to the ethnicitization of the news?

Let's consider the social citizenship and then the legal one: the formal dimension of citizenship cannot overlook the participation and the identification that can be gained through the media.

The media should be an irreplaceable resource in the processes which create forms of cohesion within an evermore multicultural and multi-ethnic society.

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Illegal Emigration from the Eastern Algarve to Morocco during the *Estado Novo*[*]

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Abstract

This text analyses illegal emigration originating in the Algarve, during the *Estado Novo* (New State), in order to clarify: what relationship existed between this illegal migratory flow and other contemporary emigratory systems? Who were the illegal emigrants activating this system? What circumstances and motives explained these emigrants' option? Analysis was made of data obtained in a documental *corpus* of 43 court cases dealt with at the courts of east south Portugal, for facts related to illegal emigration, in which 178 people were accused.

In *Estado Novo*, there was increased control of illegal emigration by the border police of the corporatist regime, but the illegal emigrants filled the shortage of labour principally in Morocco and integrated the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan migratory system, which persisted alongside the transatlantic system. The restrictions introduced by the new Kingdom of Morocco and the emergence of the European migratory system contributed to transforming the «Moroccan» in the «Frenchman».

Keywords: illegal emigration, migratory system, Estado Novo/New State, Algarve.

Introduction

The constant presence of emigration in Portuguese culture, the variations of migratory flows and their characteristics in time and space have formed a vast bibliography in the last forty years[1], but the subject continues to arouse the interest of researchers who seek new perspectives of approach and diversification of the sources these imply.

The most recent investigations have aimed for global understanding of the phenomenon through articulating the various levels of analysis, from the global to the local, of structures and policies with the behaviour of individuals and their motivations. The subject of research was extended to illegal emigration, meaning increased attention to judicial and oral sources, which to a great extent remain to be analysed. In this connection, this text focuses on illegal emigration originating in Central and Eastern Algarve during the *Estado Novo*[2] (New State), aiming to clarify the following questions: what was the relationship between this illegal emigratory flow and other contemporary emigratory systems? Who were the illegal emigrants feeding this system? What circumstances and motives justified these emigrants' option? What are the dynamics repressing this phenomenon over the considered period? Seeking answers to these questions meant elaborating a documental corpus formed of forty-three court cases in relation to illegal emigration, whichwere dealt with in the courts of Faro, Olhão, Tavira and Vila Real de Santo António, from the 1930s to the 1970s. In these processes, data on criminal proceedings and *corpus delicti* were the focus of attention, leaving for another opportunity other aspects of the phenomenon that can be analysed from data contained in the remaining components of these cases.A database was formed, with the variables being analysed using theIBM-SPSSStatisticsprogram.

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[1] For a perspective of studies about Portuguese emigration until the mid-1980s, see Rocha-Trindade(1984). For new approaches, consult Campos & Rocha-Trindade(2005).

[2] New State: the authoritarian, conservative and corporatist regime formally instated with the 1933 constitution, which ended on April 25, 1974.

1. The judicial sources

The one hundred and seventy-eight persons accused in the forty-three cases that constituted the documentary corpus analysed in this study do not represent the universe of those accused of illegal emigration, and other crimes related to this phenomenon. This is because not all the cases were preserved in judicial archives of the counties in question. Despite this limitation, the existing processes constitute a significant sample due also to the multiplicity of the voices presented in them and to the plurality of data they contain.

Since the implementation of Decree No. 5624 of May 10, 1919, penalties for correctional detention and fines were provided for "illegal emigration" (imprisonment from 15 days to 3 months), for "incitement to illegal emigration" (imprisonment of 1 to 12 months), and for the "agents of illegal immigration" (imprisonment of 1 to 3 years). In the first case, the correctional police process was provided and in the last two cases, the correctional process was provided (article 47).

The Code of Criminal Procedure (1929) defined various types of common proceedings, according to the severity of the penalties. The major penalties involved a lawsuit proceeding[3] (art. 63). Correctional sentences of more than 6 months associated or not with other penalties, such as a fine exceeding 6 months, implied a correctional process[4] (article 64). Correctional sentences of up to 6 months associated or not with other penalties, as a fine up to 6 months, implied a corrective police process[5] (art. 65). Defendants caught in flagrante delicto whose infractions corresponded to corrective police processes were judged in summary proceedings[6] (article 67). The contradictory instruction became mandatory in the lawsuit proceedings, according to the Criminal Procedure Code of 1945 (article 34). The characteristics of these processes are complexity and extensiveness. Correctional processes and corrective police processes could have contradictory instructions, when required by the accused. In summary proceedings, there was no contradictory statement

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[3] In Portuguese language: «processo de querela».
[4] In Portuguese language: «processo correcional».
[5] In Portuguese language: «processo de polícia correcional».
[6] In Portuguese language: «processosumário».

(article 36). The preparatory instruction was not necessary when the news case trusted the court (article 19).

In this legal context, the most frequent processes in the documentary corpus are the corrective police processes ones (n=28), followed by correctional processes (n=6), lawsuit proceedings (n=4) and summary proceedings (n=4). There is still a body offense (incomplete process).

Next, we describe the general context of the phenomenon under study.

2. Background

It is calculated that between 1900 and 1988, around 3,5 million people emigrated from Portugal, 25% of them having done so illegally (Baganha, 1994, p. 960). This estimate is based on both official Portuguese statistics and immigration statistics from the main destination countries (USA, France and Germany). Official Portuguese statistics, as well as the most recent estimates, which are certainly closer to the true situation than the first, still require critical analysis[7], since they do not account for return and re-emigration, nor do they calculate illegal emigration to certain destinations, such as the one that interests us most here.

A decreasing trend in the number of legal emigrants in the 1930s and 1940s gave wayto a growing tendency in the 50s and 60s, which reached its all-time maximum number of emigrants in the early 1970s. In the middle of the century, there was a change in the structure of migratory systems of which the Portuguese were part: flows ceased to be predominantly intercontinental, to become mostly intra-European, this tendency being inverted once more from the end of the 1970s.

According to Baganha (1994, p. 962), the proportion of illegal emigrants reached 1/3 of the total number of emigrants in the 1960s

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[7] As argued by Isabel Tiago de Oliveira (Oliveira, 2007, p. 839), official Portuguese statistics on emigration require critical analysis, particularly with comparison with other indicators such as the migratory balance. This author calculates that legal emigration accounted for 109,3 thousand Portuguese citizens in the 1930s, 90,4 thousand in the 1940s, 353,4 thousand in the 1950s and 681 thousand in the 1960s.

and even surpassed the number of legal emigrants in the 1970s.The value of emigrants'remittances in relation to that of exports rose from 13% in the 50s to 24% in the 60s, reaching 56% in the 70s. This growth shows the importance of emigration in the national economy and goes towards explaining the evolution of the legislation and the result of interventionby institutions of control and repression in the emigratory phenomenon.

The data regarding Portuguese emigration, and particularly those on illegal emigration led various historians (Baganha, 2003);(Pereira , 2002); (Pereira, 1981) to question the impact the *Estado Novo* had on the evolution of this phenomenon, since changes in emigration policies in this period did not produce the effects that were apparently desired. Over four decades, and anti-emigration policy[8] (1933-1947), which did not contemplate illegal emigrants, was replaced by a policy of quotas[9] (1947-1962), which, despite aiming for better control of the emigratory flow, did not prevent illegal emigration. Finally, the need was recognized to adopt a policy of openness[10] (1962-1974), which became effective in the Marcelist spring, from 1968.

The first period of the New State's emigration policy, which lasted until the end of the Second World War, was characterized by the construction of the unified emigration control mechanism based on the issue of passports according to specific criteria of gender, age, level of education and socio-professional class. These was defined, amidst other legislation, by Decree-Law nº 16:782, of 27 April 1929, and by Decree-Law nº 33:918, of 5 September 1944. An ordinary passport could not be issued to manual workers in any industry or agricultural workers, requiring proof of completion of the third year of education from those over 14 and under 45 years old for the issue of an emigrant's passport. The State Surveillance and Defence Police (PVDE)[11] had the function of border control and prevention of illegal

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[8] Established by Decree-Law nº 16:782, of 27 April 1929 (suspended successively, for example, by Decree-Law nº 24:425 of 27 August 1934, by Decree-Law nº 31:650 of 19 November 1941) and by Decree-Law nº 33:918 of 5 September 1944.

[9] By Decree-Law nº 36:558, of 28 October 1947.

[10] Decree-Law 44:422, of 29 June 1962 and Decree-Law nº 46:939 of 5 April 1966.

[11] Created in 1933 by Decree-Law nº 22992, 29 August, with powers extended in 1934, by Decree-Law nº 23995, of 12 June, concerning the «repression of illegal emigration» and the «struggle against recruiters».

emigration and activities associated with this. The State Defence International Police (PIDE), which succeeded it from 1945[12], held, among other functions, those of administration, prevention and repression of illegal emigration and illicit encouragement of such.

The second period of the New State's emigration policy, between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s, was characterized by the creation of the Emigration Department[13], whose objective was complete control of the emigratory process by State institutions. A quota system was created, defining a maximum number of departures by region and occupation, aiming to control the health and transport of legal emigrants. The creation of Emigrant Offices in Lisbon and Porto was foreseen, for the purpose of «guiding and protecting» the emigrants«arriving from the provinces for departure» or «receiving returning emigrants»[14].

