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Past and Current Realities about Mexican/Latino Immigration. Looking Beyond the U.S.

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Abstract

The literature including social media shows that Mexican/Latino immigrants have attracted contempt and have been traditionally objected to as a minority in the U.S. The intent here is to search for historical and other factors that might explain the public antipathy and to identify reasons that could, either in isolation or in combination with others, explain anti-immigrant sentiments among people, many of whom are descendants of immigrants. The perusal of the challenges of Mexican immigrants to the U.S through the decades will highlight some similarities related to discrimination against waves "peoples of color", not only in the U.S. but in other parts of the world. The daily treatment within the society of immigrants of color as well as the frequent lower immigration quotas imposed on certain groups, including Mediterranean people, makes the topic quite relevant to today's concerns.

Keywords: Civil rights; Historical discrimination; Immigration; Nativism; U.S. Mexicans.

Purpose and Introduction

This paper will examine factors that might explain the antipathy to the Mexican/Latino immigrant population. The literature including social media shows that Mexican/Latino immigrants have attracted contempt as a minority from the start in the U.S. The intent here is to search for historical and other factors that might explain the public antipathy toward Mexicans in the U.S. and to identify reasons that could, either in isolation or in combination with others, explain nativist—often xenophobic- and other anti-immigrant sentiments among people, many of whom are descendants of immigrants.

For those particularly interested in the implications of a socio-historical piece on Mexican immigrants, the perusal of the challenges faced by Mexican immigrants to the U.S through the decades will highlight some similarities related to discrimination against waves of "brown" and other

"peoples of color", not only in the U.S. but possibly in other parts of the world. The daily treatment within the society of immigrants of color as well as the frequent lower immigration quotas imposed on certain groups, makes the topic quite relevant to today's concerns.

The persistence of negativism towards Mexican immigrants in American society has been a surprise to many observers from other nations. The U.S. as well as most Latin American nations have been the home to immigrants from all over the world. Consecutive flows of Irish, Italians, Greeks, Jews and even some Latin-American waves of immigrants overcame their initial rejection while millions of Mexican migrants continue to have pointed difficulties in the society, their plight becoming a historically intriguing subject.

In brief, although this paper ostensibly addresses Mexican immigrants, readers can learn that using a similar rationale, nativists movements in the U.S. were instrumental in developing restrictive entry quotas for Southern European migrants during decades following the 1924 Immigration Act. Much of this discrimination falls within the spectrum of what W.E.B. Dubois (1903) called "the color line".

1. The Spanish Settlers

During the period of the Spanish explorers fear of the Spaniards brew deeply in the Anglo mind. In 15th and 16th hundreds, when the Spanish settled in the Americas, the British, the Dutch and the French competed for lands in the continent. The geo-political reality of competing empires offered fertile terrain for the propagation of stigmatizing narratives. The *Black Legend* about the Spanish "race" as a "brutal, sanguinary and sadistic" group of abusers was propagated and took root in the public psyche (Fuentes, 1992, p.132). Bartolomé de las Casas, in an attempt to defend the native inhabitants from abuses, reported the colonizers' mistreatments of natives to the Crown. The bad behavior of the colonizers solidified negative perceptions. This was the start of what today is called the "Latino threat narrative". This negative narrative was inherited by Mexicans centuries later and survives, as we shall see, to these days.

An early source of Anglo-American antipathy towards Hispanics is found in the *Black Legend*. This interpretation has sixteenth-century English propagandists discrediting the reputation of the Spaniards in the New World in order to further their own imperialistic plans. As a consequence, Anglo-Americans held negative views even before confronting Mexicans on New Spain frontiers where the encounter itself deepened prejudices and provided at least one important rationale for 'Manifest Destiny.' The violence of the Texas Rebellion and the Mexican War further fueled the antipathy. (Rosales, 1997, p.5)

The Spanish were "the first Europeans to traverse much of the United States" before the arrival of the pilgrims in 1569 (Daniels, 1990, p. 96). Cabeza de Vaca walked the western country from Galveston to Culiacan, Mexico (1536). From Santa Barbara in Mexico, the Spaniards moved into New Mexico and Arizona. New Mexico was settled in 1598 before the Pilgrims arrived at Jamestown, in 1610. Florida remained in Spanish hands from 1565 to 1819 when the Adams–Onís Treaty of 1819, also known as the Transcontinental Treaty, the Florida Purchase, or the Florida Treaty, ceded Florida to the U.S. and defined the boundaries between the U.S. and New Spain, the latter remaining Mexican until approximately 30 years later[1].

From Santa Bárbara in Mexico, Spain moved to claim "the Kingdom of Teja" to resist threats from the French and Christianize the Caddo Indians, ca. 1680 (Iber & De León, 2006, p. 57. See also Steward & De León, 1993). Junípero Sierra founded 9 of 21 missions in California from 1769 to 1823 (Daniel, 1990). New Mexico, Arizona, California, parts of Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma and Kansas remained part of Mexico until 1848 when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed at the end of the war with Mexico and the Gadsden purchase expanded the southern border in 1854. Mexicans, the descendants of Spaniards and native groups had a significant presence in what is today the U.S., a matter that causes surprise when observers notice the marked antipathy to a population that was once native. The Mexican population was not at the start an immigrant population but rather an autochthonous one in southern North American lands. Puerto Rico was annexed in 1898 after the Spanish American War.

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[1] http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-u-s-acquires-spanish-florida.

2. *The Sequelae of the Black Legend and Racism*

The cruelty ascribed to the Spanish colonists existed in other imperial powers but the Black Legend had disseminated attitudes against Mexican immigrants, different from the attitudes about other foreign nationals arriving in the U.S. The issue of Catholicism and language emerged after the creation of the new nation and loomed large in the Anglo mind for many decades. "Anglo-Americans held negative views even before confronting Mexicans on New Spain frontiers where the encounter itself deepened prejudices. The violence of the Texas Rebellion and the Mexican War further fueled the antipathy." (Rosales, 1997, p.5).

After the annexation of the various Spanish territories, the reality was that the Spanish language remained predominant in many areas. Texan local politicians delivered speeches in both languages until the 1900s (Rosales, 1997). However, the issue of language was a contentious point in Arizona and New Mexico. New Mexico protected its heritage the longest by provisions in its constitution which made Spanish an official language, equal to English (New Mexico Constitution, Artxx-12, 1912.)

Still during the colonial period, with the arrival of African slaves to the New World (circa 1619), racism took complete hold of the minds and hearts of the white population. The English saw the Spanish as the embodiment of racial impurity exemplified by "mestizaje" with the Moors and the Indians. Racist attitudes about not only Africans but other dark-skin people, including southern Europeans, persisted until the Civil Rights movement. In Texas, for example, De León writes:

> Most whites who first met Tejanos in the 1820s never had prior experiences with Mexican nor encountered them anywhere else. Yet, their reaction was contemptuous, many thinking the Mexicans abhorrent…." (De León, 1987, p. 1).

Racism penetrated immigration policies from the start. In Texas, for example, Stephen Austin and his son, who had been granted permission to settle in those lands, desired only "to redeem it from the wilderness—to settle it with an intelligent, honorable and enterprising (sic) people" (Stephen Austin, quoted by De León, 1987, p. 3). De León further comments that it was clear that Austin's and other politicians desire was to bring to

Texas a population that would harmonize with the rest of the Anglo settled states on the *East*, "in language, political principles, common origin, sympathy, and even interest." (De León, 1987, p. 3).

