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## **Changer les attitudes contre la violence de genre: culture, éducation et apprentissage mutuels \***

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### **Abstract**

This article examines the concept of gender and its multiple meanings. First we will ask what that concept for understanding the dynamics of its construction and its evolution. Then we will link it with the term "violence" and its different meanings that will be explained through the elucidation of special cases such as anti-violence centers in southern Italy.

**Keywords:** Communication, Gender, Education, Prevention, Violence.

### **Synopsis**

Cet article interroge la notion de genre et ses acceptions multiples. Nous allons d'abord nous interroger sur cette notion pour comprendre les dynamiques de sa construction et de son évolution. Ensuite nous allons la lier avec le terme de «violence» et de ses différentes déclinaisons qui seront expliquées à travers l'éluclidation des cas particuliers comme les centres antiviolence dans le Sud de l'Italie.

**Mots-clés:** Communication, Éducation, Genre, Prévention, Violence.

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\* Les auteurs ont partagé l'ensemble des travaux, cependant, en particulier, Nanta Novello Paglianti a rédigé les paragraphes 1 et 2, tandis que Giovanna Truda a rédigé les paragraphes 3 et 4.

## **1. La nature sociale du genre au milieu des dynamiques sociales**

Cet article se divise en deux parties. Dans la première nous allons revenir sur le concept de genre, désormais très étudié, pour rappeler quelques problématiques inscrites dans cette notion. Dans une deuxième partie nous allons étudier comment le genre et la violence sont liés entre eux en s'appuyant sur des exemples concrets: les centres antiviolence de la région de la Campanie, située au Sud d'Italie.

Pour ce qui concerne le premier point, trois contradictions semblent émerger, selon I. Thiery (2011), à l'intérieur de l'actualité contemporaine par rapport à la notion de genre:

La première concerne la différence entre les études de genre et les études sur la famille et/ou sur la parenté (Lévi-Strauss, 1949) comme si les deux notions pourraient rester séparées. Il existe un lien direct entre famille et genre et les deux concepts ne peuvent pas être analysés séparément. Le rapport au genre comprend aussi celui à la famille, à l'école, aux institutions et à la politique (Foucault, 1975).

La deuxième se centre autour de l'égalité des sexes. Du moment que dans certains pays la parité entre les sexes au moins "formelle" a été acquise, la problématique semble être résolue. Toutefois, les problèmes de l'inégalité restent encore présents autour de la répartition du travail et du soin des enfants. Si pendant les années 70, la lutte pour l'égalité des sexes n'était pas encore acquise, actuellement elle est devenue une valeur commune à partager théoriquement unanime. Malheureusement, les questions de parité posent encore problèmes aujourd'hui et sont encore une source de fortes disparités.

Troisièmement, la problématique de genre a été étudiée sous l'angle d'un modèle ethnocentrique comme idéologie contraire aux différentes valeurs actuelles. Même si l'analyse des rapports entre les sexes restent importante, la valeur d'ethnocentrisme et le modèle dominant masculin ont été pris comme terme de parangon. Toutefois aujourd'hui ils ne sont plus applicables à nos sociétés contemporaines.



Toujours selon la sociologue citée auparavant, le partage de l'anthropologue M. Mauss (1925) des populations par sexe, âge et génération comme critères premiers de toutes les sociétés humaines est encore d'actualité. Nous insistons sur la division **par** et non des sexes. Selon cette perspective, le sexe rentre dans des catégories qui ne sont pas identitaires mais pragmatiques et entièrement relationnelles. Nous comprenons qu'une répartition est faite non par les personnes mais par leurs statuts, par les droits et par les devoirs à l'intérieur d'une société. Il s'agit de la construction de classes statutaires qui prennent leur sens grâce à la relation entre elles.

Une différence reste centrale: le concept de genre conçoit non seulement en tant qu'attribut identitaire des personnes mais aussi comme modalité de relations sociales. Le genre, et sa distinction entre masculin et féminin, est d'abord une construction sociale et non naturelle. Cette dichotomie s'est concentrée autour de l'opposition des sexes pour des raisons médicales dans les années 70 en Amérique. Un savoir clinique était, à l'époque, à la base de cette segmentation qui voyait un corps biologique d'une part et un Moi de l'autre. Les caractères des individus étaient saisis comme le fruit d'un conditionnement culturel dans la période infantile. Dans cette acception, le genre était un attribut lié à la personne, constituant l'identité de l'individu, et non une "modalité de relation sociale" (Thiéry, 2011, p. 30) comme aujourd'hui l'on affirme. De fait, une conception dualiste de la personne a été présente jusqu'aux années 80, date clé de sortie de la société occidentale de ce parallélisme. Les relations exprimées à travers la séparation des sexes impliquent autant d'aspects relationnels. Le sexe a été souvent synonyme d'identité substantielle plutôt que d'une relation partagée et continue entre homme et femme.

Aujourd'hui, nous adoptons une définition de genre qui englobe cet aspect:

"Le genre a des connotations psychologiques et culturelles, plus que biologiques. Si les termes appropriés pour sexe sont "mâle" et "femelle", les termes correspondants pour genre sont "masculin" et "féminin"; ces derniers peuvent être totalement indépendants du sexe biologique [...]" (Stoller, 1978, p. 28).

L'intérêt de cette explicitation n'est pas dans la reprise des concepts de masculinité et de féminité mais dans la redéfinition de

ces caractères en tant que produits d'un conditionnement culturel de plus bas âge. Ces stéréotypes de comportement sont intériorisés par l'individu comme des croyances et des traditions.

La conception contemporaine de genre, très présente en Amérique latine, le conçoit comme un concept relationnel: il concerne "les interactions et les négociations entre hommes et femmes" ( Chant & Craske, 2007; Ortale, 2012, p. 9). Dans cette perspective la caractéristique sociale du genre est de plus en plus développée (Arragiada, 2007; Riquer, 2001). Le genre est considéré aussi à l'intérieur de la notion du bien-être qui s'ouvre à des institutions et à des espaces sociaux plus vaste comme l'Etat, les marchés, les habitations, les communautés et la société civile dans son ensemble. Malheureusement la contribution féminine à la construction du bien-être social reste souvent masquée ou utilisée comme "ressource exploitable" pour le bon fonctionnement sociétal.

## **2. Autour de la violence de genre**

La violence de genre est un phénomène social qui touche les femmes de tous les pays du monde, de tous les milieux culturel et social indépendamment de l'âge, de l'éducation, des revenus et que pendant trop longtemps a été négligé et couvert par le silence et la tromperie. «La violence contre les femmes est un phénomène qui est étroitement lié à au moins deux autres variables déterminantes pour sa définition: l'identité personnelle et sociale des hommes et des femmes, qui n'est pas donnée une fois pour toutes, mais a été reconstruite dans le temps, grâce aux rôles et aux espaces sociaux que nous occupons, et le pouvoir, non pas comme la force physique, mais comme un ensemble de capacités expressives générées par l'identité, par la position sociale et économique occupée par chacun » (Corradi, 2009, p. 128).Violences qui englobent non seulement la violence charnelle mais aussi celle psychologique et plus subtile (le chantage psychologique et la dépendance économique), celle structurelle (l'inégalité de l'accès aux soins, la mortalité féminine pour manque d'attention et de nutrition) et différentielle pour chaque pays (l'accès inégal à l'instruction, les investissements mineurs autour du travail de la femme, l'accès aux responsabilités, etc.).

Selon l'UNIFEM<sup>1</sup> (Fonds de Développement des Nations Unies pour la Femme), les statistiques décrivent une situation effrayante en termes de conséquences sociales et sanitaires de la violence contre les femmes. Pour les femmes âgées de 15 à 44 ans, la violence est la principale cause de décès et d'incapacités (Conseil de l'Europe, 2002).

Pour citer quelques chiffres de l'association Mémoire Traumatique et Victimologie<sup>2</sup>, chaque année, 216 000 femmes âgées de 18 à 75 ans sont victimes de violences physiques et/ou sexuelles de la part de leur ancien ou actuel partenaire intime. Au cours de l'année 2008, 184 personnes sont décédées, victimes de leur partenaire ou ex-partenaire de vie.

Tous les deux jours en France, un homicide est commis au sein du couple. 156 femmes sont décédées en une année, victimes de leur compagnon ou ex-compagnon, 27 hommes sont décédés, victimes de leur compagne ou ex-compagne. 1 femme est tuée par son partenaire ou ex-tous les 2 jours et demi, 1 homme tous les 14 jours. Finalement, les femmes sont les victimes dans 84,4 % des cas. L'enquête de Seine St Denis en 2008 confirme que les plus jeunes femmes (18-21 ans) subissent plus de violences dans le couple au cours des douze derniers mois.

Selon Julie Devineau et Delphine Lacombe (2012, p. 7), les regards les plus habituels posés sur ce phénomène sont principalement deux : premièrement l'exemplification journalistique, le buzz médiatique autour du fait violent qui va s'estomper dans un temps assez court ; deuxièmement la dénonciation immédiate de l'injustice et du machisme qui ensuite une fois montrés rentrent dans le fonctionnement « normal » d'un pays. L'épisode de violence pose des problèmes parce qu'il affiche « les formes complexes d'articulations entre les instances symboliques, matérielles, juridiques et politiques qui structurent et perpétuent l'inégalité des sexes » (Devineau & Lacombe, 2012, p. 9).

La thématique de la violence, question moins étudiée et il y a 30 ans, s'est répandue grâce aux études et aux politiques féministes et

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<sup>1</sup> Informations fournies par le site [www.onufemmes.org](http://www.onufemmes.org), consulté le 20/12/2015.

<sup>2</sup> Informations fournies par le site [www.memoiretraumatique.org](http://www.memoiretraumatique.org), consulté le 10/12/2015.

aux mouvements internationaux qui ont dénoncé globalement ce phénomène souvent sous l'étiquette plus générale des « oppressions de minorités ». En revanche, cette distinction est centrale pour faire émerger la violence : la spécificité des actes de violence sur les femmes constitue des agressions genrées et non annulées dans un problème culturel plus vaste.

Le questionnement autour de la visibilité de la violence émerge comme un aspect essentiel. Elle est souvent invisible et d'un statut « incertain », non défini jusqu'à l'émergence de sa preuve matérielle et indiscutable qui est le viol ou le meurtre (par exemple les assassinats de 400 femmes et 500 disparues dans la ville de Ciudad Juarez au Nord du Mexique à partir de l'année 93).

La notion de genre prend une place centrale dans ce contexte : les femmes sont victimes de violence, dans les cas les plus extrêmes, pendant les conflits armés (Colombie) et dans les territoires, etc. Cherchons à réfléchir sur le statut de ces femmes :

Dans le cas du conflit armé la femme est un instrument symbolique de violence contre l'ennemi masculin. La vraie cible n'est pas la femme en tant que telle mais la violence symbolique perpétuée aux hommes. L'ennemi possède le bien symbolique plus près de l'ennemi : le corps mère de la femme. Il est l'élément plus proche et qui permet la renaissance de l'ennemi (et donc sa force). La violence symbolique va jusqu'à toucher le corps féminin réduit à un objet à un bien à piller, mais symboliquement celui qui est visé est celui masculin de l'Autre.

Dans le cas de violences publiques à l'intérieur du pays la femme est souvent discriminée en tant que coupable de son geste : par exemple à travers la provocation (jupes courtes, décolletés). Si elle dénonce les faits, elle est souvent mise à l'écart par son entourage de proximité ou au moins stigmatisée en tant que porteuse à vie des séquelles de violence. Elle devient un témoin de ce que la société lui a fait subir.