These changes in emigration policy assumed recognition that emigration performed the function of a«safety valve» for the excess of population in relation to available resources. At the same time, the aim was not to harm the interests of groups who, within the regime, were opposed to emigration (V. Pereira, 2014). The aim was externally acting in favour of the regime both the image of «protection» of the emigrant (Paulo, 1998)and the remittances they sent back. These changes are set in the New State's options of economic policy and foreign policy which prioritized industrialization and modernization of the productive system in the terms foreseen in the 1st Development Plan and improving the international image of the authoritarian and conservative regime in the new democratic context after the Second World War.

The third period of the New State's emigration policy, between the early 60s and1974, is characterized by establishing bilateral agreements between the Portuguese State and the States ofFrance[15] (1963), Spain (1962), Federal Republic of Germany(1964), Luxembourg (1965), the Netherlands (1966), Argentina (1966), Brazil (1969) and Belgium (1970). The view was to ally control of the emigration phenomenon with maximizing the economic return

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[12] Created in 1945 by Decree-Law nº 35046, of 22 October.
[13] Decree-Law nº 36558, of 28 October 1947.
[14] *Idem*.
[15] About this agreement, see V. Pereira (2002).

from emigrants and social support for their families. The persistence of illegal emigration and the high growth rate and internationalization of the Portuguese economy favoured the introduction of these changes in emigratory policy.Decree-Law 46939, of 5 April 1966, increased the penalties for those who encouraged, or helped, or transported illegal emigrants, considering them crimes punishable by a prison sentence of two to eight years, while maintaining the sentences applicable to illegal emigrants. Even so, illegal emigration continued to grow, a situation that raises questions as to the coherence between the political objectives described and the control and repression practices of those operating on the ground(National Guard and PIDE), as was shown by the authors quoted above (Pereira, M.H., 1981; Pereira, V., 2005, 2002).

With Salazar being replaced by Marcelo Caetano at the head of government in 1968, the ambiguities of the emigration policies were eliminated: amnesty was applied to the crime of illegal emigration[16], followed by its decriminalization in 1969, when it came to be considered as an offence punishable with a fine of 500$00 to 20.000$00[17].The prison sentence of up to eighteen months and a fine was reserved for aiding and abetting «so as not to widen excessively the difference between the penalties applicable to the authors of those acts and the emigrants themselves…»[18]. The Emigration Department was dismantled in 1970, to be replaced by the National Emigration Administration[19], whose mission was «discipline of the migratory flow to Europe» and «assistance to Portuguese workers abroad»[20]. Simultaneously, the government ofMarcelo Caetano tried to lessen the intensity of the migratory flow through improving the living conditions of the most vulnerable, extending social welfare to agricultural workers and granting a family allowance[21]. In fact, the numbers emigrating decreased slightly from 1970. Regarding this relationship between the emergence of social security and the slight reduction in the emigration flow,Victor Pereira (2009)says that

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[16] Decree-Law nº 48 783, of 21 December 1968.
[17] Decree-Law nº 49 400, of 19 November 1969.
[18] *Idem*.
[19] Decree-Law nº 402/70, of 22 August.
[20] Decree-Law nº 15/72, of 12 January.
[21] Law nº 2144, of 25 May 1969 and Decree nº 445, of 23 September 1970.

emigrants going to France were attracted not only by higher purchasing power, but also by the social security system and by the prospect of increased status for themselves and for their descendants.These conditions did not exist in Portugal until Caetano's government.

Portuguese emigration, especially illegal emigration, besides forming a kind of daily resistance to bad living conditions – in terms of refusing to follow the law and adopting practices contrary to the speeches made by the authorities– allowed emigrants to make contact with promising social situations. This situations were later narrated to those who remained, contributing to opening new horizons of possibilities in the home country, which would explain, among other factors, the lack of credibility of the New State in increasingly extensive sectors of the population, as Víctor Pereira (2009) showed. Then again, the reduced workforce, due to the intense emigratory flow in the final period of the New State, contributed to increased labour costs and to the impact of the growing rebellious movements appearing in the towns and rural areas. Marcelo Caetano, on the eve of elections, could read these signs, which led to the depenalization of illegal emigration, in articulation with social policy measures that intended to discourage it.

In the context described above, the case of the Algarve is distinguished by its specificities, which we can summarize in three points. The1st– the long persistence of the migratory system of the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan sea area until the 1960s; the 2nd– the importance of temporary emigration and re-emigration for work; the 3rd– the interconnection between the migratory system of the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan sea and the transatlantic migratory system, in which the preferred destination of Argentina stands out[22].

In the following section, illegal emigration from the Eastern Algarve is set in the scope of the migratory system[23] of the

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[22] This preference grew during the 1st Republic and reached a peak in the 40s, with Argentina attracting 2/3 of legal emigrants originating in the Algarve (Borges, 2009).

[23]*Migratory systems* are recurrent migration flows that link regions or states with different demographic, economic and cultural structures. Migratory flows include emigration, immigration, return and re-emigration. These flows sustain interaction networks that act as vehicles of information, assistance and cooperation linking migrants to the system (Borges, 2009, pp. 73-75). Migratory systems are dynamic and flexible; they emerge, adapt and can disappear according to internal or external changes. They can co-exist and interact

Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan sea, the term used by Romero Magalhães (1970; 1988).

3. The long persistence of the migratory system of the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan sea

Participation in the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan migratory system by people from the Algarvedates back at least to the beginning of modern times[24], if not even to medieval times[25], and remained active until the mid-1950s. In contemporary times, migratory flows to theAlentejo, Andalusia, Gibraltar and Morocco, which were mainly seasonal, were dominated by migration from the Algarve.Its economic and social relevance having increased to such an extent that political power did away with the requirement of a passport to do seasonal work in Spain, replacing it with a authorization in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, Arnaldo Anica (2008) noted the record of184 seasonal emigrants in the short period of the first three months of1923, in the*Terms of Accreditation of Tavira Local*

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with other systems. As has been pointed out, this concept is an appropriate tool for process and systemic analysis of migration, allowing us to relate the local to the global, national, regional, local and individual specificities with international structures (Moch & Hoerder, 1996). Another line of research focused on survival strategies, cultural practices and identity construction, proposing the concept of *transnationalism* to mean the processes by which migrants (transnationals) construct social fields that link their country of origin to the host country, making decisions, acting and developing feelings and identities in the domain of social networks. Thesedynamics articulate one or more cultures simultaneously (Basch, Schiller, & Blanc-Szanton, 1999).

[24] Joaquim Romero Magalhães states that «one of the characteristic features of the Algarve, a factor marking individuality within Portugal, is maritime activity and the geographic-economic solidarity of the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan Algarves forming the Gulf of Gibraltar» (Magalhães, 1970, p. 233).

[25] Oliveira Marques explains how the bread crisis was solved in the Algarve recently re-conquered by the Christians: «The first definite reference we have about cereal imports in Portugal is found in a document from the end of the thirteenth century. The Algarve had been conquered three decades earlier; the momentary interruption in the trade with peninsular and African Islam stopped the supply of bread to the province, which was always scarce there. The king was obliged to loan wheat from his stores to supply some strongholds; in 1282, there was an attempt to normalize the situation, allowing once again exchange with the Moors» (Marques, 1968, p. 156).

Authority[26].81of them were destined to agricultural work in various locations in Southern Andalusia, between Ayamonte and Gibraltar, and 103 were destined to fishing-related work to be done between Ayamonte and Cadiz.[27] In turn, Carminda Cavaco (1971, pp. 41-83) recorded3482 contracts of workers from the Eastern Algarve for temporary jobs in tuna traps and fish-canning factories located mainly in Morocco and Tunisia, but also in the south of Spain, between 1933 and 1952. Fishing and the fish-canning industry, agriculture and mining were the main economic sectors involved in this migratory system (Cavaco, 1976; Costa, 2002).

The legal aspect of the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan migratory system is better known than its illegal side. Even so, it is known that during the nineteenth century, there was intense contraband in land and sea routes, and it is plausible that illegal emigration was connected to that activity. Over land, mules carried goods to the river Guadiana, the moment of crossing the river being the most critical in the set of operations. These procedures generally involved smugglers supported by back-up forces who frequently ambushed Portuguese customs officers. Azinhal was the favourite point for the illegal passage of skins, tobacco, horses, gunpowder, thread, soap, wheat, nets and sugar. By sea, arriving illegally on the Algarve coast from Gibraltar and Huelva were large quantities of tobacco, but also butter, paper, wheat, cod, tea, canvas, shoes, playing cards, textiles, gin and other drinks, irons and sheets. This diversity of goods could be subject to large-scale contraband, involving foreign vessels supported by national receivers, or could involve small domestic boats that fished and trafficked from the Algarve coast to the Strait of Gibraltar (Anica, 2001, pp. 103-115).

The Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan migratory system was interlinked with the transatlantic system, since the port of Cadiz served the route from the south of the Iberian peninsula to the ports in America, and was therefore the port of embarkation for those who aimed to reach the other side of the Atlantic (Borges, 2009).

In the 1920s, most legal emigrants from the Algarve were destined for Argentina (59%), followed by Europe (12,8%), Brazil (12,4%)

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[26] Foreseen in the General Regulations of Emigration Services published on 19 June 1919.