Taking a big time leap, racist removal policies were present during WWII, when fear fueled not only the removal of immigrants, both Mexicans and Japanese, but the rise of fear and intrigue regarding immigrants. However, an interesting thing occurred in relation to Mexicans, which we shall discuss later under The Bracero Program.

There were many immigration laws and regulations that targeted Mexican/ Latino as well as Southern European immigrants through the decades. The important thing to remember is that given the numbers and the proximity of Mexico to the U.S., the situation was always more acute in their case. Measures that addressed literacy as a condition for entry were keenly felt by a population that for years had provided field laborers. On this point, comparisons with Italian immigrants, many of whom had come from the Mezzogiorno and a tradition of agricultural labor and were not necessarily literate also provide points of comparison.

The constant changes in U.S. and Mexican policies did not create even the most minimal level of trust between those two groups. As Mexican President Porfirio Diaz (1830-1915) once stated, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!". His words appear to remain quotable today, particularly when US politicians are bent on curtailing immigration at all costs.

3. Nativism and Flooding Immigration

Although the U.S. is a country of immigrants, the arrival of large numbers of immigrants in the early 20th C. was perceived as a threat. In 1894, a group of Harvard graduates formed the Immigration Restriction League, a pressure group that argued for fundamental changes in the immigration policies.

According to one of its founders, Prescott F. Hall, the question for Americans to decide was whether they wanted their country "to be peopled by British, German and Scandinavian stock, historically free, energetic, progressive, or by Slav, Latin and Asiatic races historically

downtrodden, atavistic and stagnant". (Daniels, 1990, p. 276). Daniels further comments—and this also affected Mediterranean people, that

…by the late nineteenth century, many of the 'best and brightest' minds in America had become convinced that of all the many 'races' of Europe [today, we would say 'ethnic groups'], one alone—variously called Anglo-Saxon, Aryan, Teutonic or Nordic—had superior innate characteristics. Often using a crude misapplication of Darwinian evolution, which substituted these various races for Darwin's species, historians, political scientists, economists, and later, eugenicists discovered that democratic political institutions had developed and could thrive only among Anglo-Saxon peoples. (Daniels, 1990, p. 276).

This latter has been called the Anglo-Saxon complex (Daniels, 1990, p.276).

Within the spirit of restricting immigration, a large number of bills made their way through Congress (1895, 1897,1913,1915), sometimes getting to the presidents, who typically vetoed them, until 1917. These bills had a common theme, which was literacy that frequently mascaraed racism. In 1910 the Mexican Revolution erupted. Waivers from literacy restrictions were given for temporary agricultural and railroad workers. However, the nativist spirit continued, even though Presidents Cleveland, Taft and Woodrow Wilson argued that the U.S needed labor to do work Americans did not want to do. An immigration restriction bill was finally passed in 1917, but by then, European immigration had decreased due to the war in Europe. The literacy bill of 1917 eventually proved to be unnecessary. (Daniels, 1990; Lukens, 2012). The acts of 1921 and 1924 related quotas and birthplace (McSveney, 1987). Quotas favored the Northern European countries that had been represented in the U.S. population. Despite changes in ideology through the decades, "the nation's basic immigration law remained the national origins system set up during 1924-29." (Daniels, 1990, p.305).

According to Daniels (1990) and other observers of the immigration quota system in the U.S., quotas remained fairly intact until 1965, even though after the War, there was a gradual relaxation and a large number of immigrants entered the country.

4. The Bracero Period (1924-1950)

The Bracero program was a special agreement that affected primarily Mexican immigrants. Between 1929 and 1936, at least six hundred thousand Mexican nationals and their children, many of whom were born in the U.S., returned to Mexico—this represented about one third of the U.S. Mexican population. Economic downturns had been a constant factor in their lives, but nothing compared to the suffering created by this crisis. (Rosales, 1997, p.49). In 1942, the US and Mexico signed the Bracero Agreement for the recruitment of Agricultural workers. As part of the agreement 4.6 million contracts were issued between 1943 and 1965 for agricultural workers and 69,000 for railroad maintenance (Alarcón, 2011). Both the U.S and Mexico promised to apply the protections of labor laws, public health, fair treatment, etc. to the "bracero" workers. About 10% savings were withdrawn from workers' salaries. These monies were to be returned to the workers at the end of the contract by the Mexican government. However, no savings were initially returned and the controversy continued until a settlement was reached in a California court in 2008 (Belluck, 2008).

In spite of their role in the economy, in 1947, Mexican undocumented immigrants from California and Texas were targeted for return. In 1954, through Operation Wetback, more than one million workers from the West Coast were deported.

 In 2005, President Bush suggested a guest worker program similar to the Bracero Program for other immigrants but Congress did not support him (Fletcher & Fears, 2005).

As we try to offer some useful comparisons with Europe, the old U.S. Bracero Program has a great many similarities with the current practice of guest workers in Europe, for example, "contratos en origen", in Spain. Agricultural workers are often hard to find and the harshness of the labor makes it very undesirable to natives. Furthermore, agricultural business interests often make the case that they have to rely on foreign cyclical workers for their business, since crops are seasonal.

5. Race and Self-perception among Mexican Immigrants in the U.S.

The contemporary usage of "white people" or a "white race" as a large group of (mainly European) populations contrasting with Black, American Indian, or other non-white categories originated in the 17th century. Today it is often used as a racial classifier in multiracial societies. Wikipedia offers a fuller discussion of current census classifications in various countries.

Many countries have specified categories under which they count citizens from other lands. Generally, people are counted by country of birth. In Europe, after the WWII in particular, any racial classification was viewed as suspect. Neither France nor Spain, for example, collect any data on racial classifications (Bleich, 2001). They use country of origin to identify immigrants from different countries. This is not to say that often, policies based on geographic regions where specific groups with specific needs might reside, do not become equally politically controversial.

However, in the U.S., where race was always a variable and a determinant of historical discrimination, the conflicting messages sent by the Bureau of the Census in its counting practices, did not help Mexicans. Until 1920, the Census had not identified Mexicans; however, the enumerators tended to note the presence of Spanish surnamed "mulatos" in the Western States (Ortiz &Telles, 2012, p.4*)*. The 1930 Census provided specific instructions for the counting of Mexicans, identifying them as a very mixed group belonging primarily—if not totally, to the laboring classes. According to Ortiz and Telles (2012), the use of 'laborers' in the first line of the Census instructions "suggests that class may have played a role into the use of Mexican in that laborers might have been classified as *Mexican* but higher status Mexicans might have been classified as *White"* (Ortiz & Telles, 2012, p.4). This caused the Mexican government and LULAC (the League of United Latin American Citizens) to protest about using Mexican as a racial category, and from there on, until the period of self- identification in 1980, Mexicans who may have marked "other" in the Census form, were classified as White. Finally, in 2000, for the first time in the Census, individuals were presented with the option to self-identify with more than one race and this continued with the 2010 Census.

The way in which countries classify their immigrants has always had policy and legal consequences. An interesting significant event which

involved a number of well-known civil rights attorneys and LULAC in the post WWII period addressed race/class classification in a criminal case which got to the U.S. Supreme Court. The case, *Hernandez v. the State of Texas*, was about a migrant cotton picker accused of murder in a small town in Jackson County, Texas. The lead defense attorney, Gustavo García,

…envisioned the Hernandez case as a challenge to the systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican origin from all types of jury duty in at least seventy counties in Texas. It was not surprising to him when Hernandez was found guilty and the decision was upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals[2].