Dans le cas des violences domestiques, l'agression est mise sous la justification de « disputes conjugales ordinaires » qui ont dégénéré à cause de justifications externes (alcool, argent, jalousie, etc.). La violence rentre dans l'étiquette souvent montrée dans les séries télévisuelles américaines et acceptées comme « normale » ou englobée dans le « crime passionnel ». La femme en tout cas prend

sur elle et elle est invitée par la famille à se taire et à ne pas dénoncer les faits. La sphère privée camoufle le geste violent et cherche à résoudre à son intérieur la gravité des actes. Encore une fois l'invisibilité devient synonyme de non-lieu des violences.

Malgré la diversité des cas évoqués, la figure féminine subit la violence mais elle n'est pas « la » protagoniste en tant que sujet respecté. Son image est tirillée à fin de rétablir l'ordre social mais elle n'a pas une place légitime. Pourtant la conférence de Belém do Para (Brésil, 1994) a défini dans son premier article: « la violence contre les femmes est tout acte ou comportement fondé sur le genre qui cause la mort, des dommages ou des souffrances physiques, sexuelles ou psychiques à la femme, aussi bien dans sa vie publique que dans sa vie privée<sup>3</sup> ».

Ce type de violence a été reconnu comme spécifique au genre et différents pays ont créé des législations pour combattre le féminicide, l'assassinat misogyne d'une femme<sup>4</sup> (Rafford & Russell, 1992). C'est le cas, entre autres, de la loi générale d'accès aux femmes à une vie sans violence, (LGAFVSV, 2007), de la loi n°2010-769 du 9 juillet 2010, en France, relative aux violences faites spécifiquement aux femmes, aux violences au sein des couples et aux incidences de ces dernières sur les enfants et de l'Article 14- 6, de la Loi du 7 août 2015 en Italie.

Ces actes violents s'expliquent par une grande tolérance de la violence masculine envers les femmes (violence qui concerne les différents milieux sociaux) et par l'impunité de l'Etat par rapport à cette typologie des actes.

Ces crimes commis par des hommes souvent faisant partie de l'entourage familial, ne concernent pas que les pays de l'Amérique Latine, territoire étudié par des liens stricts au féminicide mais bien évidemment aussi l'ensemble de l'Europe.

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<sup>3</sup> Article 1 de la « Convención intramericana para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer », [www.oas.org](http://www.oas.org) . La convention a été ratifiée par 27 pays sur 35 de l'OEA. Le Mexique s'y est ajouté en 1998.

<sup>4</sup>Ce concept est né aux Etats-Unis dans les années 90 par Diana Russel et Jill Radford (1992)

qui soulignent la dimension sexiste des violences portant à la mort des femmes et/ou à leur anéantissement socio-psychologique. Beaucoup de pays en Amérique Latine ont reconnu l'existence de ce néologisme et l'ont inscrit dans les reformes des lois pour la tutelle envers les femmes.

Nous ne devons pas oublier qu'à travers la modification des habitudes culturelles et le travail de sensibilisation autour du partage des rôles, une des sources de stéréotypes et de violences « genrées », le cadre culturel des territoires est une dimension importante à prendre en considération pour commencer un travail de sensibilisation envers cette problématique.

Nous concevons le cadre culturel comme « un ensemble de pratiques sociales et d'habitudes construites collectivement » (Geertz, 1973) qui souvent enferment l'individu dans un fonctionnement soi-disant « naturel » voire identitaire. La déconstruction de ces cadres de référence permet d'instaurer un discours autour des relations paritaires entre les genres.

La violence peut-elle être mesurée et identifiée à travers des paramètres d'évaluation de genre ? Comment les différents territoires combattent ce phénomène ?

### **3. Les centres antiviolence**

La violence contre les femmes est un phénomène social qui touche les femmes de tous les pays du monde, de tous les milieux culturel et social indépendamment de l'âge, de l'éducation, des revenus et que pendant trop longtemps a été négligé et couvert par le silence et la tromperie.

Les centres anti-violence ont contribué à briser le silence des femmes. En Italie, au cours des dernières années, la confrontation continue et l'activisme politique des femmes qui ont fondé diverses *associations*, ont permis la création des centres antiviolence et des centres d'accueil. En 1990, lorsque les centres n'étaient pas encore aussi nombreux qu'aujourd'hui, on a construit un réseau de centres anti-violence, un réseau informel, créé surtout sur des échanges d'informations.

En Janvier 2006, il a été signé à Rome par les 56 centres anti-violence autonomes, une *Charte des refuges pour femmes* afin d'adopter des valeurs communes sur lesquelles orienter son action.

Le document se réfère à certains des principes qui identifient l'identité et de la méthodologie des centres, y compris: le mâle violence contre les femmes comme un phénomène qui a ses racines

dans la répartition inégale du pouvoir entre les sexes considèrent; que les centres sont créés et gérés uniquement par des femmes; qui est garanti aux femmes anonymat et la sécurité.

La constitution d'un réseau des refuges pour femmes c'est un moment de changement, surtout pour la visibilité du phénomène. Ces centres acceptent et soutiennent les femmes qui ont subi des violences en effectuant un soutien juridique et psychologique.

L'analyse en général a produit une étude approfondie sur le concept de la violence de genre et en particulier a analysé le rôle des refuges féminins présents sur différents territoires nationaux et elle propose une comparaison internationale avec les réalités similaires.

Les centres anti-violence à la fin d'assurer l'efficacité de l'action de leur part tenue de soutenir les femmes en difficulté à cause de la violence, on a besoin d'une continuité des financements publics, par conséquent, en absence d'une législation nationale spécifique sur les politiques à l'appui des centres anti-violence, les différentes régions italiennes, à des époques très différentes, ont adopté des lois spécifiques. Les politiques régionales sur la violence contre les femmes sont très souvent une solution locale au problème économique. Exemples sont la mise en place des maisons des femmes à Bolzano (province autonome) (LP10 / 1989); les règles pour la création de centres anti-violence ou maisons refuge pour femmes battues dans la région Lazio (L.R. 64/1993), la réalisation de projets de lutte contre la violence et la création de centres pour femmes en détresse en Friuli Venezia Giulia (loi régionale 17/2000); la création de centres et maisons d'accueil en Campania (L.R. 11/2005) la loi L.R. 31/2006 en Abruzzo; la création de centres et maisons d'accueil et d'assistance pour les femmes battues en Liguria (L.R. 6.3 / 2007).

Au lieu de cela, dans des nombreuses autres régions italien, l'aide aux femmes battue jugé plus approprié d'inclure la question de la violence contre les femmes dans les lois régionales générales sur les services sociaux. En fait, avec le lancement de la dévolution des pouvoirs de l'État vers les régions et les autorités locales, la politique sociale est géré par Ente Région et par conséquent, les actions relatives à la protection des femmes battues sont maintenant sous la responsabilité de l'autorité locale.

La loi nationale 328/2000<sup>5</sup> fournit, à travers des plans sociaux et de santé ou le bien-être, des outils concrets de la programmation de la politique sociale locale.

Les recherches menées lors de la deuxième Conférence nationale des centres anti-violence<sup>6</sup> montre que de nombreuses régions citent les centres anti-violence, ou vous rapporter à la prévention du phénomène de la violence contre les femmes dans leurs plans la santé sociale, mais souvent sans fournir interventions prévues ou identifiées.. Ceci est l'un des pourquoi en Italie il y a un fort déséquilibre par rapport à la couverture et les moyens (locaux, dort dans les maisons d'hébergement, les lignes téléphoniques d'urgence, etc.) à la disposition des centres anti-violence, qui sont souvent à risque de fermeture pour manque de financement local, ou laissé seul dans toutes les actions de prévention et d'éducation afin essentielle pour réduire un phénomène d'une telle vaste étendue que celle de la violence contre les femmes. En raison de cette fragmentation régionale, les centres anti-violence réclament depuis longtemps une loi nationale qui donnerait un cadre et précise, afin d'encourager l'initiative des autorités locales.

Lorsque nous analysons le phénomène de la violence contre les femmes, nous nous rendons compte que nous ne sommes pas confrontés à un phénomène linéaire, mais opposé à un chemin qui correspond à un cycle, le soi-disant cycle de la violence. Un cycle qui se répète jusqu'à ce qu'il ya un changement dans le comportement d'une ou de l'autre partie. Il est possible d'identifier les étapes de ce cycle (Fig.1) en trois essentiels: - la répétition et la croissance de la culpabilité de l'agresseur, il tente un retour affectif, le soi-disant «lune de miel»; - la discussion et l'accumulation de tensions entre les deux individus dans la relation. Les tentatives futiles par la victime de parler, mais le comportement violent de la personne totalement hors de contrôle; - la personne violente commence à agir avec violence physique et perpétue ainsi une forme de contrôle sur la

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
<sup>5</sup> Loi nationale n° 328 de 2000 - «Loi-cadre pour la réalisation du système intégré d'interventions et de services sociaux» a redéfini, en Italie, le profil des politiques sociales en faisant une série de nouveaux éléments.

<sup>6</sup> 2ème National Convention Centre antiviolence et Maisons De Femmes "Les femmes produisent la connaissance, de la santé, le changement", Marina di Ravenna, 28/29 Novembre 2003



victime à suivre la situation créée, renouvelant le cycle de la violence. Lorsque la victime tente de mettre fin au cycle, il y a deux solutions possibles; ou il peut conduire à la violence extrême comme le suicide ou la sortie du cycle, mais il n'est pas possible sans l'aide et le soutien des refuges, des associations communautaires ou de la famille.

Fig. 1 - Le cycle de la violence



En Italie, les refuges ou les associations sont des services dans la région (par exemple en Campanie) qui offrent ou devraient apporter une réponse adéquate, de l'aide à celles qui souffrent de violence. En 1990 le premier centre des femmes a lieu à Bologne, en 1991 déjà plus de 50 groupes des femmes en Italie ont créé des centres contre la violence des femmes. Aujourd'hui 100 centres sont présents sur le territoire national. C'est l'Emilia Romagna la région avec plusieurs « Centri », les plus actives et nombreuses au niveau national. Mais comment fonctionnent-ils? Qui sont les opérateurs qui y travaillent et quel rôle ont-ils? Le projet a étudié et analysé les modèles d'intervention, le rôle et les fonctions des opérateurs, la façon dont ils fournissent assistance et soutien aux victimes, grâce aux installations

spécialisées qui peuvent les aider à surmonter le traumatisme causé par la violence. L'action de l'hospitalité nécessite une approche multidisciplinaire et intégrée: elles sont toujours présentes des implications de santé, de société et légales nécessitant un réseau de travail et des ressources. En général, ce réseau est constitué des différentes organisations (Fig.2), associations et services publics ; le « Consultorio familiare<sup>7</sup> » pour l'aide psychologique, l'aide psychologique est essentiel pour renforcer la confiance en soi de la victime, et pour lui permettre de faire face et surmonter la violence, que ce soit pour soutenir le processus de l'affaire qui devra faire face pour obtenir la condamnation de celui qui a perpétré la violence. Les agences d'aide pour l'entrée dans le monde de travail;l'insertion dans l'emploi est l'outil indispensable pour l'intégration dans le système social et surtout l'indépendance économique permet de rompre le lien de dépendance qui, dans de nombreux cas, la victime a avec son bourreau. Les services sociaux pour émergence ; les services sociaux sont le premier point de contact sur le terrain, dans le cas de la violence, mais aussi ceux qui fournissent un appui et un abri viennent de subir la violence. Les politiques et les services pour les enfants (mineurs), lorsque dans une famille où il ya eu des actes de violence sont des enfants, la loi italienne est très stricte et augmente la peine pour la personne qui maltraite, mais que dire des solutions économiques possibles, ce qui permet de soutenir et d'aider les femmes victimes de violence et qui ont des enfants à l'aide de fonds alloués à la détresse du nourrisson, en particulier pendant les périodes où il ya une pénurie de ressources économiques. Enfin, mais aussi important, on a les agences qui s'occupent de donner le soutien et les conseils légaux, et les coopératives de médiation culturelle, qui organise la médiation entre la relation familiale.