[27] We thank the author for allowing access to the original text of the communication.

andUSA (8,8%). Africa (without being more specific) appeared in the fifth position(6,0%). Then in the 1930s, the pattern changed: Argentina was still the favourite destination (36,3%), but Africa jumped to second place (26%), followed by Europe(25,8%). In the 1960s, the migratory system of North-West Europe took precedence over the transatlantic system regarding emigration from the Algarve, as in the rest of the country, with France accounting for 2/3 of the requests for passports presented in the Algarve (Baganha, 2003; Borges, 2009). At that time, the independence of Morocco created conditions for many emigrants from the Algarve to return home or opt for re-emigration, from the Algarve or Morocco, with France as the destination.

Summarizing, the persistent presence of emigration and the transformations of this phenomenon over the centuries is highlighted, corresponding to the metamorphoses of the emigrant as a symbol of Portuguese culture: from «navigator», on to «settler» and«Brazilian», to become «French», as Bretell (2003) observed. However, in the case of the Algarve, the figure of the«Moroccan» emerges which, chronologically placed between the «Argentinian» and the «Frenchman», reflects the specificity of the migratory phenomenon in the south of the country.

Next section, we will focus onthe dynamics of illegal emigration within the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan system during the New State.

4. Dynamics of illegal emigration

As mentioned, in the first half of the twentieth century, although people emigrated from the Algarve legally above all to North and South America, with a preference for Argentina, the same did not happen with the illegal emigrants who made other choices. A number of factors explain the preference for geographically closer destinations, among them being knowledge of the area, the formation of social and economic relations with the people of these regions going back a long way and the limited financial resources available to invest in the migratory projects.

The *corpus* gathered for this study is formed of a total of 178 accusations of crimes, the majority being for illegal emigration (89,3%) and the remainder for aiding and abetting illegal emigration (8,4%) and for encouragement and transport of illegal emigrants (2,2%). The total number of accused corresponds to only a small part of those who left and those who aided and abetted leaving, illegally. This situation is demonstrated by the processes themselves, since those charged, on being questioned in the legal proceedings, frequently mention their history of emigration and the existence of other illegal emigrants who had left for the same destination, using the same means of transport. It is also known that the system of controlling and repressing illegal emigration varied in its effectiveness over the period considered, this being an aspect of this phenomenon, which it is not possible to account for in the sources analysed.

Considering the court cases examined, which concern events in the court districts of Vila Real de Santo António, Tavira, Olhão and Faro in the period of the New State, illegal emigration in this region is found not to have developed linearly, presenting distinct phases and specific occurrences, which will now be characterized briefly.

Fig. 1 – Accusations by decade

Fig. 2 – Accusations by year and country of destination

Considering the development in the number of accused, by year of performing actions related to illegal emigration in the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan system (Graphic 1), the phenomenon is seen to begin to grow in the 1930s, reaching a peak in the 40s, with a significant decline in the 60s. The same data let us infer that the phenomenon of illegal emigration was most intensely repressed in the 1940s and 50s. From 1954, there is a fall in the number of people involved in court cases of this nature, and cases concerning illegal emigration to Morocco in fact disappear (Graphic 2). This last fact arises from the growing difficulties facing illegal emigrants at their destination, which is understood in the context of Morocco's independence (1956). Then again, as already mentioned, in the 60s the New State prioritized repression of the crime of encouragement and ended up depenalizing illegal emigration (1968), which is necessarily reflected in the frequency of accusations.

The flow of illegal emigration in the period analysed was predominantly towards Morocco (73%), followed by Spain (12%) and Gibraltar (7%). In Morocco, sources refer to the destinations of Casablanca, Rabat, Quenitra, Tangier and Fez. In Spain, the Andalusian destinations of Aljaraque, Cristina Island, Figueirita and Huelvaare documented. France appears as an alternative to Morocco, but only from the mid-1950s (4%).

The destinations of illegal emigrants varied according to the origins of those involved. In fact, those from the local authorities of Faro, Tavira and Olhão preferred Morocco, followed by different places in the south of Spain, while the destination of Gibraltar predominated for those from Olhão.

Illegal emigration was favoured by the location of the ports of departure and by climatic conditions, as revealed by the data. Journeys were programmed for the hot months of spring-summer, the month of August accounting for the majority of departures (57%), of which most were made by sea. Boats of the most varied types were used, including canoes, coastal fishing boats, yachts and even short-range motorboats. The area around the ports of Olhão and Tavirawere the main places for the movement of boats involved in illegal emigration. This is not surprising given the economic difficulties of the men of the sea and their specialization in deep-sea fishing, especially regarding the port of Olhão, which gave them great experience of navigation in the waters of the Gulf of Cadiz. The combination of these conditions favoured both illegal emigration and the activity of transporting illegal emigrants. Indeed, the port of Olhão sent out 44% of illegal emigrants, with Tavira being the second most important port with35% of departures, followed by the port ofFaro with 11%. Considering the place of residence of illegal emigrants, we know that it was not only residents of these ports that used the facilities they offered. The local authority of Loulé accounted for 10% of illegal emigrants, who left the country from ports in the Eastern Algarve, with Vila Real de Santo António accounting for 5%. The attraction of the ports of the Eastern Algarve for illegal emigration spread out to residents of Lisbon, Portimão and Silves.

The data also infer that repression of illegal emigration focused mainly on emigrants destined for Morocco, interpreted as a reflection of the greater intensity of this flow, followed in descending order by the flow destined for the south of Spain andGibraltar. The residents in the ports of central and eastern Algarve mainly composed the migration.As already mentioned, the western coast of the Algarve, the valleys and hill regions also contributed to the exodus.

The following section defines the profile of the social actors involved in the illegal Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan migratory system during the period considered.

5. Characterization of social actors

Age and gender structure

One characteristic stands out: those who emigrated were adults. The most active age-group was between 25 and 34 years old (38%), but the phenomenon involved people of all ages, from young people to the elderly. Adolescents and young adults (from 15 to 24 years old) also had a significant weight in illegal emigration (32%). This was followed by the 35 to 44 age-group, which represented 21% of illegal emigrants. The numbers highlight how illegal emigration was rooted in the daily life of the Algarve residents who participated in it as part of the family strategy to improve living conditions or as a resource to ensure survival. Those who emigrated were poor and vulnerable or intended to add a complement to their limited means. This complement could be obtainedeither through internal migration or through emigration. It was a question of seeking an alternative, with varying degrees of urgency and temporariness, to unemployment or insufficient means of subsistence.

As for the women, it is of note that they were older than the men, namely in the 45 to 54 age-group, which is not in conflict with the characteristics of female emigration presented next.

The illegal emigration visible in court cases was a predominantly male phenomenon, despite women not being absent: of those involved,90% were men and10% women. Differently from men, around ¼ of the women who emigrated illegally had Spain as their destination, the remainder heading for Morocco. They emigrated together with their husbands or intended to join them, and so keep the family together.

Socio-professional structure

The occupations of those involved in illegal emigration were diverse, coming from all sectors of economic activity. Illegal emigration was fed by the primary sector (42%), in which«sea-workers» predominated (26%)– that is, fishermen, shellfish fishermen, those who lived from the sea - and«labourers», a term generally used to designate rural employees (11%). These were closely followed by the secondary sector (41%), predominantly stone-masons (15%), joiners (11%), locksmiths (6%) and a great

variety of other occupations of a more artisanal than industrial nature. Those originating in the service sector did not account for more than 17% of all illegal emigrants.

The women described themselves as«housewives», except for one who said she was a«labourer».

The socio-professional origin of illegal emigrants affected the choice of destination: among emigrants choosing Gibraltar, «sea-workers» predominated; «labourers» preferred Spain; the flow to Morocco was the most intense and the most diversified (Graphic 3).

Marital status

The marital status of the individuals involved in illegal emigration is a significant element in understanding this phenomenon. The majority of them are married, around 61% of the total. Single people represented36% and those widowed only 3%. These data suggest that the pressure of economic difficulties, which tended to increase with family responsibilities, and the wish achieve the conditions to form an autonomous family structure would be the most relevant factors motivating illegal emigration.

Fig. 3 – Occupations of illegal emigrants by country of destination (>1%)

Academic qualifications

Concerning the academic qualifications of those accused, individuals considered completely illiterate by the judicial authorities corresponded to 29% of the total, with 68% knowing how to write their name, and some of the latter may have been able to read and write. Considering the relationship between gender and academic qualifications, of the total number accused, there is a greater percentage of illiterate women (59%)than menin the same situation (29%). Among the males involved in illegal emigration, the majority knew how to sign their name (62%), with the percentage of completely illiterate individuals being 26%. Those figures are not very different from the national situation, which presented extremely high illiteracy rates, mainly among females. Indeed, at the end of the New State (1970), the illiteracy rate of the Portuguese population older than ten years old was 64% for women and 34% for men[28]. Nevertheless, the different roles played in the illegal emigration process corresponded to different levels of education. For example, when considering only those accused of aiding and abetting, women predominate, both in numerical terms and regarding level of literacy.

Gender and Social Roles

Illegal emigration from the Algarve is formed by a set of actors revealed in this analysis. According to the typology of crimes foreseen by law, actors can perform the roles of illegal emigrants, enticers(or hirers) and transporters.