When the Warren Supreme Court finally heard the case in January, 1954, García argued that the 14th Amendment guaranteed protection not only on the basis of race but of class. The State of Texas contended that the 14th Amendment covered only Whites and Blacks and that Mexican Americans were White, at least at that moment. However, the Supreme Court, ordering the reversal of conviction, "accepted the concept of distinction by class, that is, between 'white' and Hispanic, and found that when laws produced unreasonable and different treatment on such basis, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is violated" (*Handbook of Texas on Line*, accessed April 27,2017). This was a great triumph for the concept of "other white" applied to Mexicans, a concept that persisted until the 1970s.

These changing classifications fueled Mexicans' own definitions of self and influenced the public images of the group. This is not unlike what happened among other ethnic groups where color and class intersected with their ethnicity. Given the complex relationship of race, ethnicity, class, gender, and other dimensions in the modern world, it is not surprising to find that members of many groups find themselves confused by the Census and sometimes the courts, which, by default, required until very recently single classifications. In the case of Mexican Americans, even for the courts, when acting favorably to them like in the case of Hernandez v Texas, the issue of identification was unsatisfactory ("other white") from the perspective of psychological identity.

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[2] *Handbook of Texas Online*, V. Carl Allsup, "Hernandez v. State of Texas," accessed April 27, 2017, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/jrh01.

6. Mexicans and Civil Rights

After WWII, the struggle for land and labor rights gave rise to a significant period in the Chicano civil rights movement. it involved leaders, such as César Chavez, and Reies Tijerina. For Cesar Chavez, the continued flow of cheap labor for the agricultural fields was an unrelenting impediment to the improvement of working conditions: "for millions of ordinary Americans, the terrible plight of migrant workers and efforts of the late César Chavez were the introduction to the Chicano/a movement" (Iber & De León, 2006, p. 266-7).

For Cesar Chavez, as long as there were unorganized Mexicans who followed the crops in the West, there was plenty of room for disempowerment, rejection and disdain. He looked towards the unions to support the cause. Tijerina branding a strong sense of entitlement did not shy away from confrontation. But the *"aliancistas"*—members of a strong movement started by Tijerina-- quickly became associated with violence in the minds of the authorities. Other groups involved in civil rights but with antecedents preceding the formal Civil Rights period such as LULAC, founded in 1929, which participated and won a number of important court cases, were involved in litigation. Very importantly, LULAC formed strong alliances with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, founded in 1909).

Although statistical correlations might be missing, U.S. history shows that the nativist perspective apparent during the colonial period continued to taint all policy measures and events through the decades and into the Civil Rights period. In the 1920s — although many surviving today — examples of nativist organizations were the American Party or Know Nothing Party; the American Protective Association, the Ku Klux Klan, the Aryan nation, the English Only movement, etc.

In spite of the variety of approaches and philosophies in the struggle for Mexican recognition which rendered many successes, Mexican-immigrants and even Mexican-Americans remained more marginalized and disparaged than white members of other immigrant groups. Chavez's ideas about the constant supply of poorly or non-organized labor coming across border and being unable to demand equal treatment continues to be a valid

hypothesis to attempt to understand the discrimination of immigrants in various parts of the world.

Conclusions: The current situation

The decline of Mexican immigrants documented and undocumented entering the U.S. in the past nine years is a well-documented fact.

> In the last decade and a half, the Mexican share among all immigrants dropped from 29.5% in 2000 to 27.6% in 2014… Mexico is no longer the top origin country among the most recent immigrants to the U.S. In 2013, China and India overtook Mexico as the most common countries of origin … more Mexican immigrants have returned to Mexico than have migrated to the U.S. since the end of the 2007-2009 Great Recession (Zong & Batalova, 2016, pp.1-2)

This decline did not alter the anti-immigrant public discourse. Although the constant flow of new comers is often associated with nativist tendencies, the intensity of negativism does not correspond to an increase in the volume of newcomers, either in absolute or relative terms. Massey and Pren (2012) have suggested that it is not easy to document the rise of xenophobia because it is not asked in surveys but they reliably trace it to the rise of border apprehensions and the rise of conservatism in the U.S., which are reliably measured. McCarthy (2015) reporting the results of a recent Gallup survey[3], suggests that "the treatment of Hispanics, particularly of immigrants, takes on special significance as the nation continues to debate immigration reform" (p.4). Very pointedly, he reports on the gravity of the issue which has been brought to the fore by Donald Trump not only during his presidential election campaign but also as his presidency took hold and executive measures began unfolding, in spite of persistent reversal of those measures by the courts.

Signs of exclusion of specific groups, and even anti-immigrant violence have occurred in places *without* large or sudden increases in the immigrant

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[3] www.gallup.com/poll/184769/immigrant-status-tied-discrimination-among-hispanics.aspx.

population (Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016). In the U.S., the case of the "dreamers" - young men and women who were brought by their parents as children and had lived in the U.S., attending schools and often succeeding beyond expectations -was highlighted during and after the presidential campaigns. They were not really part of a constant flow but their case often activated the same negativism and anti-immigrant sentiments. The same document by Papademetriou and Banulescu-Bogdan from the Migration Policy Institute Transatlantic Council suggested that anti-immigrant sentiment all over the world is not necessarily changed by the reality of numbers. Nothing has been truer for the current status of the Mexican immigrant in the U.S. and immigrants in general in parts of Europe.

It is important to note that what is observed in others countries is also observed in the U.S. No single factor can be directly correlated to outbreaks of nativism and xenophobia. And yet, each factor (the appearance of taking jobs from Natives, single criminal occurrences, etc.) is used often as an explanation to exclude a particular group. Language, religion, dress, customs are all used to show that a group is not fitting into the nucleus of a specific society.

U.S historical ties to slavery and disdain for African Americans extended to other non-northern European populations. As we noted earlier quoting W.E. B. Dubois, "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line," and the 21st century color line is the Border (Newman, 2005). Today's color line, which after the Civil War reserved the best jobs, businesses, etc. to decrese blacks extends to the border and citizenship. The question must be asked whether particular borders are the demarcating line between acceptable and non-acceptable migrants in Europe. The historical relationship drawn by census and courts when they classified Mexican/Latino immigrants using class as well as race, designating laborers as "mulatos" or Mexicans while other Mexicans/Latinos were designated as white, showed how color and class mattered.

What the research literature shows is that a predilection for groups that blend easily into the host society has been a historical and sociological fact. Witness for example, the threat of the Muslim ban in the U.S. today, or the threat that less-restrictive border crossing policies of the European Union represent for some member states, as evidenced by the success of many ultra-right political platforms. King, a prominent Iowa Republican and a

vocal advocate against illegal immigration, tweeted, "We can't restore our civilization with somebody else's babies" (*The New York Times*, 12 March 2017). The building of the wall, the expulsions of people, the constant discourse associating Mexicans with danger, all show a disregard for what were believed to be the ingrained moral and legal principles of the U.S. as a country of immigrants. While many in the U.S are denouncing the racism inherent in these extremes, the fact that citizens of a well-known solidly immigrant community would dare make such statements bespeaks of underlying racism. It should be equally asked whether exclusivist remarks and proposed policies in Europe do the same thing.

Our premise was that perhaps historical data would provide some enlightenment on the migration predicament of citizens of Mexico. We believe that it offered explanations for the ingrained prejudicial pattern of discrimination that the U.S. has not overcome. The data confirmed the coexistence of xenophobic periods with periods of high unemployment and economic strain. It also showed that the constancy of a flow of immigrants from a single region to the same places often aggravate negative feelings in local communities, even though those communities often request immigrants to perform specific tasks.