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<sup>7</sup> Le Consultorio familiare est un service public et de la santé sociale, le conseil et l'assistance à l'individu, du couple et de la famille établi par la loi national du 29 Juillet 1975 n. 405. Le Consultorio familiare publique par la loi ont l'obligation d'aider toutes les femmes italiennes et étrangères, aussi pas en possession d'un permis de séjour, et de leurs enfants jusqu'à ce qu'ils viennent de l'âge.

Fig. 2 - Le réseau des ressources



#### 4. Les instruments

Les instruments que le centre utilise sont différents mais sont tous basés sur une relation. Les relations dans les refuges des femmes "Centri Antiviolenza", sont principalement de deux types: les relations entre opératrices, les relations entre opératrices et femmes qui demandent le « service », mais surtout toutes les relations sont des relations entre femmes.

La première étape de connaissance des femmes arrive dans les entretiens d'orientation. Chaque femme est aidée à analyser sa propre expérience dans un contexte de pleine confiance, tranquillité et liberté pour permettre de réfléchir sur elle-même. Les entretiens de connaissance ont lieu normalement deux fois par semaine pour donner le temps de réfléchir sur la rencontre, ils aident les femmes à prendre conscience et à métaboliser tous les événements passés.

Après la phase de connaissance, l'individuation des problématiques et l'indication des phases du parcours, les usagers sont plus autonomes pour affronter et/ ou résoudre le problème. Les opératrices, doivent indiquer toutes les informations et les références et offrir disponibilité et soutien le plus possible. Cette phase s'appelle phase d'accompagnement et insertion.

Les relations qui s'installent sont très différentes des autres services à la personne qui existent sur le territoire. Cette différence s'explique dans la relation d'aide qui n'est pas une diagnostique d'une opératrice sociale, mais une réflexion et un travail pour la prédisposition vers un projet ad hoc pour la victime, une relations à deux dans la quelle est nécessaire la participation active de la victime est donc elle doit nécessairement être d'accord à faire le parcours. La relation est une forme/modalité où l'on expérimente l'existence, c'est un espace créatif existentiel où est possible penser l'accueil et trouver avec la femme le sens de la relation qui peut devenir une relation d'aide. La relation représente l'instrument à travers lequel on peut réaliser un processus de changement positif dans le développement d'une personne et dans la solution de ses problèmes.

Si les relations entre les opératrices sont paritaires on ne peut pas dire le même pour les relations entre opératrices et femmes accueillies. Même les mots utilisés: "opératrice" et "usager" on remarque la position différente dans la relation des deux, aussi s'elle tentent à maintenir une relation plus possible paritaire. La méthodologie d'accueil implique une reconnaissance directe du couple sexe/genre. «... *On cherche à construire un système communicatif et expressif qui appartient au monde féminin pour orienter le regard, l'unique qui est capable de renvoyer à la signification profonde d'être femme...* »<sup>8</sup>

Le "Centro antiviolenza" représente un lieu institutionnel de relation entre femmes, un lieu où est possible redonner sens au comportement et aux choix. L'analyse a réfléchi aussi sur la fonction centrale du contexte dans lequel le soutien psychologique et juridique est effectué afin d'évaluer le degré d'efficacité et d'efficience.

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<sup>8</sup> Extrait du document Layka 2010.

Une attention particulière dans l'analyse a été donnée aux refuges pour femmes qui travaillent dans une action d'éducation / formation autour de la violence afin de ne pas répéter les mêmes attitudes et afin d'identifier quand il est possible le harceleur. Ils existent des réalités différentes dans les nombreux pays d'Europe pour donner une réponse forte et partagée sur la violence contre les femmes. Il faudrait mettre en place des mesures pour prévenir et lutter contre la violence de genre, donc combattre la violence signifie aussi d'offrir aux femmes et aux hommes des possibilités et des outils pour faire face à la prise de conscience de la problématique de la violence contre les femmes, et au-delà des stéréotypes.

Le chemin à suivre peut être l'éducation et la formation dans les écoles pour l'action préventive en activant un processus d'éducation au genre à travers la mise en œuvre de projets dans les écoles.

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# **The Migrant's Gaze.**

## **A Survey on Mobility Factors Carried out in the Reception Centres of Taranto \***

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### **Abstract**

The migration phenomenon has significantly grown over the last years. Migrants no longer consider Italy as a country of transit, but also as a final destination. Therefore, institutions and civil society organizations have explored new and unprecedented forms of collaboration. This paper presents the results of a survey aiming to analyse in depth the reasons underlying the migration project as well as to identify any forms of integration in the host country, starting from immigrant reception centres. The journey to Italy, as well as the related costs and risks have been considered from the migrant's point of view. Most of the people interviewed come from Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly from the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. To have a more complete and comprehensive survey, it was deemed useful to analyse the standpoints of the operators who are professionally called to respond to this emergency.

**Keywords:** Immigration, Integration, Mobility, Social services, Welcoming immigrants.

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\* All authors contributed to the whole paper. However, Alfonso Zizza has specifically composed the Abstract, Foreword and first section (paragraphs: 1, 1.1,1.2), Antonio Panico has developed the analysis in the second section (paragraphs: 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3, 3.1, 3.2), and Marinella Sibilla has developed the last part of the analysis in the second section, third section (paragraphs: 3.3, 4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5), and the Conclusions.

## Foreword

Migrations, as any other social phenomenon, are the whole of individual and collective stories. For a better understanding of the phenomenon, it is worth recalling some of the migration theories that have been developed over time.

Opposing structuralism or macro-sociological theories and individualist or micro-sociological ones influences existing literature on migration. The former emphasise the uneven development and the disparities in different countries of the world (Piore, 1979) as well as the “world-systems theory” (Wallerstein, 1974); the latter instead, as the neoclassical migration model, highlight the demographic imbalances and geographical differences of the labour market. However, within a micro-sociological theoretical framework, the New Economics of Labour Migration argues that migration decisions are not taken by isolated actors but by larger units of related people, typically households or families (Stark 1991; Sayad 1999).

Among the explanations provided by macro and micro sociological approaches it is worth mentioning the theory of *networks* (Massey 1988; Boyd 1989), which are sets of interpersonal ties, that link migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas. Ties can be considered as a form of social capital useful to obtain information or material and emotional support (Portes, 1989).

The underlying causes of the current refugee crisis are simple and complex at the same time: wars, inhuman behaviour, racial hatred, famine and poverty (OECD 2011).

The tragedy of our time is the deep gap between wealthy technologically advanced countries and other vast regions of the world suffering from terrible conditions.

In 2016, 361,709<sup>1</sup> migrants landed on European coasts. This is a significant drop compared to 2015, during which more than 1 million people crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The flows toward Greece saw a drastic decrease starting from May 2016, also as a result of the implementation of the Agreement between the

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<sup>1</sup> Cfr. <http://www.ismu.org/2017/01/aggiornamenti-emergenza-immigrazione-europa/>. Retrieved January 30, 2017.



European Union and Turkey (March 2016). On the contrary, the number of migrants arriving in Italy has increased by almost 28,000 units compared to 2015 (Tab. 1).

*Tab. 1 – Landings on the Mediterranean shores*

	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Greece	41,038	856,723	173,447
Italy	170,100	153,842	181,436
Malta	568	105	0
Spain	4,348	4,408	6,826
<b>Total Mediterranean</b>	<b>216,054</b>	<b>1,015,078</b>	<b>361,709</b>

The present study aims to better investigate the dynamics of the migrants coming to Italy with particular reference to those living in the Puglia Region reception centres of Taranto and Massafra. The objective is to understand in detail the reasons why migrants run away from their countries, what they were escaping from and how they organise their journeys also in terms of costs and expenses, and to let them express their expectations, in order to obtain an invaluable insight from the migrant's point of view and perspective.

A sociological disciplinary approach has been used.

## **1. The survey design and the research methodology**

The current research was made possible thanks to the collaboration between the University and the local ACLI of Taranto (Christian Associations of Italian Workers) and was carried out within the local migration reception centres.

The survey was divided into two steps: the first involving the immigrants and the second the operators.

During the first step, structured questionnaires including some open questions were submitted to the migrants. The questions were related to various subjects such as the migrant routes (to and from Italy), as well as migrants' health conditions and integration level.

The study was carried out on a survey sample consisting of 180 adult immigrants who had been living in Italy for at least 3 months. The reference reception centres in Taranto are the following:

- N. 3 CDA (Reception Centre): ABFO (Associazione Benefica Fulvio Occhinegro-charity association); Noi & Voi association; Salam association;
- N. 2 SPRAR (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees): the “Motus Animi” project, Massafra (Ta); “OltreConfine” project.

The second step instead directly involved 19 operators, as first-hand witnesses, working in the above-mentioned centres. Interviews were focused on specific areas such as services, legislation, and health services as well as on the role-played by the volunteers and by the associations.

The main professional profiles involved are: 2 Managers, 5 Cultural and Linguistic Mediators, 1 Psychologist, 6 Social Assistants, 1 Legal Expert, 1 Italian Teacher, 2 Volunteers, 1 Educator.

The data related to individual questionnaires were entered into a *Data Entry*, and then converted into *Data Sets* compatible with the various procedures of multivariate statistical analysis (*a posteriori coding*). SPSS software was used to process data.

### *1.1. Who they are*

The forms used to collect information about the immigrants clearly show that in the reference reception centres there are only men, with the majority aged between 18 (32.8%) and 19 years (13.3%) and that they are bachelors (83.3%).

They come mostly from the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal (Tab. 2).

The most remarkable datum resulting from the interviews clearly highlights the difficult situation our interlocutors find themselves in, due to the alarmingly low level of schooling: despite the fact that 74.4% of them state that they can write, and 75.6% can read, there are reasons to believe that most of them are essentially self-educated. In fact, 31.1% of them state that they have never attended any educa-

tional institutions and only 10% of them attended regular school for 6 or more years.