The various aspects of those involved in the illegal migratory system favoured the differentiation of roles of their direct actors. Hirers had the principal function of obtaining false documentation, one of the commercial operations their business lived off. In exchange for large sums of money, which the poor clients found in their meagre savings or by turning to a relation or friend, hirers dealt with passports, which generally did not appear, demanding cash payment for the service from potential emigrants.

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[28] Illiterate resident population over 10 years old according to the censuses: total and by gender. Data sources: INE - X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XV General Population Censuses. PORDATA.

Transporters dealt with organizing transport for the illegal emigrants, which as mentioned was mainly by sea destined for the south of Spain,Gibraltar and Morocco.

The same person could ensure enticement and transport. However, there were also court cases in which those accused of aiding and abetting did not coincide with those accused of transporting. These cases reveal greater complexity in illegal emigration networks. As referred to above, gender difference is identifiedin performing the various roles, since women were more numerous in enticement, unlike what happened in other roles where men predominated.

Gender difference is also found in the degree of literacy of those involved in the process: the majority of women accused of illegal emigration were completely illiterate, unlike the women accused of enticement. On the contrary, the majority of men accused of illegal emigration could at least sign their name.

The men involved in illegal emigration did not intend to avoid carrying out military service as was the case of many in Portugal and the Algarve at that time, mainly in the 1960s, when they refused to be enlisted for the wars in Africa. On the contrary, the cases reveal that illegal emigrants even returned to «serve the homeland». These circumstances point to emigration motivated mainly by factors of a socio-economic nature, as is revealed in the next section.

6. Circumstances and motivations for emigration

For the illegal emigrants, conditions were hard and the risks were high.The emigration phenomenon, and particularly that of illegal emigration, was associated with the myths of returning and rapid wealth, myths that prospered in a hierarchical society characterized by limited social mobility, in which expatriation emerged as an instrument of survival and raised social status. Leaving the country was seen as temporary, and frequently was so, but indispensable for accumulating resources that would allow a change in the emigrant's socio-economic status.

The illegal emigrants emigrated, according to their own statements, for reasons of, in decreasing order: «seeking better work» (38%), a very general expression which could include meanings

similar to some of the following categories; unemployment (37%); insufficient pay (6%); «shortage of work» (4%); «living better», i.e., seeking a better quality of life(3%); «joining the family», i.e., family regrouping (2%).Besides the reasons indicated, a justification of a different nature from these emerges, that of the desire«to get to know other places» (1%)[29].

In the motivational context referred to above, the process of organizing the outward journey could done by the emigrants themselves, who got together and put money towards the initial investment of purchasing a small vessel, or could be left to «enticement and transport» networks. These had different sizes and different resources and operated from the Eastern Algarve or, more rarely, stopped off there.

Summarizing, the Algarve's population developed strategies to cope with the difficulties of daily life during the New State. Among themit was emigration, which fed into two contemporary migratory systems: the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan system and the transatlantic system.

Regarding the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan system, the illegal emigrants came mainly from the Eastern Algarve, from the coast and inland areas. They were above all seeking work and better living conditions, wishing to build a more stable future somewhere else, with Morocco predominating.Illegal emigration expose a kind of daily resistance to bad living conditions and a refusal by Portuguese citizens to follow the law. To fulfil their objectives, the emigrants coming from various economic sectors – principally craftsmanship, fishing and agriculture– overcame the restrictions of the repressive laws of Salazar's New State and the limitations imposed by their meagre financial resources, filling the workforce shortage in industry, fishing, agriculture and services at their destination.

The success of the undertaking implied challenging the state's control and repression and mobilizing traditional wisdom, of family, neighbourhood and socio-professional networks, as well as updating knowledge, which was acquiredin the migratory process itself and in contact with new situations at the destination. In this process, illegal emigrants revealed a remarkable capacity to accept risk and challenge

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[29] In 9% of cases, the reasons for deciding to emigrate illegally were not recorded.

authorities, which, more and more in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, tried to confine them in limits, which were traditionally alien to them.

The roles performed in the illegal migratory process are different according to the gender of those involved, with women taking a more prominent part in encouraging and supporting illegal emigration and men being more numerous as emigrants.

The difficulties raised to illegal emigration by the new Moroccan state and the growing attraction of Europe developing in the post war relegated the Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan and transatlantic migratory systems to a residual flow from the mid-1950s. Even so, emigrants originating in the Algarve did not stop their efforts to build the future they longed for abroad, adapting to circumstances and re-investing in other destinations. Then the «Moroccan» changed into the «Frenchman».

The migratory system of Portuguese-Spanish-Moroccan sea was a long duration, dynamic and flexible one. It emerged in ancient times, and adapted according to internal and external changes. During the Portuguese *New State*, this system was mainly interrelated with the south Portuguese people needs, goals and its resistance culture, as well as with migratory lawsand repression practices of the Portuguese authorities. In addition, the flows in this migratory system were interrelated with the needs of workforce. They were also correlatedwith the politics of migration in the European countries and their colonies or post-colonies in the north of Africa. This migratory systemco-existed and interacted with transatlantic emigratory system.

Improving living conditions in the origin country of migrants seems to be the most long-term way to reduce migratory flows, as we inferred in this case.

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How an Italian Amorphous Space Became
a Twelver Shi'a Mosque

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Abstract

This paper aims to explore the sense of "mosque" for Italy's Twelver Shi'as through the study of a Shi'a organisation based in Turin. Some comparative references to Shi'a centres in Padua and Milan will demonstrate different meanings of these spaces for their attendees. In the case of the Turin's Shi'a centre two factors are deemed responsible in conferring mosque-ness to an a functional and abandoned place: gender relations and the nature of initiative sheld within its headquarters.

Keyword: mosque, Twelver Shi'ism, Italy, communication channels, gender relations

Introduction

The impossibility or difficulty of building Islamic worship places in Italy, due to the lack of agreement between Muslims and the Italian state, has been repeatedly underlined by jurists and sociologists (e.g. Ferrari 2000, Cilardo 2002, Aluffi B.P. 2004, pp. 139-140, Bettini 2008, pp. 71-74, Cardia and Dalla Torre 2015). The absence of such locals has made "mosque" a vague and controversial category."The word mosque in Italy is used by the press, by politicians and by society itself to indicate any place where Muslims gather to pray" (Bombardieri, 2011, p. 54). To this statement we can add "also by scholars", among whom "mosque" has become a macro-category or useful instrument for addressing any type of Islamic worship hall (Guolo, 1999, pp. 67-90, Guolo, 2003, Guolo, 2005, pp. 639-640, Blancat and di Friedberg, 2005, p. 1084, D'Agnolo Vallan, 2004, p. 64, Pacini, 2001, Negri and Scaranari Introvigne, 2009, Roggero, 2002, p. 135, Giudei, 2005, Lano, 2005).However, when it comes to a census of these locals, a

definition of "mosque" is inevitably required. In such surveys, Muslims' places of congregation enjoy more specification and "mosque" is distinguished from other categories like Islamic association, centre, prayer hall and *mussallah*(Allam, Gritti, 2001, pp. 41-69,Allievi, 2003, pp. 27-32, 263-266, Allievi 2010, pp. 15-16). Bombardieri suggests that architectonic characteristics, capable of conferring visibility to Islamic worship halls, can be used as a criterion for being mosque (Bombardieri, 2011, p. 54, Bombardieri, 2014, pp. 53-54).Whereas other authors adopt functionalist approaches (Allievi, 2010, Caragiuli, 2013, pp. 76-77) for at least two reasons. They believe that some external features, such as minaret, are sometimes absent from mosques even in Islamic countries, while in Europe these features have only become a matter of identity-building and conflict (Allievi, 2010, p. 28, Rhazzali, 2013, p. 57), or because, in Islam the sacredness of space depends on human praxes instead of outward characteristics of worship places (Caragiuli, 2013, p. 80).Therefore, in Europe, Allievi declares thatall places with three characteristics are eligible for this title: they should host "Muslims", "to pray", "on a regular basis" (Allievi, 2010, p.15). Notwithstanding his awareness of the inaccuracies in such a definition, according to him, in Europe the *function* of prayer and "its collective and public aspect" are what determine the essence of mosque. In his earlier book dedicated to the census of Islamic worship halls, he introduced an important criterion: they should welcome followers of all schools of Islamic thought (Allievi, 1993, p. 139).Interestingly, Allievi underscores the different meaning of a worship place for Shi'as without delving into it (Allievi, 1993, p. 140, Allievi, 2003, p. 61). In this way, the sense of worship place, like many other aspects of Twelver Shiism, has been studied only within general frame of Islam.