On a more hopeful tone, for all groups in the U.S., the historical data also shows that time spent in the country produces changes in the local social structure and often eases the situation of immigrant groups. Current examples of an African-American President, or of Latino members of the Senate or of Mexican legislators and mayors, etc., should be viewed as an indication of progress, albeit slow, fraught by regressions and never broad enough.

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Controlling Irregular Immigration at the European Union's Southern Maritime Border.
An Emerging System Driven by "Migration Emergencies"

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Abstract

Over the last 25 years the southern maritime border of the European Union witnessed the interaction of considerable and increasingly complex irregular migration flows in the Mediterranean with the progressive construction and implementation of restrictive migration control policies by the European Union and its member states at their external borders. The article describes the evolving migration patterns and changes in migration routes both as a stimulus and as consequence of locally stepping up migration control at the emerging hotspots at different parts of the border, creating deviation effects in migration routes with alternative points of entry and higher costs and risks for migrants. Special attention is given to the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis on border management and the new challenges it poses to the asylum system and the protection of fundamental rights.

Keywords: European Union; Integrated Border Management; Irregular migration; Migration control policy; Refugee crisis.

Introduction

Containing irregular immigration has become a priority on the European political agenda over the past two decades. The signing of the Schengen Agreement at the start of the 1990s initiated the gradual creation of a common border policy, which has advanced a great deal over the last few years through institutional and instrumental development, combining national actions with supranational and multilateral initiatives that have resulted in what is known as Integrated Border Management (IBM). These initiatives have mostly focused on actions taken at what is referred to as the "external southern blue borders" in the European Union.

The southern maritime border of the Schengen Area has a longitude of just over 35,000 kilometers, extending from the Portuguese coast to the Greek islands near the coast of Turkey. Spain, Italy, Greece and Malta have become the main destinations for irregular migration flows arriving by sea to Europe, mostly due to their geographical proximity to countries in the Southern Mediterranean Riviera and Turkey. The main European routes for irregular immigration through the Atlantic and Mediterranean (which includes the Alboran, Ionic and Aegean seas) are primarily directed towards these four countries, more specifically, the Western Atlantic route, the Western Mediterranean route, the Central Mediterranean route and the Eastern Mediterranean route[1]. These are routes that have experienced fluctuations inflows over the last 25 years and have been subjected to selective (im)permeability practices for unauthorized migration heading to Europe.

For more than a decade these routes have sparked the interest of public opinion and political authorities due to their volumes, the danger involved in using them and because they have served as "test benches" to develop European policies on maritime migration control, concentrating a large number of initiatives and European and national resources.

The dynamics of maritime migration have been conditioned by changing geopolitical contexts, especially in African or Middle-Eastern countries, and by the migration control actions that have been implemented at different parts of the border around Europe's perimeter. The development of these control actions during the construction of a common policy has been influenced by the diverging interests of the European countries whose geographical positions lead to much different reception frequencies. Because the creation of this common border policy is a delicate process involving asymmetrical state and supranational interests and actions, it has generated serious political tensions among member states during the different migration crises. To complicate things further, the external areas surrounding the European Union function as a buffer system, in which increasing control of migration flows in one area produce changes, or "deviation effects", in others, a situation that has been likened to playing a game of whack-a-mole. Despite these issues, common migration control policies have been applied over the past decade,

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[1] See http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/ and I-Map (http://www.imap-migration.org/

characterized by a series of interrelated dynamic traits developed sequentially and in an increasingly coordinated fashion: externalization (including bilateralism), communitarization, "remote control", techno-logization and privatization.

The objective of this article is to analyze the dynamics and discrepancies involved with applying this policy on the southern maritime border of the European Union since the creation of the Schengen Area. This focus highlights aspects related to the maritime nature of these borders, combining these physical and geographic conditions with the idiosyncrasy of a political action that in an uncertain geopolitical setting has had to simultaneously deal with: a) different levels of migration frequency; b) diverse national, binational and supranational interests; and c) numerous responses against such action by civil society and the international community. It is, therefore, an analysis that characterizes the political sphere of border control as a multilayered, multi-staged, multi-located and contested action.

The article is divided into four parts. The first part describes the evolving traits of this intervention, based on the perception that migration control at the border is a "selective permeability" mechanism used to block unwanted human movement within a highly complex European border system. The second part analyzes the migration dynamics of the main maritime routes, with special attention paid to the cases of Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece. The third part examines the changes that the maritime border has undergone since the end of 2013, with the intensification of the Central Mediterranean route and later the refugee crisis through the maritime route to Greece. The fourth part analyzes how adapting the European migration control system, including border control, freedom of movement and asylum instruments, to these new dynamics has produced serious political tensions, once again focusing on the discrepancies that have emerged between national and supranational interests.

2. Controlling irregular maritime immigration in Southern Europe: geopolitical determinants of constructing a single border

2.1 The gradual construction of a common border

The economic integration of the European Union, and to a lesser degree its political and social integration, has advanced substantially over the past

few decades, creating a single market that allows the free movement of capital, goods and people among the member states. The creation of an area of free movement made necessary the construction of a shared external border with similar permeability at all points, including the manner in which the entry of irregular immigrants is controlled. This process involves continuous agreements on many issues, such as the regulation of visas, the determination of requirements to allow passage through the territory or the creation of joint systems to register passengers and migrants.

The construction of a common external border has encountered many obstacles due to the reticence of member states to cede part of their national sovereignty to supranational institutions. These misgivings have limited the progress in this area to small concessions during border crises that obligate member states to accept greater collaboration.

In the case of migration management, nation states retain direct control of their borders, with some voluntary collaboration through Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), and integrated information systems like EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System). Moreover, the freedom of movement across internal borders guaranteed by the Schengen Agreement can be temporarily suspended given extraordinary circumstances, as occurred in 2015 along the routes used by Syrian and Afghan refugees.

The way irregular immigration is controlled illustrates the reactive nature of the "bordering" process, which leads to what some authors refer to as "borderscapes" (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007; Brambilla, 2015), highlighting that it is a dynamic process undergoing constant reform. There is a vast economic gap at the southern border of the EU, separated and connected by the Mediterranean, the main interstitial space between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, which generates a great deal of migratory pressure. Not surprisingly, the management of international mobility in this part of the world has faced emerging challenges regarding the protection of migrants, the implementation of the rules to access the Schengen Area and international cooperation between EU member states and also with neighboring countries.