*Tab. 2 – The countries they come from*

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Absolute values</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Afghanistan	5	2.8
Bangladesh	15	8.3
Benin	1	0.6
Ivory Coast	3	1.7
Egypt	1	0.6
Gambia	44	24.4
Ghana	7	3.9
Guinea Conakry	2	1.2
Iraq	3	1.7
Mali	37	20.6
Mauritania	1	0.6
Nigeria	27	15.0
Pakistan	3	1.7
Palestine	1	0.6
Senegal	26	14.4
Sierra Leone	2	1.1
Togo	1	0.6
Tunisia	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### *1.2. What they are escaping from*

It is well known that migration is mainly a form of geographical mobility (Ambrosini & Sciolla, 2015, p. 336) and can be a very traumatic experience when the final destination of the migration route is a foreign country. In the majority of cases, international migrations are preceded by domestic migrations, usually from a rural area to a big city, where it is easier to find useful contacts and plan the migration abroad (Zanfrini, 2004, p. 25). This is the case for the majority of the interviewed sample: before leaving their country only 43.3% of them lived in the capital city or in a big town. As far as the

migration dynamics, the main reasons why these people fled their homes are strictly related to family problems accounting for 37.8% (parent-child conflicts, divorce, family revenge) and for 10.5% to personal problems (as they said: “*the husband of a woman wanted to kill me*”, “*legal problems due to financial compensation*”, “*my grandpa was the only one taking care of me*”...). Nearly half of the migrants seeking asylum in Italy are not supposed to have the right to claim it. The remaining 51.7% of them have claims that could be eligible to apply for the refugee status.

Tab. 3 – The reasons why they left their Countries of origin

Which are the main reasons why you left your Country of origin?	Absolute values	%
Lack of /difficulty in finding a job in the country where I lived.	5	2.8
Seek a better quality of life for me and for my family	4	2.2
Run away from family problems (parent-child conflicts, divorce, family revenge)	68	37.8
To study abroad	1	0.6
War /civil conflict	45	25.0
Persecutions /restrictions to freedom for racial, religious, ideological, political and, sexual orientation.	48	26.7
No answer	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

When migrants were asked why they had chosen Italy instead of another country, 90 out 180 of them, i.e. half of those interviewed, stated they had not deliberately chosen to come to our country. 20% of them chose Italy because it is easier to reach, while for 22% Italy offers a better quality of life in terms of lifestyle, landscape and climate. Two immigrants said: “*In Italy life is good*”, “*the weather is always fine*”. It is worth pointing out that for many of them Italy is a transit country, on the way to Northern Europe. They remarked that it is easier to enter and stay, with or without an entry visa, and there are fewer checks.

Regarding how they were able to reach Italy, and here their answers may not represent the whole truth, 77.8% of them did not seek anybody’s support to find the money for their journey to Italy or if

they did, they were helped by relatives who did not live in Italy. Over 61.1% of them stated they did not ask anybody to help them organize their journey and get temporary housing. 15.6% of them admitted they had sought assistance from some illegal organizations. The journey was extremely long: more than 1 year for 59.4% of them as they had to travel across other countries before reaching Italy (93.3%).

There is clear evidence throughout the present survey data that some Northern African Countries represent the point of confluence of very articulated and well-organized itineraries that branch off along the African continent. Those are specifically the “routes” followed by the migrants to reach the places where they can illegally embark to land on European Coasts.

There are two main routes: one going upwards towards Eastern Africa in order to reach Libya and the other one crossing Burkina Faso, Niger or Mali, also reaching Libya. The current chaotic situation present in this country fosters all kinds of trafficking, including that inhuman beings.

Due to its geographical position and geo-political situation, Libya could be considered as a sort of “natural funnel” for the majority of African migration flows, largely because the local militias, in collaboration with unscrupulous criminal organizations, have an interest in maximizing profits resulting from this inhuman smuggling business. The overcrowding of ramshackle boats sailing for Italy even with unfavourable weather conditions is the evident demonstration of an extremely dangerous and totally out-of-control phenomenon.

The migrants that we interviewed have predominantly followed the second main route before arriving in Libya and eventually landing on the Italian coast.

## **2. The Journey to come to Italy**

The great majority of migrants (82.2%) arrived in our country by boat or dinghy. This datum is referred to the last part of the route followed by the migrants who arrived in Libya by other means such as truck, bus, car and train or even by foot, walking for many miles.

86.1% of the interviewed migrants declare that none of the people they travelled with during the whole or part of the journey is actually present in the reception centre where they are now hosted, nor have they found any known friend there (Tab. 4).

*Tab. 4 – Were any of the people presently living in this reception centre with you during the journey to Italy?*

<i>Were any of the people presently living in this reception centre with you during the journey to Italy?</i>	<i>Absolute values</i>	<i>%</i>
Yes	25	13,9
No	155	86.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

80% of those interviewed declared that they reached their destination with the same travel companions they departed with, to reach our Country (Tab. 5).

*Tab. 5 – Arrival in Italy*


<i>Did all the travel companions you travelled with by sea, arrive with you?</i>	<i>Absolute values</i>	<i>%</i>
They did not arrive by sea	7	3.9
Yes	144	80.0
No	25	13.9
No answer	4	2.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The table shows that 25 interviewed migrants (13.9%) report a much less fortunate journey by sea for their travel companions: not everybody arrived to destination. Therefore, we asked them to tell us why, whether they knew. Only one person did not answer and another one stated that one of his travel companion suffered from a disease during the journey and did not survive; all the other interviewed migrants referred to “drowning” as the main cause of death. *“One friend died. He fell from the boat”. “The boat broke before reaching the island. There were many dead people around me in the sea”*. In fact drowning, experienced by some of their fellow migrants, as they

told us, is indeed reported as the main cause of death during this particular kind of journey, in addition to the high number of fatalities occurring during the perilous crossing of the Sahara desert. The data reported by IOM (International Organization for Migrations) confirm the above data as death by drowning has recorded a dramatic increase over the last years.

More specifically, there was an increase from 3,279 migrant deaths in 2014 to a staggering 3,772 deaths by drowning in 2015 and most of them occurred in the middle of “Mare nostrum” as revealed by the above-mentioned organization<sup>2</sup>.

*Chart 1 – Migrant deaths in the Mediterranean*



<sup>2</sup> See <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en/latest-global-figures>.

Tab. 6 – Casualties in the Mediterranean Sea, divided by route, 2015

<i>Month</i>	<i>Central Mediterranean Sea</i>	<i>Eastern Mediterranean Sea</i>	<i>Western Mediterranean Sea</i>	<i>Total</i>
January	67	0	15	77
February	337	9	0	346
March	53	8	0	69
April	1,230	14	0	1,244
May	95	0	0	95
June	4	6	0	10
July	206	24	0	230
August	652	29	5	684
September	76	190	2	268
October	163	221	48	432
November	8	98	0	105
December	1	207	4	135
Jan	2,892	806	74	3,760

Source: <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en/latest-global-figures/mediterranean>

The table shows a significant increase of deaths by drowning during the last months of 2015 in the Eastern area of the Mediterranean Sea, also confirmed during the first months of 2016. The current Syrian situation shows no signs of change in a positive direction, and the narrow water channel between Turkey and the Greek Islands, seems to encourage lots of refugees in a desperate situation to risk their lives and cross the strait.

### *2.1. The cost of the journey*

Following one of the “migrant routes”, regardless if legally or illegally requires significant efforts and resources, especially from an economic point of view.



Tab. 7 – Migrants who committed money or other for their journey to Italy

<i>In order to come to Italy did you have to give money or something else to anybody?</i>	<i>Absolute values</i>	<i>%</i>
Yes	108	60.0
No	71	39.4
No answer	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table n. 7 shows that 60% of the interviewed migrants confirmed that they had to give money or something else to reach Italian coasts. Instead, what was declared by the remaining 40% is likely quite unreliable. It is not hard to figure out how difficult it was to talk with them about these matters and be able to obtain, regardless, a good number of answers; our efforts enabled us to gather more data compared to the general information often provided by the mass media.

It is also reasonable to claim that although there are migrants who autonomously organize their journeys, the majority of departures are strictly controlled by a few organizations handling the passage from one border to the other.

Different media reports have demonstrated that migration flows towards the Mediterranean Sea generate a whirling racket of hundreds of millions of euros per year<sup>3</sup>.

The cost of the journey is quite high, as declared by 108 interviewed migrants who admitted to have paid in order to reach the Italian coasts. The transit cost was mainly paid in dinars, dollars, euros, and a minimum part in CFA francs<sup>4</sup> and dalasi. These are mainly foreign currencies used in some countries of the African continent. Most of the interviewed migrants, precisely 52 of them, paid for their journey in dinars, 10 in euros and 9 in dollars. It is worth mentioning

<sup>3</sup> See the news reports by Enrico Fierro and Lucio Musolino published in *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2015 <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/06/08/migranti-i-racconti-dei-viaggi-estenuanti-meglio-morire-una-sola-volta-che-tutti-i-giorni/1753207/> See also Paola Monzini, “Le rotte dei nostri migranti” published in the *Review Limes*, 6/2015 and the articles that Paolo Lambruschi, a journalist, has been publishing in *Avvenire* since 2014.

<sup>4</sup> The CFA (*Colonies Francaises d’Afrique*) franc is the present currency used in 14 Countries, which are former French Colonies.

that 27 of them were unable to express the exact cost of the journey, 3 of them did not remember, 2 did not answer and 1 did not know.

If we consider the amount of money declared by each migrant, it is evident that the maximum cost, converted into euros, is equal to 13,160.

Taking a look at the currencies mostly used to pay for the journey, comparing them to the countries where they are actually used, we can draw a sort of “monetary geographical map” that perfectly matches the map of the routes followed by many migrants to come to Italy.

## 2.2. *Why coming and settling in Italy*

The interviewed migrants, even if they find themselves in a sort of transitory condition, “suspended” in a “space” that cannot be necessarily defined by their identity, history or social relations, have nevertheless, as shown by the survey data, expressed their wish to stay in Italy. At the time of the survey, in fact, 82.2% of the people interviewed said they wanted to settle in Italy.

This unexpected answer may be the result of a good welcome in the host country or merely the sense of contentment experienced by those who have escaped from dramatic conditions and managed to survive the hazardous journey. It is also likely that those interviewed were simply not completely sincere in their answers, being afraid to disappoint the interviewer who was indeed Italian. Furthermore, they were still waiting to be granted the refugee status or were hoping to receive the minimum subsidiary protection. Moreover, it should be noted that 50% of the interviewed migrants stated that they had not previously or deliberately chosen to come to Italy, so it is unlikely that they all so intensely wanted to remain in Italy forever.

16.7% of them do not know whether to stay or leave for other destinations, their decision may depend “*on papers*” and “*on work*”. Only 2 of them say they want to go back to their country of origin. In line with the survey data, only 1 of them clearly states he wants to go to another country, i.e. Canada.

As already pointed out, it is quite strange that almost all the migrants who arrived in Italy want to actually settle and integrate in our

country. These data strike a discordant note compared to what is happening in Northern Italy, particularly in Como, Ventimiglia and Brennero. The migrants have literally besieged the borders in order to reach Switzerland, France and Austria. These are mandatory places of transit, where, however, migrants are often forced to stay due to the controversial European policies presently covering the migration flows.

It is not at all easy to evaluate and consider the life plans and expectations of each individual. The assistance, inclusion and integration project carried out within the various service centres may not necessarily perfectly match the needs of all migrants, or parts of them or of specific ethnic groups (Panico 2015).

As a consequence, the assistance, inclusion and integration services need to be re-designed in a different way, also at a more specific territorial level and only secondarily within the framework of European and domestic rationale. It is crucial to consider individual ethnic backgrounds and cultures: what is good for a Somali migrant is not necessarily good for a Syrian one. However, we are very far from a “tailored” integration process.