Aside from the opinions of outsiders, "mosque" carries different connotations among Twelver Shi'as as well. For followers of this faith who live in Italy, it is a place to share their religious solitude with those who bear similar set of values and experience this social context in almost a same manner. Mosque for a medieval Shi'a scholar is the place of *sujud* (prostration), thus any worship place or any Islamic worship place or even five points of the body that touch the earth during prostration can be called *masjid* (mosque) (Mirshahvalad, 2017,

p. 3). Mosque for an ayatollah, who is the leading expert of the modern jurisprudence of Twelvers, is a very specific place with clear characteristics that has nothing to do with immigrants' loneliness, scholars' labelling, literalist approaches of medieval scholars and Italians' politics. For ayatollahs, what distinguishes a mosque from other Shi'a structures, like *Husseiniyye*[1], *takiyya*[2] and *mussallah*[3], is neither minaret, nor dome, nor even the mere functions of gathering and prayer. Mosque, for an ayatollah, is a place built or donated specifically for Islamic prayer, which has received consecration through the process of *waqf*[4]. It can by no means change its function or be sold even if its site is destroyed; non-Muslims cannot enter it even to visit it as a historical monument and even if their presence does not entail any act of sacrilege. The access of children and mentally ill people, for some ayatollahs is *makruh* (detestable), for others is *haram* (prohibited) and if they enter, they should be controlled lest they disturb congregants during religious ceremonies. Moreover, women who have obtained the authorisation of their husbands to attend mosque, should have a specific place, distant from non-Mahrams'[5] gaze, to pray and practise ablution. Other initiatives like the projection of a film, playing sport, the creation of a library and

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[1] *Husseiniyye* is the name of congregational halls in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon where the martyrdom of the third Imam is mourned by Shi'as. The name comes from Hussein ibn Ali, the third Imam of Shi'a Muslims. (Ja'fariyan, 2004, p. 317). No specific ordinances have been envisaged for *Husseiniyyes.* (AsqariyyanJeddi, 1393/2014, pp. 46-47).

[2] Like *husseiniyye, takiyye* is a rather new Shi'a structure. Whenever there are not enough funds for the construction of *husseiniyye*, basements, warehouses and public passages can become *takiyye.* Sometimes benefactors make their homes available during mourning periods of Muharram for the ceremonies of this month (Asqariyyan Jeddi, 1393/2014, p. 47).

[3] Lit., the place of prayer. Traditionally, *mussallas* were built on the outskirts of the urban sphere for the celebration of the important Islamic festivals. They were plain and roofless buildings made of clay that could not have prestigious pulpits (like mosques). In contemporary times, *mussallas* have lost some of their traditional characteristics as they have become a combination of mosque and worship hall (HamzeNejad, Sa'adatJu, Ramezani, 1394/2015, pp. 41-57).

[4] According to the prevalent ideas of ayatollahs, a building can become mosque when the owner pronounces a declaration called *siqat al-waqf* testifying that he/she has ceded the place to public domain. Afterwards a Muslim may pray there and the place becomes a mosque. For an English definition (Kozlowski, 2004, pp. 730-732).

[5] The term Mahram corresponds to women's unmarriageable kin, e.g. father, brothers, grandfathers, uncles, sons, sons-in-law, etc. Given that sexual relationship is forever forbidden with these relatives, women are not bound to wear the veil in front of them.

the celebration of festivals should be approached with caution in order not to reprioritise prayer. Bearing in mind all these different definitions of mosque, we may ask: which type of mosque are Italian-based Shi'a worship places, and how, why and when do they gain the status of mosque?

In this paper, focused only on the biggest branch of Shi'ism, I aim to demonstrate that, as far as Twelver Shi'a worship places in Italy are concerned, there are factors that work as regulators of what I call "mosque-ness"; meaning that they decrease, increase and change the intensity of what creates mosque where such a structure is physically non-existent. Some European scholars cast doubt on the existence of specific, circumscribed and sacred space within the Islamic tradition, at least as it is perceived by Christians (Frishman, 1994, pp. 30-33, Allievi, 2003, p. 27, Vercellin, 1996, p. 113). However, in the context of migration the exigency of heterogenising the space (as Eliade would have said) is felt more, thus mosques are greatly desired by Muslims.

Twelver Shi'a organisations in Italy belong to one creed but they sharply vary in terms of national and linguistic composition of their attendees, and from an important aspect: the nature of their headquarters. I believe that, mosque-ness among Italy's Shi'as is not so much as a by-product of the function of prayer, but more the outcome of a synergy between two factors: Shi'as' attitudes towards their places of worship and Italians' perception of these spaces. These two factors are regulators of the level of mosque-ness of Shi'a worship places in Italy. The first one, which I consider their internal characteristic, promotes a certain type of human relations inside the worship places that is affected by the probable bonds of these organisations with the Iran's political representatives in Italy. The second one, deemed an external strand to this phenomenon, is the fruit of what the Italian context imparts to them.

To explain these dynamics, I will appeal to a Twelver Shi'a local based in Turin with some comparative references to other Shi'a organisations in Rome, Milan and Padua. After a general presentation of the Turin's Shi'a centre, we will see how two catalysts moulded an abandoned local, hardly definable and unusable, into a Shi'a mosque. The first one is accessory and gives a panorama of relations of two national groups in Turin, which follow

the same religion, yet have two different understandings of it. It will show how a division of power purified this institution from non-Shi'a interests. The second catalyst, instead, is crucial for it establishes the boundaries of the sacred space.

In order to undertake this study, besides ethnographic notes and semi-structured interviews conducted both with the executive committee and congregants of the Turin's Shi'a centre – registered in December 2009 under the name Centro Culturale Tohid (CT) – I carried out an analysis of the CT's communication channels that allowed me to reconstruct the history of the centre. This review is necessary as otherwise the process of change to which this centre was subject cannot be illustrated. Twenty people of the CT, aged from 20 to 62 were interviewed. They had different occupations and interests, but almost all of them had university degrees and prestigious jobs. During normal periods at the CT, this number represents the entire population of congregants, but throughout Muharram and the Nights of Qadr[6] the CT's population is five times more than the number of my interviewees. My study was not limited only to the CT's attendees. A female refugee who did not attend the CT because of her political concerns, but was a practicing Twelver Shi'a, was also taken into consideration. She was a Lebanese student from the University of Turin who knew the CT very well.

I chose ethnography and semi-structured interview as methods of data collection because the lack of sociological studies on Twelvers in Italy had left this field completely unknown, therefore, the formation of theories could occur only during the fieldwork. I chose my interviewees based on some of their specific characteristics such as, their attitudes towards the worship hall, their position in the community, and their social profile. I started visiting the CT from 10 November 2016 and continued attending it on Thursday evenings and for the whole month of Ramadan, apart from specific events like the commemoration of the martyrdom and birth of Imams and the Prophet. On the 9thof November 2017, I visited the CT for the last time when the commemoration of Arbain was supposed to be held. My Iranian nationality offered me the possibility of being easily inserted in the CT's context facilitating my contacts with Iranians,

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[6] Last ten odd nights of Ramadan

whereas with other nationalities extra effort was needed in order to gain their trust[7]. Being Iranian exonerated me from justifying my presence in this hall, therefore, for some months, I conducted a covered ethnography and only at the end of the itinerary I revealed the idea of this study to those whom I wanted to interview.

1. An overview

The appearance of the first Shi'a organisations in Italy can be traced back to the early 1990s in Trieste, Rome and Naples (Vanzan, 2004, p. 2, Bombardieri, 2011, pp. 199-201). However, the number of these centres continues to change in that some of them vanish because of their organisers' emigration to other Italian cities or abroad and some others commence their activities in response to Shi'a citizens' exigencies. Therefore, the information related to these organisations has to be constantly updated.

At the moment, Italy's Twelver Shi'as are mainly of Pakistani, Iranian, Afghan and Lebanese origin, however, a limited number (roughly 10%) of them come from countries like Iraq, Tunisia and Morocco. There are also a few male and female converts to Shi'ism who take part in activities and associations with the Shi'a immigrants. It is not possible to provide an exact estimate of the number of Shi'a Muslims in Italy, but it seems that around 1.5% of all Muslims in this country are Shi'a ("Sciiti in Italia", 2012, p. 17).

Since the end of the 19th century, Turin has been attracting immigrants from different parts of the world for its occupational opportunity. Currently almost 9.7% of the population of the Metropolitan city of Turin is composed of foreign immigrants[8].It hosts more than 100 different religious communities (Pennacini, Díez, 2006, p. 5) that make it a good laboratory of multicultural cohabitation (ivi, p. 28). Thecity is a fertile land for cultural

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[7] While I was conducting this research, I discovered the importance of national belonging in trust building. Using Italian and English as lingua franca was helpful but could not compensate for the absence of national and linguistic bonds with other nationalities.

[8] See Rapporto 2015 dell'Osservatorio Interistituzionale sugli stranieri, http://www.prefettura.it/torino/contenuti/Osservatorio_interistituzionale_sugli_stranieri-3842.htm, visited 11/06/2017.

associations. Apart from the CT, Iranians have another four cultural associations in Turin with differing levels of vitality. The Association of Islamic Students, the Association of Students of the Polytechnic, the Association of Iranians and the Associations of Iran-Italy. Whereas the Lebanese (the other main national component of the CT) do not have any organisation in this city. The reason maybe their smaller population size in Turin[9] or that they are less homogeneous in terms of religious affiliation.

In this northern Italian city, there is not any relationship of cause and effect between the presence of Shi'as and the emergence of the CT, since this organisation was formed many years after the presence of Iranian and Lebanese students and workers in Turin. This city has witnessed the presence of Shi'a citizens since 1990s;however, the birth of its first and only existing Shi'a worship hall was no more than seven years ago. Therefore, we cannot attribute the birth of the CT only to the growth of number of Shi'a citizens. As one of the senior members of the executive committee told me, for more than one decade they would gather in each other's apartments for congregational prayers. Later they were accommodated on the second floor of a school near Porta Palazzo, where the Asai Association had offered them a hall for their religious practices. In this school, they would gather with Afghan and Pakistani refugees, but the need for an independent worship place eventually propelled them to establish a self-governing headquarters.