The combination of policies, institutions and instruments that the European Union has adopted since the 1990s has the following features. First of all, the southern maritime border of the EU has gradually been made impermeable by focusing on "emergent" routes and hotspots where

irregular immigration routes attempt to penetrate European territory. This has resulted in control measures being deployed first in the western Mediterranean and later extending east. This gradual implementation includes a wide variety of actors and employs many instruments, making it a multi-located, multi-staged and multilayered intervention. Second, this gradual deployment has resulted in an integrated information and detection system named EUROSUR equipped with advanced technologies to detect the vessels used by immigrants, facilitate information exchange between states and accelerate the development of coordinated actions. EUROSUR is a key part of the final objective, which is to attain complete Integrated Border Management (Godenau, 2012: 8). Third, the European Commission has opted to outsource the creation and experimentation of the technologies used by EUROSUR, seeking the active involvement of prominent companies in the Defense and Security industries (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016a; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013; Baird, 2016). Fourth, the creation of Frontex has allowed the operational response capacity of the EU along its external borders to be expanded. Its mission is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. Frontex has gradually increased its scope and competences; for example, it now includes a Fundamental Rights Officer to help protect fundamental rights during the interception, retention and derivation of migrants, among other oversight mechanisms. Fifth, Integrated Border Management also covers one of the specific causes of forced migration: the search for refuge and asylum. In this area, the EU follows the principle that the first member state to take the fingerprints of a refugee or that receives a request for asylum is responsible for examining the request for international protection (Dublin III Regulation of 2013: Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013). As we shall see later, this principle generates asymmetries due to the fact that some countries are more exposed to external borders than others. The outermost countries have to deal with a greater number of asylum seekers, regardless of the desired final destination of the migrants, and the refugee crisis of 2015 has provoked an intense debate regarding the mechanisms used to distribute refugees among EU member states. Sixth, the increasing number of refugees reaching the EU external borders triggered the decision to use Turkey as an enforced destination of migrants, with the aim of reducing the

number of additional asylum seekers in EU countries. This type of remote control does not concentrate on controlling migrants' exit or transit, it focuses on creating substitutive involuntary destinations.

The complexity involved in creating and maintaining this common border explains why its approach to managing economic and forced migration is so different from other international borders to which it is frequently compared, such as the border between Mexico and the United States (Andreas 2001; Fernández-Kelly and Massey, 2007; Koslowski, 2011; Jaskoski, Sotomayor and Trinkunas, 2015). The fact that it is a maritime border, coupled with its complex political and institutional framework, makes it very distinct from other borders.

2.2The dynamics of maritime migration flows (1990-2016)

The transformation of southern European countries into migration destinations in the 1980s led to maritime flows of irregular immigrants just a few years later. Therefore, this is not a new phenomenon, although the volume it has reached today is larger than it has been in the past quarter century (Fargues and Di Bartolomeo 2015; UNHCR, 2015; Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm, 2016; Crawley, Duvell, Sigona, McMahon and Jones, 2016).

Despite the fact that for years the volume of these flows was modest compared to those entering through airport and land borders, this type of migration has been a priority on the agenda of Spain, Greece, Italy and Malta over the past few decades. Their geographic proximity with the southern Mediterranean Riviera and the Maghreb, the Balkans and Turkey have converted them into the first stage or final destination of mixed flows (economic and forced) since the beginning of the 1990s. The dynamics of these maritime routes to Southern Europe have been affected by economic and geopolitical factors, such as the control measures taken at different points of the perimeter. In fact, whenever control has been increased over one part of the area surrounding the perimeter through surveillance, detection and (physical and virtual) containment measures, it has activated new corridors or reactivated old routes. This has created a dynamic and interactive system that evolves and receives feedback from land and air routes and shapes the geographic priorities for actions and intervention.

The fact that these irregular migration flows are travelling through a maritime environment makes an enormous difference in how they are

controlled compared to other settings[2]. First of all, because migrants must use some kind of vessel (which depending on the type of crossing varies greatly, from large ships to medium-sized boats to tiny *pateras* or even inflatable toy rafts used in the Strait of Gibraltar) they need some material resources at their disposable (or to be able to pay for them), a certain amount of organization, at least in the mid-sized vessels that require fuel, some type of navigation system and the ability to steer. The need for a vessel has generated a substantial market for middlemen in the coastal regions of countries from which these voyages are launched, a local migration industry that coexists with the remote surveillance carried out by receiving countries through collaboration with transit countries. The varying durations and risk involved in the different types of voyages also requires the migrants to undertake them with very different resources. Second, the amplitude of the maritime borders is an incentive to use the most sophisticated and expensive control and surveillance technologies that are capable of detecting vessels from a great distance and the most advanced remote sensing systems, most of which employ satellites and UAVs (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016a). This is why maritime routes require greater organization (and a "migration industry") and the migrants need more resources than they do when taking land routes.

In addition, series of high intensity immigration episodes are central to this evolution, what the press usually refers to as a "migrant crisis". These episodes began at the start of the 1990s when the first maritime flows reached the coast of Apulia (Bari and Brindisi) in Italy, through the Adriatic and the Strait of Otranto. The fall of the government in Albania and the war in the former Yugoslavia triggered the first stream of Albanian and Kosovar refugees (Albahari, 2006).

At the end of the 1980s migrants also began flowing through the Western Mediterranean route across the Strait of Gibraltar to the Spanish coast. This flow was consolidated in the 1990s, giving rise to the first deaths along that route and provoking the first Spanish measures to control its maritime borders (López-Sala and Esteban, 2010; López-Sala, 2015).

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[2] Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm suggested that irregular maritime migration can be characterized as a "wicked problem" extremely difficult to address. In their opinion the complexity of the management of maritime migration is related to the increasing number of actors involved in the process, the overlapping legal rulings at the sea and the risk of the routes (Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm, 2016).

Something similar occurred in the central corridor of the Mediterranean where since the 1990s the flow to Italy has intensified. The stabilization of the Balkans caused this route to lose importance in the east-west direction, while at the same time the south-north flow from Africa to Southern Italy intensified, first to Calabria, Sicily and the Aegadian Islands and from 2002 to the Pelagie Islands (Pastore, Monzini and Sciortino, 2006). Between the end of the 1990s and the start of the 2000s, the Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean routes became the most active maritime routes, and the origin of the migrants diversified, with the presence of Maghrebis (Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians) and Western Africans (especially from countries in the Gulf of Guinea), Central Africans and migrants from the Horn of Africa (López-Sala, 2015; Godenau, 2014; Cuttita, 2008). Since 2002, Malta became one of the main destination countries. This was an "unexpected destination" (López-Sala and Esteban, 2010; Mainwaring, 2014) through the Central Mediterranean route for a large number of refugees from Eritrea and Somalia who initiated their sea voyage in Libya and then connected with the Eastern African land route.

Increased surveillance and control of the Western Mediterranean, especially with the gradual implementation of the Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE) in the Strait of Gibraltar by Spain, caused the flows to be diverted west, activating new routes such as the Western Africa route connecting the coast of Africa with the Canary Archipelago. This route is where the "cayuco crisis" occurred in 2006. In just one year over 30,000 migrants from various African countries arrived in this archipelago belonging to Spain, which at the time was the most intense migration episode observed at Europe's Mediterranean perimeter (Godenau, 2012; Godenau, 2014; López-Sala, 2015; Godenau and López-Sala, 2016b). The cayuco crisis had an enormous impact on the later evolution of migration control along the entire European maritime perimeter. It provoked an escalation in national and, especially EU actions to increase the surveillance and detection of maritime migrants. This included the implementation of the first joint Frontex operations (Operation Hera), the beginning of collaboration agreements with transit countries and later, the emergence of EUROSUR (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016a, 2016b). While improved surveillance in the Western Mediterranean substantially decreased the flow through the Western Africa route, at the same time it caused the flows though the central sector of the Mediterranean to increase, with a large

spike in arrivals to the coasts of Malta in 2007 and 2008 (Lutterbeck, 2009; Lutterbeck and Mainwaring, 2015) and the Italian islands of Sicily and Lampedusa (Cuttita, 2008). This led Frontex to extend its joint operations to the Central Mediterranean (Operation Nautilus) and stimulated bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the main transit countries (Tunisia and Libya) throughout 2009. Greece has also been the destination of maritime flows to its Aegean islands since the 1990s, with a slight increase in volume in the past decade, especially in 2007, but had remained below the volumes seen in Spain and Italy until the recent refugee crisis of 2015, which has surpassed previous migration records to Europe since the middle of the 20th Century.