*Tab.8 – Preference expressed on the possibility to remain in Italy*

<i>Do you presently think to remain in Italy?</i>	<i>Absolute values</i>	<i>%</i>
I think so; I think I will settle here	148	82.2
No, I ‘am planning to go back to my country of origin/ where I have my citizenship	2	1.1
I do not know, it depends	30	16.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### **3. Once arrived in Italy**

#### *3.1. Immigrants and Health*

The health status of the interviewed migrants seems to be “good” and “very good” (73.4%) and “satisfactory” (11.7%). Only a small percentage of the survey sample perceive their psycho-physical health conditions as “poor” (12.8%) or even “very poor” (1.7%) and

they make little use of medicines and products coming from their country of origin or not sold in Italian stores or chemistries.

The collected data show that the perception of the health status is influenced by their age: the most positive answers are provided by the majority of them, aged between 18 and 19 years, and that the health perception decreases proportionally as their age increases.

If we correlate the perception of their health status with their level of education, we can observe that people who say they have never studied provide the highest values of good health perception. However, as a whole, their health status does not appear to be directly related to the number of years of formal education.

As for the country of origin, it is worth highlighting that Gambian migrants have the best perception of their health status, followed by the migrants from Mali, Senegal and Nigeria.

Our survey data are substantially in line with other national studies showing that migrants tend to be healthy. The reason being their young age being predominantly young adults, as well as a sort of self-selection prior to migration of the individuals able to cope with the migration experience, a process well described in literature as the “healthy migrant effect”<sup>5</sup>.

Additionally, the perception of satisfactory health conditions could be put into relation with an often limited conception of wellbeing. For most of the migrants “being healthy,” means being able to work and contribute to the improvement of family life conditions in their country of origin.

When there is a health problem, 63.3% of them usually ask help to the linguistic or cultural mediator and 30% to the educator. In fact, the mediator plays the role of a communication “facilitator” and his/her task is to prevent any misunderstanding resulting from various linguistic cultural, religious background and multiple value systems.

It is worth highlighting that the educator remains their main point of reference. After analysing the health problem he/she is responsible for helping migrants use local health and social services as well as hospitals.

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<sup>5</sup> See <http://www.saluteinternazionale.info/2015/06>.

The survey also showed that health-related needs are also treated throughout an “informal” therapeutic system, even if only for a limited number of cases: only 2.8% of those interviewed have in fact declared to approach their country-fellowmen mostly because they speak Italian better than they do. A much lower percentage equal to 1.1% prefer to ask healers from their Country of origin, currently living in Italy, for help. This is a clear example of the strong need they have to re-appropriate themselves of their cultural and social values, from which they have been forcedly uprooted due to the separation from their context of origin.

Another similarly small percentage (1.1%) has declared to autonomously manage their health-related problems without referring to anybody in particular. It is remarkable that none of them affirmed to seek help from Italian friends or acquaintances. This datum further confirms the deep social isolation they experience once they arrive in the host country.

A country of origin survey estimates that the migrants coming from the Gambia, Mali and Senegal tend to address themselves to the linguistic mediator more than Nigerians and Pakistanis who, instead, prefer to ask the educator for help.

The survey outcomes show that, despite the consolidation in numbers, no underlying vulnerability factors can be reported concerning the health-care approach in relation to the migration phenomenon in Taranto.

### *3.2. Health and Food*

One of the most explored areas concerning the “health” issue refers to the relationship between migrants and food, taking into account its strong symbolic value. Food is a meaningful element of human identity directly connected to each population’s history, traditions, lifestyles and religious beliefs. It plays a crucial role throughout the whole acculturation process (Sam, 2006, pp.11-26) characterizing the migration experience.

The migrant struggles between his desire to adapt to the new life by integrating as much as possible into the new reality and his need to keep his roots alive and re-conciliate himself with his own iden-

tity. When the migrant feels this lack of identity due to the alienation of his “cultural universe”, food becomes a powerful means of cultural re-appropriation: it is the bridge with his country of origin and his family (Morrone, Scardella & Piompo, 2010, pp. 29-49). Traditional dishes can “nourish” his soul and make the migrant intimately re-experience his home atmosphere, colours and tastes as well as mitigate his suffering from separation, even if just for the duration of the meal<sup>6</sup>. This is the reason why most of the migrants, upon arrival in foreign countries, prefer to remain faithful to the culinary habits of their own ethnic group.

Nevertheless food is also a profound means of identity mediation. It evokes the concept of integration because it results from the combination of various ingredients and also because the convivial dimension encourages people to meet (Calvo, 2012, p. 54). The kitchen becomes a place of communication and cultural exchange between local people and foreigners who can progressively get familiar with the food traditions of the host country by including the local traditional dishes in their daily meals. The survey data show a positive feedback from the migrants concerning Italian cooking. Most of them like our food very much (20.6%) or enough (50%).

The highest percentages of positive feedback are estimated among people coming from Middle-Eastern countries (Iraqis and Palestinians) and among Asian migrants (Bangladeshi and Pakistanis). The percentages of those who, instead, like Italian cuisine a little bit (21.7%) or not at all (7.8%) are drastically lower.

However, within the majority of the reception centres migrants are not allowed to use the kitchen facilities. Consequently, the staff in charge of preparing the meals daily for the reception centre guests ends up providing almost exclusively Italian food. As shown by the survey data, immigrants eat Italian food every day (97.2%), and actually feel nostalgic for their distant “home flavours”.

On the other hand, upon their arrival in Italy their diet changes: as a side dish or as a replacement of their main dish, they now taste and experience daily new dishes and foods, until now unknown to them.

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<sup>6</sup> See [http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/IIIPunto/Documents/Rapporto\\_finale\\_CENSIS.pdf](http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/IIIPunto/Documents/Rapporto_finale_CENSIS.pdf)

### 3.3. The Italian language

It is a widely-held opinion that learning a language is crucial to build those social and working skills, which are in turn, essential to the realization of an individual's life plan.

Giving foreigners a chance to learn the Italian language means offering them the same opportunity to develop those “minimum-working skills” required to live with dignity in the host country.

Therefore teaching them Italian is to be considered as an essential factor to foster real inclusion. The survey results show that the majority of the migrants interviewed (96%) could not speak Italian upon their arrival.

Data suggest that the stay in our country has enabled them to reduce their communication difficulties.

Chart 2 - When you speak to an Italian person do you have difficulty in making yourself understood?





Chart 2 shows that the percentage of people still having much or enough difficulty in making themselves understood has decreased to 62%, while 29% say they have very little difficulty and 9% no difficulty at all.

Chart 3 - When you speak to an Italian, can you understand what he/she says?



Spoken Italian is still a problem for 54% of interviewed migrants; the remaining 37% state they have very few problems in understanding and 9% say no problem at all.

Tab. 9 - Understanding spoken Italian on TV

When you watch Italian programs can you understand what is said?	Absolute values	%
A lot	42	23.3
Enough	50	27.8
A little	67	37.2
Nothing	12	6.7
I do not watch TV	9	5.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The above-mentioned data are supported by 51% of the people interviewed who admit they still have problems in understanding spoken Italian on TV.

37% say they have quite a good level of comprehension and only 6.7% say they have good listening skills.

The study shows an extremely diversified linguistic repertoire. However, the European language most spoken by the interviewed migrants is English (21.2%), followed by Italian (20%) and French (11%).



Given the origins of the group of migrants interviewed, the *Mande languages* are, instead, the most spoken non-European languages.


The fact that almost 33% of them can speak English and French is to be considered a great opportunity for the teaching-learning process because of the several grapheme and phonetic points these languages have in common with Italian. Learning a language also means acquiring knowledge of cultural similarities, which are essential to enhance the social integration process.

#### 4. Migrants and services

The services provided at the various reception centres represent for the migrants the first place where social integration can be achieved. During this crucial phase it is possible to identify, analyse and understand their needs in order to provide more and more efficient and effective responses.

As people who had recently arrived in Italy formed the survey sample, our study mainly dealt with the first-reception services, which constitute an initial indicative and informative phase of the integration process.

Chart 4 - Opinions on the services provided by the host structure



A preliminary analysis of the data, illustrated in chart 4, shows evidence that a little more than half of the interviewees are fully satisfied with the services provided. 23% believe that services are quite good and 19% poor, while only one out of 180 claims that the services are unsatisfactory.

The *customer-satisfaction* level analysis of the survey shows that 94 migrants claim to have problems resulting from the slow bureaucracy of our system in providing them with the papers required for their residence in Italy. They complain that reception structures do not support them enough in this difficult process, which is essential to their socio-cultural integration and their job-seeking efforts.

Having access to the labour market is one of the core problems for 64 interviewed migrants.

The study shows the difficulties in accessing the labour market, which cannot be simply related to the inefficiency of the reception facilities. This phenomenon should be observed within a wider framework characterized by different interacting variables. According to some previous studies the access to the labour market is a complex process involving many individual factors such as age, gender, ethnic group, education level, seniority of migration, professional experience. On the other side it is necessary to consider whether the host society is able and willing to provide real job opportunities (De Luigi, 2011, pp. 41-43).

According to 50 of the interviewed migrants training is another aspect that needs to be improved. The group sample highlights further minor problems, which are, however, essential to assess the quality of the services provided. 8.1% of them complain about the fact they cannot autonomously manage their own money and the irregularities by the reception structures to provide them with their *pocket money*, i.e. the daily amount (€2.50) foreseen for each migrant out of the overall amount that the government pays to the reception centre for each guest.

4.8% of the migrants points out some difficulties in the host facility such as inadequate and overcrowded rooms, the unsuitability of the clothes provided, lack of a Wi-Fi network or television, poor hygienic conditions. Only 0.6% of them stresses the problem of missing the at-home feeling at the reception centre and would rather live in a private residence. 1.2% believes that also health services need to be

improved and 1 person out of 180 says he would like to move to another centre.

#### *4.1. First-hand witnesses*

To have a more complete and comprehensive survey, it was deemed useful to analyse the standpoints given by operators professionally called to respond to the migrant emergency.

Several professional operators working in different kinds of structures were interviewed in order to better understand their individual experiences related to the massive arrival of migrants to the territory of Taranto.

The reference sectors of the interview outline are ascribable to the following areas: services, volunteers, legislation, health services and the role of associations.

#### *4.2. Services*

Two categories of reception facilities have been considered: Reception Centres (CDAs) and Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR).

In almost all of the CDAs there was no real distribution of work responsibilities among the operators. The operators themselves complain they all have to do “*a bit of everything*” supporting needs as they arise, with the only exception being that of specific activities such as legal assistance (Sibilla 2015).

The interviews show that the strength of these centres is the close rapport between operators and migrants. Emblematically, an operator affirms: “*Despite the numbers, they are not treated as mere numbers such as one might generally think.*” For the operators themselves, working in these realities and in strict contact with people coming from cultures so very different from their own is a source of personal and professional enrichment, which provides strong motivation to keep up with the hard work, despite the difficulties they encounter every day.

A common weak point to all CDs is the inadequacy of the facilities, too often overcrowded and significantly understaffed. They are able to handle emergency situations such as landings, only thanks to the large number of volunteers working in the centres.

Overall, the operators believe that the services provided to the migrants are sufficient, especially when taking into account the present emergency situation. The resources could be optimized with the implementation of adequate networking, which is not always the case.

The SPRAR centres do not host a very high number of migrants (on average around 20) and this represents a point of strength as they can provide a more tailored assistance.

In this case it is possible to meet the same immigrant several times and better understand his/her specific needs.

The point of weakness of the project is, however, the Institution in charge, which is the Municipality. Although said body is directly related to the Ministry of the Interior, it plays a secondary role and in the end, the responsibilities of the project fall completely on the associations.