Nowadays, the local of this organisation is a plain hall, almost 150 square metres, situated beside the inner courtyard of a building. It has one entrance for both sexes and, like many other Islamic worship halls, is deprived of security conditions envisaged by the Italian law for public spaces. The walls are embellished with the green, red and black flags of Imam Hussein, Abu al-Fadl and Imam Mahdi. Inside the hall, there is not any division between the sexes. There is a kitchen and a bathroom used by both men and women.

The CT was initially designed to welcome both Sunnis and non-Muslims who could join it to celebrate Christmas or conduct lectures

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[9] According to the Osservatorio Interistituzionale sugli stranieri in provincia di Torino, in 2015 there were 10.304 Iranians in this province while Lebanese were not more than 3.691 individuals. See http://www.prefettura.it/torino/contenuti/Rapporto_2015-5350874.htm

on topics, such as the benefits of fasting in Ramadan. Currently its executive committee is composed of five members: two Lebanese and two Iranian men, and one Italian woman converted to Shi'ism. The committee is elected every five years by those members who pay an annual fee of 50 euro for their membership. The CT's regular meetings are held on Thursday evenings when a well-known Shi'a prayer, called *du'aKumeil* (lit. the supplication of Kumeil), is offered, however, the most important reasons for gathering are Qadrnights and the first ten days of Muharam when hundreds of Shi'as come to the CT.

Finding this centre was not easy. Initially, I did not even know that there was a Shi'a worship hall in Turin, but even my later awareness of its existence was not of any help. Firstly, because I did not know its name; secondly, even if I have known it, I would not have found it because on the Internet, you cannot find a website, email address or phone number for the CT, either in Italian, Persian or Arabic[10]. When I heard about it from a university professor, my search, by chance, ended up in an encounter with a Palestinian girl, who then put me in contact with a young Lebanese man who would attend the CT often. The hall is situated in Corso Emilia, but from the outside you cannot find any sign of a worship hall. The only indicator for an outsider is Ass. Culturale Tohid written on the doorbell.

During my visits, people in this centre were mainly of Iranian and Lebanese origin, but there was also a limited number of Shi'as from Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as a handful of converted Italians. They were from different age groups and professions. Some Iranians and Lebanese had already acquired Italian citizenship, some had a residence permit for work reasons, but a considerable number of them were students at the Polytechnic, which is Turin's main attractive quality for Iranian students.

1.1. Fromi dea to practice
In the following two paragraphs, I will explain why Iranians founded this centre and what motivated them to abandon it. Most of

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[10] One of these lists belongs to the Associazione Islamica delle Alpi, which governs two principle "mosques" of Turin (Taiba and Rayan). This association on its website, presented as "portale dell'islam torinese" (portal of Islam in Turin), has published the names and addresses of fifteen "mosques" of Turin, but the name of Tohid Centre is not mentioned.

what I found out in this regard was the fruit of an analysis of the CT's means of communication, and some informal conversations made with the CT's initial founders.

Many Italian garages, basements and warehouses have changed their function to become Muslims' worship halls. The CT's headquarters, though, in 2009 was void of any function and utility. I heard different narratives about its original nature. Some of its first promotors talked about an abandoned carpenter workshop, some others remembered a ruined garage or a small factory, an Iranian physician, who was one of its first financers, described its former status as a destroyed and dilapidated structure to which hardly one could attribute any function. It was then rented by some Iranian and Lebanese students and families who looked for an independent place for their religious practices as they had sometimes been targeted by Sunni Muslims because of the use of *mohr* (Ar., *turbah*) or the position of their hands. The space was then reconstructed, furnished and equipped with soundproofing materials while windows became completely blocked lest they disturb neighbours. Initially it was devoid of any flag and the completely white walls (as one can see in their old photos available on their Instagram and Telegram profiles)made it seem bigger and brighter. Nowadays, the disharmonic carpets and flags that cover the floor and walls – brought here from Karbala and Qom – have made it look smaller and feel suffocating. A current member of the executive committee, and also one of the participants, told me that this association was initially founded as a means to help Iranian students in different areas, such as applications for residence permits, finding jobs and accommodation. Nevertheless, the coincidence of the CT's birth with the aftermath of the Iran's presidential elections of 2009 had important consequences for its relations with Iranians. The years 2009 and 2010 had specific meaning for Iranians who lived abroad. Like other countries, Iranians in different cities of Italy organised manifestations in solidarity with the victims of the Iran's unrest. The CT, which was devised to be a reference point for Iranians, felt the effects of those upheavals. Some people, especially women who were initially interested in the foundation of such a centre – as one of its initiators told me – abandoned it as it was presumed to be in contact with Iran's political representatives; a reality that later transpired to not entirely be devoid

of truth. The consequence was that the CT remained without its initial Iranian supporters who had a different understanding of Shi'ismor had looked for a cultural association rather than a religious centre. As a result, the presence of Iranians decreased in such a way that during my final visits there was only three Iranian males,and not even one Iranian woman, despite the fact that in Turin, they are twice as many Iranians as there are Lebanese.

Nowadays, the association does not have to pay any rent, but it was impossible to identify the owner of its headquarters. Its current Lebanese director, during a formal interview, declined to clarify this question. The Iranian sources claim that it has been bought thanks to the funds of the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought[11]established at the Ayatollah Khamenei's behest. An Iranian ex-member of the executive committee, about whom we will talk later, claims that the hall belongs to Iranians.

1.2. Communication channels and intra-religious tensions

Although the CT, different from the Milan and Rome Shi'a centres, does not have a website, initially it used two forms of online communication: Telegram and Instagram applications. When I had not yet earned the trust of the CT's directors, these channels offered me priceless information about the internal relations of its members. The distance of the centre from the Iranian consulate and embassy causes a specific type of inter-national relations among its members, which is difficult to grasp at first glance. Obviously, dynamics of rivalry and internal conflicts, deemed as threats to the cohesion of a community, have to remain unmentioned. This fragility of social solidarity is higher in the case of «a minority within a minority» (Sachedina, 1994, pp. 3-13),namely Shi'as in the West. Nonetheless, I started to understand certain internal tensions of the CT through a comparison between its digital showcase and its realities.

The CT's Telegram channel was created on the 7th of November 2015by one of the ex-members of its executive committee who, during his presence, had a crucial role in the CT's relations with the

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[11] See the blog of Hujat al-Islam Khoshkhu, who visited the CT in November 2014 and has written about it. He maintains that the location of the centre has been bought partly by the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought. http://khoshkho.blog.ir/. Visited 10/06/2017.

Iran's diplomatic representatives. I had the chance to experience two periods of presence and absence of this specific member of the executive committee whom I call Sadiq. This middle-aged Iranian man, unwilling to be interviewed, was always present in the hall and highly active in the organisation of events. He had developed close ties with the Iranian consulate of Milan, as well as the Iran-based religious and political authorities.

The first message posted on the CT's Telegram channel, dated the 13th of February 2016, was written in three languages: Italian, Arabic and Persian. In Italian, he declared, «the official channel of the Tohid Cultural Centre of Turin is created to give information about this centre presenting its religious and cultural activities». In Arabic he presented the centre as Markaz Tohid Turin Italy, whilst, in Persian it is called the Islamic Cultural Centre of Tohid. The adjective "Islami" cannot be anything but the invention of Sadiqas it does not appear in the Italian name of this association. As I heard from one of its first Iranian founders, they did not want the CT to have any hint of Islam or Shi'ism in its Italian title in order to preventc oncerns over their activities. Even the name Tohid (oneness [of God]) was a precaution against being marked with Shi'a affiliation[12], especially because, different from the Imam Ali Centre of Milan, they do not enjoy the protection of a robust political machine like the Iranian consulate. Sadiq may have added "islami" to the Persian name of the CT to capture the attention of the Iranian media or to attract Iran's subsides. It is noteworthy that the adjective "islami" was interpreted in a particular manner by its creator. In different conversations, I tried to find out what Sadiqmeant by this adjective. Surprisingly, "islami" in his discourse was associated with non-religious initiatives and interpreted as something irrelevant to religion (at least in the way he tried to explain it to me).

At the time, all messages, written in three languages, were signed in Persian as Public Relations of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Tohid. Sadiq published messages of completely different natures. From greetings, to videos and audios of sermons, recitation of the Koran, pdf files of religious books, events related to the Persian

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[12] Compare it to the names of Imam Mahdi Centre of Rome, Imam Ali Centre of Milan and Muhebbin-e Ahl al-Bayt of Padua.

calendar, issues regarding different Iranian elections, the reaction of Italians to the Fadjr Film Festival, problems in Italy and Europe, Islamophobia, links to the Telegram channels of ayatollahs, Arabic and Italian lessons and so forth.

The variety of messages during the Sadiq's presence reflected the heterogeneity of the CT's activities. As interviews with some attendees testify, during the first years, the CT's programs were not limited to religious practices or to Shi'a festivals. Nowruz[13], *Sizdah Be-dar*[14], *Yalda* Night[15]and Christmas were celebrated inside and outside the centre. As I was told during an interview with an Iranian housewife, Sadiq for a brief period had held Persian lessons for Iranian children. Given Sadiq's useful contacts, Iranian envoys and the representatives of the Iran's Supreme Leader sometimes payed visits to the CT. In December 2016, I was contacted by Sadiq to participate in a meeting with the Iranian consul who had come from Milan. On that day, Iranian students had gathered to ask their questions and submit their requests. During the event, I noticed the Iranian flag on the wall, which soon after the gathering was removed. Afterwards I was in Florence for af ew months, though I did not cease monitoring the CT's Telegram channel.