The penultimate migrant crisis in the Mediterranean occurred in 2011 and was the result of the Arab Spring, which caused many young people to flee to Europe from Maghreb countries, especially Tunisia, but also Egypt. An earlier flow of Tunisian youths to Italy had been seen in 2008, when the Tunisian regime repressed the "Redeyef", a social movement that had arisen in mining areas in the southern part of the country, where the youth unemployment rate was over 60%. The 2011 crisis, however, led to a series of factors that have been consolidated since 2014. First of all, the perception that these migrant crises are emergencies, which was already present in the events of 2006, has been increasingly consolidated with each episode. It should be remembered that while the state of emergency involves humanitarian assistance, it also includes actions directed at increasing security. During the 2011 crisis, which witnessed clashes between the Italian and French governments, for the first time real statutory proposals to suspend the Schengen Agreement appeared, an aspect of common policy that until that moment had been broadly supported by the member states. In addition, at that time, the "principle of solidarity" with border countries during periods of intense inflows seemed to have been broken after years of high tension, as was evident in 2014 during the preparation of Frontex's Operation Triton, which substituted the Italian operation, Mare Nostrum. The intensification of the flow over the past year has been particularly revealing of the weakness of European policy compared to national or individual actions and also how European states react differently to these successive migration crises depending on their proximity to their territories.

3. Recent changes in the southern border of Europe: the "refugee crisis" and intra-European transit migration

Since the end of 2013 the situation at the southern border of the European Union has again undergone very significant changes. The current migration panorama in the Mediterranean has been caused by a cluster of political conflicts in areas under European influence, especially due to the instability in many Maghreb countries (Mali, Libya, Egypt), sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria) and Western Africa (Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia), as well as the deadlocked wars in Syria and Afghanistan. The unprecedented growth of migration flows and deaths in transit (Brian and Laczko, 2014 and 2016)[3] through the central Mediterranean produced a broad diplomatic and political reaction at the European level, which included the creation of the Task Force Mediterranean, the deployment of the Mare Nostrum rescue operation by the Italian government and later the Frontex operation, Triton. Throughout 2014, more than 170,000 people were intercepted along this route to Italy, in vessels mainly from Libya, but also from the coasts of Egypt and Turkey. The intensification of these flows was combined with the diversification of origins, with a growing presence of Syrians[4] and Eritreans (Fargues and Di Bartolomeo, 2015). During that year the political debate in Europe focused on creating measures that were capable of containing arrivals, while also protecting the lives of the migrants, although the resulting political agreements seem somewhat ambivalent to such a balance. Although European authorities have mentioned that search and rescue is a priority, rescue operations, such as Mare Nostrum, have also been perceived as a factor that attracts flows to this route (Fargues and Bonfati, 2014; Newland, Collet, Hooper and Flamm, 2016).

The failure to reach a diplomatic agreement with a politically unstable Libya, which had become the principal hub of this route, led the European Union to adopt extraordinary measures, including launching military operations such as EUNAVFOR in June 2015 to fight against migrant

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[3] See http://missingmigrants.iom.int.

[4] The intensification of arrivals of Syrians to European countries was also observed in Spain, although to a much smaller degree. Since 2014 Spanish territory has been accessed through what is known as the peripheral land border (mainly the city of Melilla), as indicated by the reports of different social organizations (CEAR, 2016; JRS, 2014; APDHA, 2015).

smuggling networks operating in this corridor (Arteaga and González, 2015). The Malta Declaration in February 2017 included as a priority aim the stabilization of Libya as a part of a strategy to reduce the flows along the Central Mediterranean route[5].

Throughout 2015 and 2016 the routes used by migrants and refugees, mainly from Afghanistan and Syria, diversified. Firstly, there was a sharp increase in the volume of the flow through the Eastern Mediterranean route, both through the land border of Greece with Turkey and the Aegean sea, to the islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos. In 2015 and 2016 Italy and Greece received the most immigrants and refugees in the European Union, far ahead of Spain and Malta, with low numbers in comparative terms. After the European agreement with Turkey in March 2016, the number of irregular migrants reported from the Central Mediterranean route was again higher than on any other route (FRONTEX, 2017).

In 2015 the other route widely used by Syrian and Afghan refugees was the Western Balkan route, an intra-European route (that does not only include EU or Schengen Area countries) from Greece to Central Europe. Transit through this corridor, which caught the attention of the European and International media in the middle of 2015, includes itineraries through Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary and Austria[6].

There are various reasons why media and political attention has been so intensely focused on this transit movement toward central and northern European countries. First of all, the novelty of an intra-European migration route, coupled with the various external and internal controls that have been carried out over the past three years, including building physical walls[7] and taking exceptional measures to close borders within the

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[5] This declaration also included a new action plan to support the Libyan national coast guard and other agencies, the development of local communities, especially in coastal areas, and the support of assisted voluntary return programs. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu /press-releases-pdf /2017/2/47244654402_en.pdf.

[6] It also includes a much less used route that crosses the border between Turkey and Bulgaria.

[7] In the past years border walls (or reinforced fences) have been built at several perimeter areas of the European Union: a) the border between Turkey and Greece (Erdine), b) Turkey and Bulgaria (Lesovo and Kraynovo), c) Greece and Macedonia, d) Serbia and Hungary, e) France and the UK (Calais), f) Austria and Slovenia; g) Austria and Hungary, and h) Slovenia and Croatia. A new wall is now under construction on the Norway-Russian border.

Schengen Area[8]. This intra-European transit involves the borders of EU countries, as well as those of neighboring countries that are not (yet) part of the common border. The reactions of eastern and southeastern European countries to this pressure on their borders has been particularly harsh, as could be observed in Hungary's response in the summer of 2015, both in terms of border management and in their refusal to receive refugees.

Second, the difficulties in agreeing upon common border and asylum policies in the European Union, which has a great diversity of national border and asylum policies. In this sense, it should be mentioned that there have been repeated accusations made by other member states that Greece and Italy had not been meeting their obligations to effectively control its borders and had been showing "little interest" in registering potential refugees that cross through their territory. The euphemistic expression "hotspots approach"[9] (Prieto, 2016), which provided operational support to assist member states to manage "exceptional" migration flows was not the result of intra European solidarity but a new way to ensure the registration and identification of irregular migrants and asylum seekers at the external borders of Europe.

Third, the immigration dynamics through these routes over the past three years have provoked a differentiated management of what are considered economic routes and those used by asylum seekers, which has garnered a great deal of criticism from civil associations and international organizations, who feel that some of the flows which are being treated as economic, should in fact be considered forced migration.

Fourth, the substantial growth of immigration flows through the Eastern Mediterranean route took place at a time when there was a special alert due to terrorist attacks on European soil and the fact that the immigration was coming from regions in related conflicts (e.g., Syria). The receiving societies

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[8] This element had already been introduced into European policy during the intensification of arrivals to Italy in 2011 and 2012 as a consequence of the Arab Spring. In fact, the temporary reestablishment of internal border controls was formalized in 2013 through the approval of a regulation that specifically allows suspending Schengen for security reasons. The temporary suspension of Schengen involves reactivating internal borders and controlling the movement of people as if they were conventional international borders. During 2015 internal controls were reestablished in the Schengen Area countries of Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Austria, Germany and Sweden.