Further crucial elements relate to the insufficient funds foreseen to promote integration and inclusion processes.

The migrants stay in these centres for long periods of time and the operators work with them and start with them an integration process. However the migrants soon realize that in Italy they have no employment prospects. An additional weakness is therefore the lack of consistency in the integration processes started in the structure, due to the fact that there are no real future prospects.

#### 4.3. *Volunteers*

All the operators agree that the volunteers working in this structure can play an important role if they are properly trained: “*You cannot just improvise*”. It is crucial to know the dos and don'ts of how to behave, and keep in mind that you are dealing with vulnerable people who have lost their loved ones. You must proceed with care.

Most operators admit they did not receive the proper training but they believe they are able to do their job because of specific studies

they have pursued and in the majority of cases they have a natural tendency to work in this sector. One of them affirms: "*You must have a vocation to openness and caring to do our job well.*"

#### 4.4. Legislation

As far as legislation is concerned, the operators believe there is no correspondence between legislative requirements and reality.

Legislation is not fully implemented, as Italy is absolutely not ready to host such a vast number of migrants, promote a real integration and offer them opportunities for a better future.

One of the worst problems is the high number of asylum seekers and the low number of territorial commissions.

The CDA, as many other facilities foreseen by law, are defined as real jungles left completely in the hand of their managers, which are, in some cases, of dubious professionalism.

The operators also stress another important factor: the process for the release of a residence permit. The procedure is quite clear. The law foresees clear steps and key actors who should carry out specific tasks. However, deadlines are never observed. There is insufficient personnel in the immigration offices within the prefectures to cover the huge number of requests. The procedure often changes based on the prefecture of reference and this is a further element of tension.

#### 4.5. Health services

Regarding health services, migrants are quite well covered. When they arrive they are submitted to a medical check and each of them is given a medical card. In case of need they are taken to the hospital/emergency room. All the medicines they may require are purchased and delivered to them in case of need.

We asked the operators to express their opinion on the relationships between the physicians of the structure and migrants. They all answered: "*It depends*". There are physicians who are very helpful and collaborative. Others are absent and feel afraid. Some of them refuse to examine the migrants, do not have adequate language skills,

and prove to be generally unqualified especially to solve dermatological conditions.

#### *4.6. The role-played by the associations*

The most important international organizations working in collaboration with migrant reception centres within the Ionian territory are IOM (*International organization for migration*), *Save the Children* and UNHCR (*United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*).

Obviously, if in the reception centres there are any migrant children or young people claiming to be under 18, there is a strict collaboration with *Save the Children* and in most cases, very good relationships continue to be kept with these children, even when they become adults.

The role played by IOM is particularly positive. Among all the organizations, this one provides the most concrete help to young people, informing them about their rights as foreseen by legislation. Unfortunately, the centres often do not have the necessary funds, manpower and collaboration with territorial services, which frequently makes their work very difficult and inadequate.

### **Conclusions**

Although the survey was carried out within a limited territory, it was not at all easy to investigate such a polymorphic and changeable reality as immigration. Undoubtedly the statistical relevance of the phenomenon, by far different if compared to the past, has found Italy unprepared to cope with it.

Even if Italy still remains a country of emigration, it has also become a country of immigration (IDOS 2016). However, immigrants do not always feel totally welcomed or integrated with local population. The survey denounces the failure to comply with the terms foreseen by current legislation and the serious bureaucratic delays in providing the relevant documents (visas, residence permits, acknowledgement of the refugee status and asylum).

What is clearly evident is the lack of a real network of services, as many of them work in an isolated way. The third sector represents a valid support but needs further economic resources, professional qualifications and a better institutional coordination.

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## **Imperialism and national pride in the Italo-Turkish war (1911-12)**

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### **Abstract**

Cyprus Dispute is considered to be one of the oldest unresolved disputes. However, in recent year, it is believed that there is a hope that it can be resolved. This paper is a conflict assessment of the dispute, and it gives a brief historical background, and discusses the position of the actors involved; and whether their positions can drive or mitigate the conflict. It touches upon the dividers and connectors of the conflict, which if dealt with carefully, can lead to an optimal solution. The paper gives an overall picture of the conflict, and discusses the possibilities in future.

### **Keywords**

War of Libya; Italian Nationalism; Italian national pride

After the painful Abyssinian lesson, early twentieth century Italy under Giolitti was little inclined to engage in further adventures overseas. Historical memory and the need to find outlets for its industrial goods and emigrants, however, required Italy to re-launch its imperialist objectives and a corresponding international economic policy especially in the Mediterranean and the Orient. Putting this political program into practice meant engaging in good relations with Germany on one hand and Russia and France on the other. In the Balkans and the Orient it meant coming up principally against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which presented a potential obstacle. The Yugoslav political situation, which Italy necessarily had to adjust to, implied a rapprochement between Serbia and Russia, blocking Austria's route to Salonica, tending to exclude Albania and block its access to the Adriatic. It was thus decidedly anti-Austrian and consequently likely to put a chill on the Triple Alliance. Italy's history and affinities could thus find support in Europe and outside the Triple Alliance only from the two "friendly" though non-allied nations of Russia and France. As far as England was concerned, Italy did not break off those friendly relations which acted as a counterweight to rapprochement with France. The Italian government knew that England could not do without her and her ports for its Mediterranean fleet but as Italy had now given up her imperialist ambitions in the Red Sea and accepted the *fait accompli* in Tunisia she had no further need of England for the success of her projects in Tripolitania and the Orient but did need France. Italian diplomacy thus prepared her favourable international contingencies with a covert chess board of alliances, understandings and friendships.

Part of the Italian press was favourable to the control of the Adriatic which it saw as something resembling an inland lake (*mare nostrum*) while philanthropic bodies whose purpose was the promotion of Italian language and culture, such as the *Dante Alighieri Society*, demanded that territories like Malta in which the Italian language was still spoken alongside local languages should be

reunited with the homeland. Whatever the choices and calculations made of political opportunities, some of the alliances of convenience which Italy sought were downright contradictory. In addition to the difficulties already mentioned in maintaining the Triple Alliance whilst attempting to combat Austrian influence in the Balkans, Italian diplomacy was also intent on moving closer to Russia and, at the same time, aimed to undermine the Balkan balance of power and destroy the status quo guaranteed by the Austro-Russian agreement. It relied on England to keep the peace in the Mediterranean and at the same time planned to invade Tripolitania with the connivance of France. It backed radical-socialist France for secularisation and its struggle against the Holy See and, at the same time, tried to avoid provoking religious conflict in Italy where it was also looking for a conciliatory approach aimed at containing the demands of the workers' movement. These were the main elements which Italy's malleable policy was attempting to bring together and which German Chancellor von Bülow defined with ironic disdain as a "little waltz". When in September 1911, then, hostilities between the Italian kingdom and the Ottoman Empire began, even the usually well-informed foreign observers expressed surprise bordering on disapproval. The Italian government had exceeded European diplomatic expectations. The causes of the war were not related to prior difficulties between Italy and Turkey and in fact had very little to do with the two warring sides themselves. The Italian government had been subjected to external pressure. Having found out that Turkey was preparing to rent out a port on the Cyrenaica to a German company, England planned to occupy the threatened port if Italy did not hastily apply the rights granted it by the agreement signed in 1902 with France and ratified by the English government. This explains Germany's patent disillusionment at the outbreak of hostilities, considering that in Tripolitania and Cirenaica the country would have liked to have a distinctive influence. The same position was understood by Viennese newspaper *Die Zeit* which, speaking of Italian intentions in northern Africa, looked forward to the military invasion being Tripoli integrated part of the Ottoman territory. Germany should have misled Italy in proceeding with projects in

that region. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy's point of view could have not been different from the German one, "since from an Italian action in Tripolitania severe international complications could have emerged" (*Die Zeit*, 22 September 1911)<sup>1</sup>.

Whilst expected, significant increase in French power in the Mediterranean unsettled Giolitti and the bourgeoisie. The occupation of Tripoli had thus become crucial to the strategic defence of Italy. An understanding of what was happening requires taking into account the delicate Italian political balance of power and the psychological pressures exerted on it by public opinion although this is hard to demonstrate. In July 1911 Italy's domestic status quo was shaken up. Inspired by the country's fiftieth anniversary celebrations people were showing signs of discontent with the petty machinations of parliamentary politics and sought in vain for the heirs to the great Risorgimento heroes whose valiant exploits were currently being exalted. Parliament was experiencing an equally chaotic phase with the Socialists, lured in and constrained by the government but holding the balance of power nonetheless, and a disoriented and insecure Liberal-Monarchist majority attempting to keep hold of Giolitti whilst jettisoning his program.

Italian expansion in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was extremely popular with the Nationalists who considered this future colony a sort of "promised land"<sup>2</sup>. To say nothing of the writers who were then praising Imperialism and the concept of the white man's civilization mission (D'Annunzio, Marinetti, Corradini). For them the North Africa adventure was to demonstrate that the Italians deserved their national status. Even poet Giovanni Pascoli, on November 1911, greeted this imperialist adventure enthusiastically in

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<sup>1</sup> The same position, contrary to any Italian action in Libya, appeared in another Viennese newspaper (*Neue Freie Presse*, 23 September 1911). Giuseppe Avarna Duke of Gualtieri, meticulous Italian ambassador in Vienna, will send copies of such papers to the Foreign Ministry Antonino di San Giuliano.

<sup>2</sup> If certain scholars are to be believed, even the Second Congress of Italians Abroad held in Rome in June 1911 emerged as a clear nationalist success with the latter represented by Guglielmo Marconi, Giulio De Frenzi (Luigi Federzoni), Giovanni Preziosi, Amy Allemand Bernardy and other esteemed exponents of the conservative faction (Manzotti, 1969, p. 210; Monina, 2002, pp. 216-217).

his prose essay *La grande proletaria si è mossa*, as *L'Idea Nazionale* (11 April 1912) reminisces in its eulogy in his honour authoritative body of the nationalists in whose ranks had landed in mature age after having belonged to socialism. The same roman paper observes that , since the beginning of the expedition in Tripolitania and Cirenaica, various Italians living abroad, “from the greatest to the most dark ones, wanted to offer their new homeland something of their belonging. All, from Guglielmo Marconi, who ran to implant along our fourth bank powerful radio telegraph stations, to immigrant farmers in America, heard the beauty of this historic hour and, if they couldn't risk their life as the youngest and strongest, they offered intellect and money” (*L'Idea nazionale*, 1 February 1912).

In general, the conquest of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was regarded favourably by right wing conservatives, the banking and industrial worlds, reformist Socialists (Leonida Bissolati) and the Maximalist faction. There were also a significant number of Catholics who saw occupation of these regions as a way of Christianising an area still embroiled in the slave trade. The Banco di Roma, which belonged to the Vatican, also had an important branch in Tripoli. It has, however, recently been clarified, that Pope Pius X generally and personally called for greater moderation from certain high-ranking prelates and resident bishops who had expressed support for the colonial wars in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica<sup>3</sup>. The Republican Party was divided on the subject of the attack between pro and anti-Tripoli factions and it was left to the revolutionary left (with Benito Mussolini and others) to express the fiercest opposition to the government in the name of Socialist pacifism and aversion to Imperialist wars. This latter attitude was echoed by intellectual Gaetano Salvemini for whom this African area was no more than a

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<sup>3</sup>The Libya adventure was sometimes presented by part of the clergy and a certain Catholic culture as a sacred war (*Lettera di Attilio Simonetti, segretario della Società Antischiavista d'Italia*, Montefano di Macerata, 26 settembre 1911, in Archivio storico diplomatico del Ministero degli Esteri [from now on = ASD], Ministero Africa italiana, vol. II, 1859-1945, pos. 104/1). This stance was condemned in no uncertain terms by the Holy See, and by the Pope in particular, with the latter heading off any potential doubts on the matter by publishing a letter of reprimand of these misleading interpretations in the *Osservatore Romano* (Sale, 2011, pp. 61-70).