The 24th of April 2017, the anniversary of the birth of Imam Hussein, Abul Fadl, Imam Zeyn al-Abedin, was the last time that Sadiq published something relevant to the events of the CT. Since then their Telegram channel has exclusively published koranic verses, the affirmations of the Iran's Supreme Leader, *du'a*s and sometimes messages on psychological issues and videos of the Iranian correspondent Hamid Masumi Nejad. In this period, apart from the Koran's pages, other messages were written only in Persian. You cannot find any notifications of upcoming events, any schedules, any reportage or photos of what has happened inside the hall. The most significant change was that all references to Ayatollah Khamenei started to be embellished with the title "Imam". In June, I

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[13] Lit., new-day, *Nowruz*, celebrated in eleven countries, is the name of the new year holiday that comes at the vernal equinox.

[14] Known as nature's day, *Sizdah Be-dar* is an Iranian festival held on the thirteenth day of Farvardin (the first month of the Iranian calendar).

[15] Lit., birth, in Iran *Yalda* is celebrated on the longest night of the year, which in the Northern Hemisphere corresponds to the winter solstice.

returned to Turin to visit the centre. I could not find Sadiq anymore. People told me that he was ill and could not come. Once I met his wife and enquired about the absence of Sadiq. She shook her head «people did not understand the value of his efforts and contributions to this centre», she said with a hint of displeasure in her voice. The truth, I discovered later, was that on May the 13thof 2017 Sadiq had not been elected for the new executive committee and from then on had ceased to attend the CT.

The Telegram and Instagram channels that Sadiq had created were in fact agencies that would guarantee the CT's visibility to the Iranian media and when he stopped attending the CT, Iranian media could no longer cover the CT's news. Indeed, all the Persian coverage of the CT's news date back to before the 13th of May. The other consequence of Sadiq's absence was that the Iranian political and religious authorities did not come to the CT anymore. The result was that the CT became less political, less Iranian and less multifunctional.

Currently, in contrast to Milan's centre, on the CT's walls you cannot find any photos of Iran's two Supreme Leaders. The sermons, usually conducted by its Lebanese director, are in Italian, during which there are not any references made to Ayatollah Khamenei, and no one must praise the figure of the Iran's Supreme Leader with *salawat*. All my Lebanese interviewees, except for one, who was a follower of Ali Sistani, were followers of Ayatollah Fadlallah. During a formal conversation, the Lebanese director of the CT was careful enough to remind me that «here everyone has his/her *marja*». It was an obvious declaration of ideological independence to his Iranian interviewer that the CT's Lebanese attendees should not be mistaken for Hezbollah members. The politicized nature of the CT during the presence of Sadiq had made it undesirable for followers of Ayatollah Fadlallah. The clashes of fat was of Fadlollah with those of Khamenei were noticeable in the case of the declaration of events like the end of Ramadan. This important event marks Id al-Fitr, which can also determine the date of Id al-Adha and the rest of the religious calendar. The disagreement on these dates always caused debates among Iranians and Lebanese.

My observations confirmed that in the virtual world we had a Telegram and Instagram channel, written in the Persian language and

allegedly belonging to the CT's Public Relations team, which were filled with the name "Imam" Khamenei, and only contained news that would benefit Iranians. Then we also had a physically existing CT that had become a place attended by people with different languages and nationalities who were connected exclusively through religious passion and had different *marjas*. In contrast, the Imam Ali Centre of Milan, wherein the Friday's political prayeris offered, seems to be the chapel of the Iranian consulate or a *farhang-sara* (house of culture, as a middle-aged Iranian woman termed it). Religious gatherings are only a small part of what Milan's centre offers to its attendees. From time to time, the Imam Ali Centre becomes a kindergarten, a Persian and Italian language school, a conference hall to debate Iranian cultural and political issues, a cinema, a saloon for watching Iran's football games, a place to celebrate Iran's national festivities and even a gym for women. The Imam Ali Centre organises tours for its attendees to other Italian cities for a diversion or to support the Iran's sports teams whenever games are held in Italy. Such activities are unimaginable in the CT. After a year, when I was already on more familiar terms with the Iranian founders of the CT, who had stopped visiting it, my impressions about its internal conflicts were confirmed. The most cited reason for their absence – as they termed it – was their displeasure of the mono-functionality of the Turin's centre and their incapability of changing its situation.

The split in power pushed the CT towards a more religious and less political nature. The CT's geographical distance from the Iranian consulate and embassy has brought about ideological independence but also poverty. The CT is void of heating system. It is extremely hot during summer, especially because of closed windows, and unbearably cold during winter. It does not have enough facilities to host prestigious meetings with the outside world (academic and/or non-Muslim scholars), as occurs in the Imam Ali centre. Its current directors are too busy to pay enough attention to it or consider it as a top priority, whereas Milan's Imam Ali Centre has its clerical figure and personnel hired by the Iranian consulate for different services. Therefore, the CT has remained unknown to the Turin's local authorities who promote politics of inter-culturality. During Ramadan 2017, the City of Turin, in collaboration with those Islamic

associations that had signed the *Patto di condivisione* (Pact for Peaceful Coexistence) in February 2016[16], organised a special initiative called "Mosques Open Day" to introduce these organisations to citizens. Although the CT was one of the signatories of this agreement, the catalogue published for the occasion – a document that offered visibility and prestige to these organisations – did not include its name. After consulting those officers of the City of Turin who had orchestrated the event, I discovered that the CT's directors had not participated in the preparative meetings envisaged by the City of Turin ,which had been designed to prepare them for the important initiative. When I asked the Lebanese director of the CT for an explanation of their absence, among various reasons, he spoke about the overwhelming burden of his commitments that had not left him any time to dedicate to such events. This centre was unknown even to the Turin's Centro Interculturale that arranges educational visits to the Islamic centres for students. This issue may have been caused also by the low willingness of the current Lebanese authorities of this centre to be seen. In different occasions, I tried to convince them to allow me create a website for them or upload some of their videos on YouTube but they refused my offers. Nowadays oncoming initiatives are diffused only by word of mouth. The consequence is that this centre has gained the aspects of an underground circle with no casual visitor. As a result, people in the CT has become an extended and heterogeneous family with only one feature in common: a religious passion labelled Twelver Shi'ism.

2. The question of *hormat*

In this paragraph, I will discuss the second and most important catalyst for the development of mosque-ness in the CT that is strictly related to women and gender relations. Women in this centre belong to varying age groups. Not all of them are introduced or accompanied by their male relatives. Most of them have academic

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[16] See "Torino è la nostra città. Firmato un patto di condivisione a Palazzo Civico", published on 09/02/2016, www.torinoclick.it/?p=41186. Visited 07/01/2018.

degrees or are university students. Some of them work as physicians, architects, interpreters and cultural mediators.

Interaction between the sexes in the CT is regulated through the specific division of space and the women's attitude towards it. In the CT, the spaces of sacred and profane are gender-labelled. The kitchen and the only existing bathroom used by both sexes are not carpeted, while the hall, where a specific gender segregation governs the relations of the sexes, is carpeted. In the hall there is not any material division between men and women, but a curtain roughly one meter in length provides women with a specific place for breastfeeding, the change of a chador, or a "refuge" for those who do not want to participate in congregational prayers. Despite the absence of material division[17], a certain sense of prudery helps maintain the distance between sexes; a sensation that only a few meters away from the centre or even in the courtyard vanishes. If a woman wanted to have access to bookshelves situated in the men's section, she had to breakthrough this invisible barrier between the sexes facing the uncomfortable sense of being observed by men. In the kitchen, though, this uncomfortable sense was absent where men and women cook, talk and laugh with each other, while the hall, carpeted and decorated with flags, was the place of segregation and seriousness[18]. My own experience clarifies the relationship between sexes in this space. I had developed a friendly relationship with a Lebanese boy. He was a 26-year-oldcomputer-engineeringstudent. We spent time together without a hint of misgiving, but inside the hall, he preferred to ignore me or call me in the courtyard to have a chat. I asked him the reason of his behaviour and he termed it as a vague and unexplainable awkwardness that he felt at talking with women inside the hall. Although the politics of gender apartheid governed all people's minds inside the CT, the question of the veil was not approached in the same manner by everybody. Some of the CT's attendees, including those women who did not wear the veil outsideof the CT, were against the presence of unveiled women

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[17] The absence of material division between the sexes in some Shi'a worship halls was observed also by Angela Lano (2005), who in November 1998 payed a visit to the Shi'a centre of Milan (pp. 139-142).