[9] The European Commission formulated the hotspot approach in the European Agenda on Migration in April 2015.

under terrorist threat perceive migrants and refugees not only as a population that needs assistance, but also as a source of insecurity. This climate of public opinion is a new version of "moral panic" that has been fueled in Europe in large part by right-wing political authorities and extremist groups who have gained visibility and support in the past two years.

Finally, Turkey's role as a transit country gained protagonism in this new scenario. In 2016 the European Union promoted a series of agreements with Turkey to increase its cooperation in controlling the flow through its territory, agreements that not only included generous economic endowments, but also relaxed the visa policy for Turkish nationals and reconsidered Turkey's adhesion to the European Union[10].

4. *The impact of the "refugee crisis" on the construction of a common border*

The "refugee crisis" turned the European agenda on its head and had a profound impact on the construction of the common border and the EU's policies on the free movement of people and asylum (Morillas, Sánchez-Montijano and Soler, 2015). Various factors mentioned earlier in this article have led to tensions across Europe. To begin with, for the first time a large percentage of the migrants using these routes are refugees. This means that these flows have to be managed differently than traditional flows of economic migrants, considering that refugees are forced into migration and require international protection. Therefore, the initiatives implemented through the Schengen Agreement must be combined with the conditions put in place by the Dublin Regulation.

It is important to underscore that creating an area of free movement for people in Europe through the Schengen Agreement required harmonizing European asylum policies. This was accomplished through the signing of the Dublin Convention in 1990, which was later modified in 2003 and 2013 through what are referred to as the Dublin II and Dublin III regulations. The main objective of this agreement was to determine which European country within the Schengen Area would be responsible for processing each asylum request to avoid what was referred to in the 1980s as "orbiting" asylum seekers (applicants submitting applications in multiple

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[10] EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-268_en.htm.

member states). In order of priority, the criteria to determine the country responsible for processing each application are: a) first of all, the country where the applicant has family members with refugee status[11]; b) second, the European state in which the applicant has a residence permit or visa; c) the country through which the applicant entered the territory of the European Union. The establishment of this procedure has had two important consequences for the concession or denial of refugee status. First of all, that the concession or denial is definite, that is, once the application has been processed and resolved, the asylum seeker cannot apply again in another European country. Second, applicants cannot freely and unilaterally choose where to apply for refugee status wherever they like, but rather they must adhere to the conditions established by the Dublin regulation.

This agreement has been heavily criticized, especially during the 2015 crisis. First of all, it did not guarantee a fair distribution of asylum seekers, because the responsibility falls mainly on the perimeter border states. In addition, it is common for recent refugees not to apply for asylum in the countries through which they enter European territory, but rather in those states that have better resources for receiving them. The difficulties in applying this agreement are tied, therefore, to the unequal distribution of responsibilities, the diversity of asylum policies among European countries and the difficulties in effectively determining which state is responsible to process asylum applications[12].

The disparities caused by the Dublin Regulation and the need to find a solution for the thousands of refugees who entered Europe over the past two years had much to do with the political agreement that German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the European Commission negotiated to ensure that the refugees were distributed among the different countries, which was finally signed in September 2015. This binding agreement[13] involved the distribution and relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers coming from Italy and

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[11] These criteria are considered a priority to protect the fundamental right of family reunification.

[12] Another important criticism is that the agreement violates the rights of refugees, since the fair and efficient examination of the applications is not guaranteed in every country (Garcés-Mascarenas, 2015, 2016).

[13] This is a binding agreement that must also be respected by countries who voted against it, such as Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Greece, the main entrance countries[14]. This revealed that the tensions caused by "the refugee crisis" affecting the Schengen Agreement, the main instrument ensuring free movement in Europe, have also affected the Dublin Convention, the main political mechanism for a common asylum policy.

The political implications also included new mobility dynamics. The discrepancy between where the flows of refugees have arrived during this crisis (mainly Greece and Italy) and where asylum applications were made (mostly Germany, but also in the Scandinavian countries) have been caused by an intra-European transmigration process that had not been seen since the Schengen and Dublin agreements were adopted and that has reinforced the idea the main European instruments for asylum and free movement must be reformed or replaced.

Although the recent flows of irregular immigration through the southern border of the EU contain a high percentage of refugees fleeing the war in Syria, it should be remembered that it is not the source of all migration and that the Syrian conflict is not the only one that is provoking forced migrations[15]. Furthermore, it is important to note that the speed at which the routes have changed and reorganized over the past two years reveals just how volatile the dynamics of migration flows to Europe are at present.

The emergence of migration in the Eastern Mediterranean through the routes crossing the Balkans and in the Central Mediterranean also provoked various interrelated phenomena. First, the solidarity shown by border populations and volunteer organizations, who are doing a great deal of the work to assist and rescue migrants, mainly during the dangerous maritime crossings where they put their lives at risk. It is worth mentioning, due to its novelty, that some non-state actors and private organizations are taking part in rescue operations, especially during the

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[14] By the end of 2016 European countries relocated only one in twenty of the refugees they promised to shelter under this agreement. In March 2017 over 13,000 asylum seekers have now been relocated from Greece and Italy to other European Union member states (European Commission, 2017).

[15] According to the latest data published by FRONTEX the majority of the asylum seekers come from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Other important nationalities of the asylum seekers are Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran and Eritrea (FRONTEX, 2017).

last months at the Central Mediterranean route[16]. Second, the volume of this flow over the last years has been so large that in February of 2016 the intervention of NATO military forces was approved for reconnaissance, control and supervision operations, with the goal of fighting against migrant smuggling networks in the Aegean. The intervention of Frontex, the European agency created to manage such emergencies, has clearly been insufficient. In this sense, the public mechanisms and resources that have been assigned to manage migration have been incapable of meeting the challenge of a flow of this magnitude. Third, the actions and attitudes of European countries have not exactly been respectful towards fundamental rights. Actions that have been criticized include the repressive use of the army in Hungary or the seizure of the financial resources of refugees in Denmark. Fourth, the migration crisis has reinforced the involvement of civil organizations in keeping watch over events affecting migrants, reporting the violation of their rights and the actions taken to correct these situations. In this sense, what has been called "humanitarian border" by Walters (2011) is reflected in the active involvement of civil society in holding the states accountable for their actions. Finally, the European Union will probably further externalize migration management to Turkey and other transit countries in exchange for economic and political concessions. It remains to be seen if in that transfer of competences the new actors will also be held accountable.

5. Final thoughts

The "refugee crisis" is both a reflection and cause of the difficulties faced by the European project to achieve economic, political and social integration. The debate provoked by the distribution of responsibilities reveals that national sovereignty has far from disappeared and the community project is in danger of being partially dismantled. The

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[16] One example is the Spanish NGO Open Arms Proactiva which has been carrying out maritime rescue operations since September 2015 near the Greek islands of Lesbos and Chios (http://www.proactivaopenarms.org/) and since September 2016 at the Central Mediterranean corridor, or the MOAS association, which is carrying out rescue operations since the end of 2013 in the Central Mediterranean and in the Aegean with private boats and vessels (https://www.moas.eu) (see also Cusumano, 2017).

European Union is suffering yet again from the consequences of an integration policy that mainly advances reactively and is always conditioned by negotiations of national sovereignty. Although the European migration panorama is at a crossroads, and how it is managed politically will be determined by the results of multilateral negotiations, it is urgent that public and media thoughts on this issue be accompanied by an academic reflection. This should be based on the challenges that this new scenario presents in terms of European values and internal social cohesion, the impacts on the economy and the welfare state, as well as the need to reform the common model used to manage asylum.