“box of sand”. In these months a number of newspapers which rejected the government’s propaganda (such as *L’Avantior L’Asino*) published satirical vignettes highlighting the futility of the war. So thought also newspaper such as *La Voce* and *L’Unità*, even if this last one tried to gain advantage from military expenses – often useless – that enabled the army to show their real action abilities always in doubt. While maintaining a political and moral judgment strongly opposed to the activity, the paper directed by Salvemini since the first issue, was confident in the ability of soldiers - as they were the ones responsible to battle and to give good evidence in battle - in the hope that the country could however, leave with honour as soon as possible: “Since this war Italy, already participating, must obtain every possible advantage; and one of these benefits shall be acquired, and has so far been obtained, fortunately for us, from physical skill tests, discrete military organization, good national framework given from our people”(L’Unità, 16 December 1911)<sup>4</sup>. Words that create reaction of the sheet of the left reformists *Avanti* that saw in that statement “a Nietzschean and nationalistic defence of the war’s usefulness to war for the sole prestige bought in the value of deployment and dexterity”(L’Unità, 30 December 1911).

But apart from these discordant voices, almost the entirety of the political class and the great national newspapers supported the occupation of the new colony which was given its ancient Roman name, Libya, from 1934 onwards. At the end of lengthy diplomatic efforts by Foreign Affairs Minister Antonino di San Giuliano, in the summer of 1911 Giolitti accepted the Italo-Turkish war as “historically inevitable” if Italy were not to miss her chance of obtaining one of the last available colonies<sup>5</sup>. At this stage of “soul spring” and national interests, deputies and senators had momentarily set aside the issues of wide or narrow suffrage, thinking only about the hoped enterprise on

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<sup>4</sup> On the opposition newspaper *L’Unità* and *The Voice* the war of Libya see also Marmioli, 2013, pp. 1004-1012.

<sup>5</sup> In actual fact Giolitti justified his imperialist ambitions on humanitarian rather than nationalist grounds (Giolitti, 1922, pp. 333-334). This was also the standpoint of Pasquale Turiello, the greatest theorist of Italian imperialism, who considered conquering colonies to be of vital importance to Italy and complained that no action had as yet been taken to arrange this (Molinelli, 1988, p. 302).

Mediterranean beaches of Africa. As for Vittorio Emanuele III, without wanting to resize all government positions held by the minister of the war Paul Spingardi, he remained the most authoritative representative of the army: he was the sovereign, therefore, who gave the final approval, following then constantly evolving Libyan entire enterprise. For this reason, the newspaper *L'Idea Nazionale*, usually restrictive and careful for superlatives and descriptive exuberance, could only observe: "Greetings from the Kings to a part of the expeditionary force troops has given the most solemn consecration to the great enterprise about a settled Italy, now truly awake" (*L'Idea nazionale*, 12 October 1911).

The singing of patriotic songs - reminiscing chronicles of the time - a whole population accompanied soldiers to railway stations, docks: "In Naples, Bari, Messina; like Pisa, Milan, Turin, as in Rome, real capital today, these days will remain memorable. It is useless to recall the processions of thousands of people through the jubilant city, and the popular enthusiasm overflowing, and railway stations filled up to capacity, also on top of train roofs, of delirious people, eager to accompany firstly with their eyes and then with their heart, those who left. Those who were there - and who was not? - will keep indelible memories to soothe the pain of future meanness and cowardice" (*L'Idea nazionale*, 12 October 1911). It was intense, exaggerated, naive and folksy patriotism, like the "Tripoli beautiful saying of love" (Molinelli, 1966, pp. 317-318).

After a number of skirmishes in Tripoli, on the 29 September Italy declared war on Turkey<sup>6</sup> as the nation ruling Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. An Expeditionary Force led by General Carlo Caneva (1845-1922) landed in the second half of October and rapidly occupied the most important coastal towns from Tripoli to Benghazi as far as Tobruk on the Egyptian border without, however, pushing inland. The army's lack of preparation - it had not received the necessary prior warning from the diplomats - and excessive optimism soon became clear. Despite the fact that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been a fixed objective of Italian foreign policy for decades,

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<sup>6</sup> Exactly at 2,30 p.m. (showed on *Comunicato Agenzia Stefani*, Rome 29 September 1911, in ASD, Affari Politici 1891-1916, serie P, b. 13).

neither the region's tribal society nor its geography had been sufficiently researched. After these initial successes, in fact, the war degenerated as a result of difficult terrain and resistance from its peoples who rebelled against occupation and launched a full-blown guerrilla war against Italy inflicting severe losses: 3,431 dead of whom 1,483 in fighting and 1,948 as a result of contagious diseases caught in the region. Turkish-Arab losses, however, were much heavier, at around 14,800 dead.

To block Turkish supplies to the region, cut the war short and drive the Ottoman Empire in the direction of peace, the Italian military command proposed to shift its sphere of action. The Italian Navy was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean where it occupied a number of Aegean islands called the Dodecanese - the name given to the twelve islands which the Italian government promised to return to Turkey when the latter withdrew its forces from the whole of Libya - and Commander Enrico Millo even undertook a raid in the Dardanelles straits with five torpedo boats on 18 and 19 July 1912 to demonstrate to Turkey that not even Constantinople was safe. Worried by the proximity of the Italian forces the Turkish government agreed to the peace negotiations which lead to a pact in Ouchy ratified by the Treaty of Lausanne (18 October 1912) giving up control over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica<sup>7</sup>, territories to which Italy had in any case already extended its sovereignty without waiting for international recognition. To guarantee recognition of its new possessions Italy also kept hold of the Dodecanese islands until 1947. Even though the Italian parliament was not convened in September 1911 to ratify the declaration of war, Italian morale was, however, hugely raised by this successful colonial venture whose importance was underlined by the establishment of a specific Ministry for the

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<sup>7</sup> In the following months an Arab correspondent will comment - from Rome - the first page of an Egyptian newspaper (*Al-Ahram*, 4 April 1913), in very favorable terms for Italy, the real extent of the Lausanne Treaty, so as to remove any illusion to the Ottomans. Refer also to *Lettera dell'Agenzia diplomatica di S.M. il Re d'Italia al Ministro delle Colonie*, Cairo 6 April 1913, in ASD, Ministero Africa italiana, vol. II, 1859-1945, pos. 172/1.

In fact, in the ambiguous Treaty of Lausanne, the sultan, in order to maintain link between the people of Libya and Turkey, refused to recognize the sovereignty, hinting to those North African regions that he granted them political autonomy.



Colonies on 20 November 1912 n.1205, by Hon. Pietro Bertolini. In this ministry not only will merge the duties performed until now by the Foreign Affairs Ministry for the territories passed under the sovereignty or protection of Italy, but also the Italian Colonial Institute, as confirmed by Giolitti to Di San Giuliano, thus leaving the new Pontifical Council full freedom of decision with regards to the initiatives to be undertaken in Libya<sup>8</sup>.

The positive implications of the war were thus noted in several ways with varying impact and motivations as the letter sent by Senator Pasquale Villari in November 1912 to Arcangelo Ghisleri, the then director of the Republican newspaper *La Ragione*<sup>9</sup>, on the subject of the criticisms directed at him by the strongly anti-war Socialist Filippo Turati who kept his original opinion on the matter as shows:

Dear Director,

Allow me to make a brief statement. I see that the Hon. Turati, responding to the *Corriere della Sera* in *Critica Sociale*, reiterates the assertions made by him in the Milanese City Council on the subject of an article of mine published last 24 October in the *Corriere*. In this article I set out the criticisms of those who were and are opposed to the Libyan war and added that, leaving to one side the hyperbole used in such debates and conceding a certain element of truth in them, the undeniable fact remained that the war was necessary, inevitable and supported with great enthusiasm by the vast majority of the Italian people. It raised the nation's self-esteem and its image abroad. In just a few months it contributed more to the political unification of Italy than anything else in many long years of peace had done. With expressions of considerable formal courtesy Hon. Turati argues that by not explicitly denying my adversaries' criticisms I implicitly accepted them. He thus attributes me with the opinions of my adversaries and states that I have engaged in the harshest criticisms of the war when what I have actually done is to demonstrate its historical and national value. "The certain fact", they write, is that a profound sentiment was developing in the country that this war would result in definitive nation building, in a new, great Italy recognised by all. Our soldiers

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<sup>8</sup>*Lettera del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri al Ministro degli Affari Esteri*, Rome 30 July 1912, in ASD, Affari Politici 1891-1916, serie P, b. 14.

<sup>9</sup>Ghisleri had also been an opponent of the Libyan war from 1911 and had thus clashed with certain members of the PRI although his opinion later changed and he abandoned his pacifist and anti-nationalist stance from 1914 onwards in favour of interventionism.

set off as new crusaders, acclaimed by the people who carried them on their shoulders<sup>10</sup>.

Totally unexpected, however, the statements - which troubled not just slightly the Italian front - issued by Giustino Fortunato and the Republican Napoleone Colajanni, who had continuously and strongly opposed the shipment of Tripoli. While siding in favour of neutrality, Senator Fortunato justified the military action since it had become inescapable:

Who more than I contrary to colonial adventures, and generally to war? Who more dubious, more timid than I of the new Italy? Who better than me is *certain* that Tripoli will be a fruitless enterprise, perilous and costly, even when necessary, and fatal? Well *long live the war*, though now clear that fifty years of national life were not vain, and something new, beautiful, promising is in the new Italy!... (Di Staso, 1912, p. 12).

Beyond shades and attitudes of intellectuals, few among democrats shared the exclamation of the famous southern Italian (“Long live the war”), even though agreeing with him that the war experience, for the first time after the Italy’s union, had revealed a new and beneficial national spirit. Along the lines of Fortunato, but more complex and perhaps for this reason most appreciated, the conclusion of Colajanni’s speech appeared in all newspapers of Italy, in which he emphasized the importance of the undertaking in North Africa thanks to which he had been able to regain some confidence in the army, proving Europe and the world organization, discipline and value of the Italian people (C. Maranelli, in *L’Unità*, 5 October 1912).