[18] According to Walter Burkert "Religion is serious; hence it is vulnerable to laughter and derision" (Burkert, 1998, p. 7).

inside it. Whenever I asked them the reason for their intolerance towards the presence of unveiled women, the Persian word with Arabic root, *hormat* became the leitmotiv that ran through their answers. The word pronounced as *hurma*in Arabic derives from the root *hrm* and corresponds to various connotations e.g. honour, modesty, respect and veneration. Words like haram, with a twofold meaning: both prohibited and sacred (Darwish, 2014, pp. 286-287, Ries, 2006 p. 67)and harem (Ar., *harim*, inviolable territory, domestic spaces for women in upper-class houses) stem from the same root (Anwar, 2004, pp. 291-292). Haram literary means «putting aside» (Ries, 1993, p. 351, Ries, 2006, p. 67)or what custom considers inaccessible either because of its impurity or sacredness. Thus, haram refers to both women and sacred places (Campo, 2009, pp. 290-293). The CT, for its people, is endowed with a sanctity that must be enshrined carefully. An unveiled woman is deemed a violation to its vulnerable atmosphere. Those interviewees who had a longer presence in Italy, hence, had built a greater awareness of its cultural peculiarities, were sharp enough to remind me that the question is the same also in the Catholic Church where people are asked to respect the sacredness of the space by observing specific dress code. A shining example of this kind was a 32-year-old Iranian student of architecture who would criticise the obligation of the veil in Iran but was unwilling to welcome unveiled women inside the CT.

I could see that the question of the veil had acquired more relevance to those who had a particular attachment to the centre. One evening during Ramadan, I went to the CT with a Puerto Rican girl who was extremely curious to visit. She came in without any head covering. Nobody exhibited any notable reaction, but an Italian woman converted to Shi'ism, brought a chador and asked her to cover her hair. When I asked the Italian woman as to why the Puerto Rican girl had to wear a chador she explained it was because young boys could see the girl without a covering and it was not good. Obviously, outside the CT, the hot weather of June could offer more Islamic scenery to those young boys! It is what Ithought to myself. It was clear that her main concern was ultimately something else. She was always worried about maintaining the one-meter-length curtain among the sexes. This Italian woman, with her long black *jilbab*, seemed to be a guardian of the CT's sacredness. She was highly

active in the kitchen and preparing the hall for the CT's events. Every time I visited the CT, with the exception of when Iran's consul came and the sexes sat down beside each other, she was the first woman who arrived with or without her husband and would immediately start working in the kitchen. The CT was a very serious matter to her. The episode in June stuck in my mind and sent a significant message to me. The Puerto Rican girl had asked me if she had to cover her hair and I had said no. One of the times I visited the CT, I had consulted Sadiq about the issue. He had told me that non-Muslim women could visit the CT without the veil. Curiously enough, the Italian woman's attitude towards wearing a veil inside the worship place was held by another Italian woman converted to Shi'ism whom I encountered in the Milan's Imam Ali Centre[19].

Not all women, however, had the same attitude towards the question. A 42-year-old Lebanese woman, who was a City of Turin officer and a devout follower of the Islamic dress code, expressed her disapproval of the "Iranian" style of veiling because in her view the CT was only the headquarters of a cultural association and not the "house of God", therefore this symbolic veiling, in her opinion, was absolute nonsense. According to her, veiling was a pious action that had to be done only for the sake of God and not to gain people's appreciation. Nowhere in the CT's statute does it state that the hall is considered inaccessible to unveiled women. Nevertheless, this unwritten pact among the CT's people, formed in collaboration with women themselves, puts Iranian women in such a situation that they must adopt the same attitudes towards the veil that they have in Iran; a state between veiling and unveiling; with the great difference that in the case of the CT, it occurs under a secular state and inside the headquarters of a cultural association. In this way, women bestow mosque-ness to the CT and the later, in turn, re-moulds their modernised identities to adapt them to the Shi'a paradigms of womanhood. In the CT, there is a cycle between gender relations and

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[19] Allievi (2006) underlined various functions of the veil for Italian women converted to Islam. It helps them through the process of conversion and access to the community. It facilitates their insertion and integration into the community. In addition, the veil marks the barriers of the sacred and the profane that are unclear and unstable frontiers in the western cultures (p. 145).

people's perception of mosque-ness: gender relations form people's perception and the other way around.

It is extremely important to consider that the process of mosque-building in such cases is more a question of an unconscious mental process rather than a rationally-made decision and formally-declared initiative. One episode that comes to mind that further reinforces this idea took place during an interview: I asked two officers of the Centro Interculturale of Turin – who arranged guided visits to Islamic locals for students – why they kept calling these institutes "mosque". They answered, "Because Muslims themselves term them as such". Some days later, in a conversation with the CT's Lebanese director, while explaining to me the reason for their absence from the aforementioned preparative meetings for the City of Turin, he said, "they asked us to participate in the Mosques Open Day, I answered that we are not a mosque, we are only a cultural association". Aside from the fact that such statements are issued only when it suits (because they were unable or unwilling to participate), the answer of the CT's director demonstrates that the whole process of the mosque-building, where the construction of a real one is impossible, occurs only on an unconscious level or is valid only as far as the internal components of the organism are concerned. In other words, the CT was a mosque only as far as women and gender relations were concerned, but not from many other points of view.

Final remarks

In this article, I examined two factors that in my view have contributed to the birth and growth of a Shi'a mosque from an abandoned place with a vague function. The most important one is regarding the way in which the relations between the sexes is treated inside it, and the secondary issue derives from the gradual abandonment of non-religious activities which were initially among the motivations for those who created the organisation. The synergy between these two dynamics formed people's perceptions of this place; perceptions that in its turn reproduce and perpetuate a certain type of gender relations inside it. The CT could well be the apartment of a Muslim citizen of Turin. Neither the removal of shoes at the

entrance, nor the colourful flags of Imams, nor the function of prayer and gathering are exclusive characteristics of mosques, but where the entrance of unveiled women is prohibited and the direct contact of the sexes is avoided, the atmosphere is inevitably filled with the sacredness typical of mosques. The CT has become a mosque, not only in the literal and medieval sense of the word, namely a place of prostration, but it has assumed the sacredness of mosques without being consecrated through the mechanism conceived by ayatollahs through the process of *waqf*. The access of non-Muslims to this place is more proof of the fact that it is not treated as a conventional mosque, even by its attendees; however, any transgression of the norms of gender relations continues to be considered a potential contamination of its sacredness.

This atmosphere then received further religiosity thanks to the absence of those who were more motivated by non-religious pursuits. All the Iranian students, whom I interviewed, outside of the CT, were attending other Iranian organisations as well. Therefore, when the CT gradually distanced itself from its initial nature, some Iranians preferred non-religious venues where national interests were promoted. Whereas, a Shi'a Lebanese who does not want to attend the CT cannot find other established locals for meeting his/her fellow citizens and/or coreligionists. Even the Lebanese Shi'a refugee girl, who did not visit the CT, had found her fellow citizens through it. Notwithstanding the importance of the CT for Lebanese, they did not pursue their national interests within this hall. Whereas Iranians, before the division in the executive committee, sometimes used the hall to celebrate Iranian festivals. Aside from national pursuits, a few Iranian students were also driven by social privileges that, in their return, they could presumably expect to receive from their theocratic state. The question of pursuing non-Shi'a interests in a venue like CT is what differentiates Iranians from Lebanese. It possibly derives from either Iran's long history or from its current Shi'a state that adds components to what generates motivation fort he creation of a community.

The CT's sacredness would be compromised if some changes took place: women could enter without head covers, and the sexes could have free interaction inside the hall. In that case, it could retainits function as a place of worship – like the apartment where Iranian students of Padua gather to pray – but it would not be considered

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sacred anymore. No one, neither outsiders nor the attendees of the Padua's circle, consider the apartment a mosque. Within the Paduan circle, unveiled Iranian girls participate in religious ceremonies and nobody is concerned about the guardianship of some form of sacredness.

The absence of the CT's initial promotors contributed greatly to its metamorphosis. After the early members left, their original desire to make the CT something similar to the Imam Ali Centre of Milan[20] was left unrealised, and the CT was gradually filled by different nationalities and different languages that were gathered exclusively for the sake of religious passion, and not out of a nationalistic type of belonging or for future opportunities. Different from Sunnis, who, thanks to their high rate of population, sometimes manage to form ethnic halls, the number of practicing Shi'as in Turin is so low that an ethnic division is not helpful for anyone; therefore, the uncomfortable mismatch of nations is somehow tolerated. In comparison to the Imam Ali Centre of Milan, the CT is more religious, more repetitious in its activities and much more multi-ethnic: a characteristic that is both a source of interest and tension for its congregants.

The criteria established by Allievi for labelling a place "mosque" are relevant but not nearly thorough enough. They are instruments useful for a census, but only close observation and comparative studies can reveal the different levels of mosque-ness of "mosques". Some places of worship welcome Shi'as on a regular basis for the function of prayer, and are de jure open to all Muslims, hence they meet all conditions set by Allievi to qualify as mosque. However, not all of these spaces are considered mosque by their attendees, for example, the headquarters of the Milan's Shi'a association of the Koranic studies called Acqua and the Paduan Shi'a organisation; or they are not considered as such by everyone, likethe Imam Ali Centre. The issues that we mentioned have convinced the CT's attendees to call it mosque even though it does not comply with the juridical requirements of mosque-ness established by ayatollahs. In

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[20] The first day that I visited the Imam Ali Centre of Milan, I encountered three of the Iranian founders of the CT who preferred to travel almost 150 kilometres to come from Turin, instead of attending the CT.

Turin, the formless Italian space was detached from its surroundings and gained meaning to satisfy the exigency of the seekers of "special nonhomogeneity" (Eliade, 1959, p. 20). This way of approaching the space, in its turn, reproduces a certain system of moral principle inside it. These ethics will subsequently be communicated to children whom are always brought along to the CT by their parents and will be perpetuated by other generations of the Turin's Shi'as to come.

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