Moreover even Salvemini had to admit that the Italian troops in Libya were united not only by the danger but also by the feeling of national duty and honor, and that in this respect to the country they were all in agreement, as well as all watched with sympathy the “magnificent solidarity in the war” (G. Salvemini [reply letter to Carlo Maranelli], in *L’Unità*, 5 October 1912). This was basically the

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<sup>10</sup>Letter from Pasquale Villari to Arcangelo Ghisleri, [s. l.], November, 1912, in Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Villari correspondence, b. 71. Villari was referring in particular to Filippo Turati’s article in *Critica Sociale*, XXII, nn. 21-22, 1-16 November, 1912. On this debate see P. Villari in *Corriere della Sera*, 24 October 1912.

best result achieved by the company, admitted even by those who were averse to it, which ended with cheer, while remaining solemnly contrary. A rare and wide “harmony” which, with several distinctions from the political point of view, was obtained by giving proof of seriousness, in front of a company initially justified by the lure of great wealth to be conquered without fight, although the cost of the war in terms of human life and money was high and the material benefits low. It was in any case defined by Benedetto Croce and Gaetano Mosca in sentimental terms as a demonstration of national vigour. The judgment of the two famous intellectuals is confirmed by the debate emerged in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the kingdom after the suspension of work in both houses of Parliament (10 July 1911). Simply just remember the words of praise for the armed forces pronounced in the courtroom by the President of the Chamber Giuseppe Marcora 22 February 1912 - after a parliamentary recess of more than seven months because of the war - which roused vivid, general and sustained applause. From his seat he reopened the shareholders’ meeting:

If, in fact, the firm’s first start, to which the Government has set to protect dignity and interests of Italy, the unanimous consent of thoughts and intentions manifested in every region and in every class of citizens - not without astonishment and surprise of those who do not yet know the soul of our race - revealed to the civilized world that the new Italian lives, not only in the miraculous awakening of its material energies, but also in its unity and moral discipline, the admirable conduct of our soldiers and sailors has proven that it has become the formidable defence of the conscience and the mutual will of an entire people. [...] As we are now, we will always be; in harmony and ready for any sacrifice for the honour and greatness of Italy. This is, ladies and gentlemen, our duty. *Et sit nobis in animo constantia!* (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 22 February 1912, p. 17140).

Equally strong appreciation appeared the next day, when the prime minister and interior minister Giolitti announced on November 5, 1911 Royal Decree n. 1247 by which the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were placed under the full and entire sovereignty of the Italian Kingdom and once again the hall resounded with unanimous applause. Same thing happened with the rapporteur of the Commission, Mr. Ferdinando Martini, who, again on February 23,

1912, asked colleagues to vote without delay the aforementioned decree converting it into law, because “what was act of government is surely the will of the nation” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17144).

Statements that hid a dangerous presumption perhaps chauvinistic, which is supported by far more extreme expansionist theories would then have disoriented public opinion by pushing the country toward irreparable follies. However, in the name of a higher patriotic conception almost all political parties represented in parliament put aside all internal differences reaffirming confidence on the measures submitted by the Government regarding the war, albeit with several distinctions. Congressman Sidney Sonnino - albeit by constitutional opposition benches - asked that the decree vote, he declared he would have approve, is proposed to bring together maximum consensus of votes, “because the Assembly’s voice would express the will of the country” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17145).

The broad consensus on voting - also given by those who remained firm against Libya – grew from the general belief of serving a good and useful cause for Italy. While other deputies as Leonidas Bissolati motivated favourable thought of a part of the Socialist parliamentary minority group claiming primarily the political opportunity of their choice, “not to bring the Socialist Party and the working classes to isolate themselves in a hostile attitude to the rest of the Nation...”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17153).

For the first time after Italy’s unity was managing to conquer territories beyond the national border and the effort to achieve purpose was not only military, but had assumed an increasingly “civilian” and even beneficial distinctiveness, as said by Mr. Giulio Alessio, chief of the radical party, which, in giving the membership of its parliamentary group to its approach to the Government will declare:

We know that the mixture of races and the fruitful example of the institutions of economic freedom are the most effective means to release the populations’ retreats for those subject to their average economic age. Our mission, therefore, is unquestionably a civilizing mission(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17159).

Incredibly hostile to the conversion into law of the decree on the sovereignty of Italy in Libya was the reformist socialist Filippo Turati, who, while appreciating the heroism and sacrifice of the soldiers who fought under the national flag, declared that the purported national consensus was based on a serious misunderstanding, namely that “ardor that unites all of us for the good and for the honour of the homeland” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17164).

Equally dubious - in the opinion of the Republican Eugene Church - were the words pronounced by the Foreign Ministry Antonio Di San Giuliano in his speech in Parliament of December 2 1910: “The Tripolitania must remain Turkish”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17170). Other similar statements of Di San Giuliano of 9 June 1911 were always given by Mr. Church – lined up against African shipping and against its annexation decree - on the basis of the official account: “Our policy, like the one of other powers, has as its base the maintenance of the territorial status quo and the integrity of the Ottoman empire” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17170). Foreign Minister’s statements-contradictory according to Republican Congressman - must be placed to the entire diplomatic and military planning of time, considering the changes in the international scenario and the government’s foreign policy, which had been unable to resist that “historical inevitability”, according to the prior definition of Giolitti, the strengthening of the Italian position in the Mediterranean, which took the same leader of Dronero to have to wear in a few months the role of “man of war”. A matter of prestige for Italy, which also weakened the opposition of the newborn nationalist political movement and which also allowed industry and finance to expand their markets through the colonial expansion. An additional motivation was provided by the socialist Enrico Ferri, who, though ideally opposed to any war, will specify in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies: “I cannot, however, forget the historical law, so that every civilized nation, drew a degree of economic and political development, inevitably passes through the colonial expansion

phase”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17175). For many members of parliament, therefore, the Libyan enterprise was an inescapable destiny, the same as in the nineteenth century had England, Belgium, France, Germany and Japan, and that in 1911-12 became Italy’s fate. Such shades of favourable vote with united nationalist leanings that Ferri gave to the decree, reaffirming those “new destinies of the people of Italy” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912,p. 17176)<sup>11</sup>, led him to submit his resignation from the PSI few weeks later.

The war of Tripoli, not only Ferri but for the majority of politicians, was understood as a “not pleasant but urgent need of Italian history” (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17175) to establish itself on the international stage, as always present in its meeting of February 23 1912, the Republican congressman Salvatore Barzilai, who fully agreed on the usefulness of signing the decree of sovereignty(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17175).

Even he, for proclaiming sovereignty over Tripoli arguing with Filippo Turati, will pay his utterances with the output from the PRI (Colapietra, 1970, p. 27). Not all opposition deputies granted their vote for so-called “interests of the homeland”. For example, the Hon. Ettore Ciccotti, the only member of the South that expressly declared not to vote this decree, was not convinced by the regained prestige, honour, dignity, that were caused to the country with the conquest of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17151). Ciccotti will report directly to the President of the Council Giolitti, closing the general debate at the applause, sure of the fact that on these issues even opposing parties, constantly in opposition, had put aside their internal differences aware of the need to set aside, given the circumstances, the political ideas for a higher interest of national order(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 23 February 1912, p. 17178). And so, despite some critical comments made during the debate, the result of the roll call vote on the Royal Decree of 5 November 1911

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<sup>11</sup> Remaining on the theme of “destiny», we remember the study of a well-known orientalist of the early twentieth century on the discovery of an Arabic manuscript which reproduced a prophecy concerning the conquest of Tripolitania by Italy (Pacha, 1912, pp. 15-45).

n. 1247 - by which the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy, also taking into account the pressure of the national will - was largely favourable to Giolitti who managed to make it into law.

In subsequent rounds of the Chamber of Deputies patriotic statements took it in turns with many polemical remarks, voice of two deputies of the Socialist Party, as if to emphasize the divisions within their own party. Mr. Giuseppe Di Stefano Neapolitan, a member of the Democratic Left, 28 February 1912 was sent “to all those brave heroes who fight in the name of Italy and who hold high the banner of the Fatherland in those lands, which were so much a part of the Empire that Rome had in the world, an applause greeting, gratitude and affection”(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 28 February 1912, p. 17328). In name of the socialist opposition on March 11, deputy Giulio Casalini, who already had expressed his dissent to the Libyan company voted by Parliament, believed that the huge sums spent on the war should have been used in the noblest works and production-reclamation, migration of peoples of the South, etc. -(AP, CD, leg. XXIII, 11 March 1912, pp. 17863-17866).

Testimonials unanimously in favour of “Italian patriotic soul” exempt from any discussion and distinction could be understood from soldiers’ letters. They were sometimes ungrammatical, but it showed the sincerity, strength and faith in the country: for the fighters was a joy to see their writings in newspapers, not so much for the human desire but more for the interest of reading ones name, to share and maybe seek relief in the “new family” of the army or navy at that difficult time they were crossing (*Il Giornale d’Italia*, 25 January 1912)<sup>12</sup>. The *Il Giornale d’Italia*, for example, reported deliberately highlighted in bold letter to a corporal who thanked the director of the magazine for having sent its fighters of the Ain Zara - where he too was - a copy of the same newspaper (*Il Giornale d’Italia*, 21 January 1912).

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<sup>12</sup>In another newspaper was hoped to collect letters of soldiers in anthologies to spread amongst young people “manly education» as an alternative to “funny affectation or feminine discomforts so prevalent today in our schools” (P.S., in *L’Idea nazionale*, 6 December 1911).

But the military occupation of the new colony- between 1912 and 1913 welcomed by the European press, the *Petit Niçois* (22 August 1912) to the London *Times*<sup>13</sup>, as well as Consulates, legations and the Italian Embassies around the world<sup>14</sup> - we know that it did not bring economic and occupational benefits which many had expected. In exchange for the treaty, Italy made a generous - and risky - concession to Turkey allowing it to retain its religious jurisdiction in Libya through a representative, who would have had to live on the African colony and thus, within certain limits, have a voice in political and judicial affairs by the end of 1911 and early 1912 some daily newspapers and specialised press were highlighting the need to renew the civil and penal judicial framework in Tripolitana and Cyrenaica: “a very serious and important matter and one for which an immediate, in the true sense of the word, solution must be found” (*Rivista di emigrazione*, V. 1-2, 1912, p. 59)<sup>15</sup>. It was now, in fact, seen as an anachronistic judicial body in Western terms requiring reform in human terms to free it from the irrational prejudices inherent in local traditions. It was an extremely complex task, as the *Rivista di emigrazione* noted: “this organisation is in fact rendered more difficult by the fact that, in this branch of civil life in particular, the Turks have left us a legacy of shameful measures and deliberations which make necessary a veritable “step by step” conquest of peoples and contexts used to viewing judges as vulgar grace or sentence vendors, for Italian justice too” (*Rivista di emigrazione*, V. 1-2, 1912, p. 59).

Without offending local and more generally Arab sensibilities, what was thus needed was to convince the Muslims living in Libya that justice was to be dispensed in the name of the King of Italy and under the jurisdiction of the Italian magistrate deputed to the post, leaving religious leaders jurisdiction over family law, faith based and civil matters relating to disputes worth no more than 500 lire.

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<sup>13</sup>Whose articles 4, 5, 6, September 1913 were even reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador in London (see the correspondence in fasc. “Stampa estera”, in ASD, Ministero Africa italiana, vol. II, 1859-1945, pos. 172/1).

<sup>14</sup> See documentation kept in ASD, Affari Politici 1891-1916, serie P, b. 14.

<sup>15</sup> On the review cited see Orazi, 2015.



Prefects, courts and the Court of Appeal were to have jurisdiction over all other matters. This was, ultimately, the only way to make the control inherent in a conquest felt.

As far as Italy was concerned, its new international status prompted it not only to offer an alternative to mass emigration, which was then mainly moving to the Americas, but also to revitalise its economy, seeking more intense trading links with the Orient, initially with China and then, even more emphatically, with Russia (especially the Caucasus), a market which was accorded significant importance after the conquest of the Dodecanese islands. The same *Rivista di emigrazione* mentioned above noted, in 1917, that “Italian exporters inclined to invest in those lands will certainly not regret the time and money expended and will soon be compensated by significant profits” (*Rivista di emigrazione*, X, 7-8-9, 1917, pp. 81-93).

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