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Women and Refugees in Twitter: Rethorics of Abuse, Vulnerability and Violence from a Gender Perspective

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Abstract

In this unprecedented humanitarian crisis, women refugees are experiencing extreme vulnerability and violence, both during their journey and in the camps. Our objectives through this article are to analyze how women are being treated in the Social Media (images, discourses, social representations, or narratives). Data for this article were extracted from Twitter (with the help of Nodel XL Pro), from which we collected 1,807,901 tweets about "refugees", using this word as search strings in six different languages. One complete year was covered (starting at mid-2015). Our final dataset was composed of 862,999 tweets. Results suggest that women refugees are targeted just because of their gender. Women are constantly victimized and mistreated due to the perpetuation of a patriarchal outlook that justifies abusing women. We also found many discourses disseminated through Twitter that reject refugees based on disproportionate generalizations and stereotypes, and unfounded and radicalised arguments., using gender difference to feed racism and xenophobia.

Keywords: Gender; Patriarchy; Refugees; Social Media; Twitter.

Introduction

The dramatic situation of refugees today is clearly characterized by statistics. According to UNHCR, in 2015, forced displacement recorded 65.3 million people in the world, 21.3 million of whom were refugees. 98.400 were not accompanied and were separated minors from their families. Women and children represented an important part of these refugees. By 2015 women accounted for 47% of all refugees, and children under 18 accounted for 51% (UNHCR, 2016). Some of these statistics are also associated with terrible realities as continuous deaths and disappearances, and serious vulnerability and risk, especially for children. Risks such as separation from family, detention, sexual and

gender violence, exploitation, or physical and psychological damage (International Organization for Migration, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children's Fund, 2017).

According to CEAR (2016), vulnerability for women means physical violence, rape, economic exploitation, sexual harassment and poor health, particularly serious for pregnant women. Women are vulnerable not only during their journey, but also in the refugee camps. Indeed, women, children and the elderly are the segments of the population who suffer a greater vulnerability in these type of situations and armed conflicts.

It is particularly complex to find a satisfying and comprehensive solution for the situation of refugees. It is an unprecedented global humanitarian crisis, as has been acknowledged by UNHCR. This crisis includes a crisis of solidarity (UNHCR, 2016). The complexity of the problems associated with it are of different nature, which makes it difficult to handle: for instance, the issue of resettlement and relocation quotas to achieve a fair distribution among the diverse receiving countries, the vulnerability of refugees' asylum rights, or the slowness of procedures. Not to mention the constant allegations about the lack of compliance with human rights in different places and types of situations, the reality of States that do not accept more refugees, or the severe policy of border controls. Without forgetting the deaths and precarious living conditions in the camps (such as Calais or Idomeni) (Newland, 2016; UNHCR, 2016). The seriousness and scope of the situation helps to understand the important role of international cooperation today for solving this global crisis, to provide answers that facilitate possible ways to deal with the rights and needs of immigrants and refugees (Newland, 2016).

On the other hand, over the past years we have observed the difficulties of medium and long-term integration that immigrants and refugees confront in different societies, as well as the reactions and discussions that generate policies related to these populations, clearly visible in the latest electoral events in Europe and The United States. The tragic situation of refugees is not indifferent to citizens. Reactions in Social Media are frequently polarised, especially regarding the diagnosis of what is happening, as well as actions and

policies to adopt, both internationally and nationally. In today's world, especially in the so-called 'Western', with the advent of Web 2.0, participation is enhanced through social platforms like Twitter, with 319 million active users worldwide (Statista, 2017).

Much of the social reactions to the situation of the refugees are reflected in these media. High rates of internet penetration[1] along with the establishment of social networks, enable the rapid dissemination of news concerning refugees, and capture the attention of millions of citizens today. In the case of Twitter, which this article is based on, without being the platform that heads the ranking (that is Facebook), its contents are particularly important. In addition to serving as an interpersonal communication platform, it is a public source of information, and a key one for journalists, through which citizens are able to participate and follow important news, events, and social and political debates in real time (Weller, 2014).

1. Gender Discrimination and Perpetuation of Patriarchal Violence

As we mentioned above, female refugees are experiencing extreme vulnerability, both during their jorney and in the camps. So we decided to focus on their plight to ascertain their actual difficulties. As is well known, in conflictive situations or wars women of every age are the victims of sexual abuse and physical violence just because of their gender, and also as a psychological weapon to destroy them, and their families. Although we are dealing with an unprecedented humanitarian crisis (and not a war), unfortunately the same pattern is verifying itself. Women are victimized in really great numbers and not enough is done in order to prevent these horrifying practices particularly aimed against them.

In general, the vulnerability of women increases in situations of violence, chaos and lack of respect for inviolable human rights, the first one being the right to human dignity that public authorities

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[1] Penetration rates of 76,6% in Europe (30 December), and of 88.1% in the US (Internet World Stats, 2017).

shoud protect and oblige everybody to respect. But we need to remember that this is intimately related to how women are discriminated against at a global scale. In our globalized world, women continue to be subjected to significant gender discrimination that hinders their growth as human beings, and strongly restrict their opportunities both in education and career development: opposition to their education, exclusion from legal powers or inheritance of land/property, difficulties to access qualified work, etc. Just one clarifying example: In 2015, 54% of girls still had no access to primary education (Entreculturas, 2015), which is a clear indication of the kind of discrimination that is being perpetuated in our contemporary world. Sadly, women and girls are nowadays subjected to ill-treatment and neglect worldwide, as an evidence of the ubiquity of gender discrimination.

Indeed, the roots of these discriminatory practices can be traced back to the way in which our contemporary societies are still influenced by a patriarchal and androcentric system that denies basic rights to women, and places them in extremely physical and psychological hardship and dependence. This gender inequity leads to their social and political disenfranchisement and under-representation. The conventional patriarchal outlook is based on a traditional gender division of labor and separate gender roles, in which women are relegated to the domestic sphere and the family unit, while men occupy the public domain providing economically for the family. Following the so-called "sexual contract" coined by Carol Pateman (1988), women agree to their subordinate status in exchange for security and protection.[2] Therefore, women are granted neither autonomy nor agency, since it is the patriarch who exerts control over the family and is responsible for all decision-making.

Male dominance, and especially male sexual coercion towards women, are undoubtedly at the core of the patriarchal system of

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[2] For an updated revision of these concepts, see Vrushali Patil's "From Patriarchy to Intersectionality: A Transnational Feminist Assessment of How Far We Have Really Come" (2013).

domination from ancient times,[3] and constitutes one of the most visible results of the way in which women are seen as objects, even sexual objects, that can be used and abused with impunity. So women's objectification and subordination are crucial to ensure a patriarchal structure. Patriarchy, as any form of oppression, attempts to "naturalize" this view basing it on women's alleged physical and intellectual inferiority. Moreover, women's mistreatment is justified because of their inability to protect themselves. Cruel realities such as sexual violence and rape, gender violence, genital mutilation, forced pregnancies, human trafficking or sexual slavery are all supported by a patriarchal ideology that condemns women to ostracism and severe suffering and pain.

As Bell Hooks contends,

Patriarchy is a political-social system that insists that males are inherently dominating, superior to everything and everyone deemed weak, especially females, and endowed with the right to dominate and rule over the weak and to maintain that dominance through various forms of psychological terrorism and violence (2004: 18).

In fact, sexual violence impacts both men and women, but "99% of people who rape are men" (Serres, n.d). Geoge Lakoff talks about the "war on women" (as cited in Serres, n.d). Both men and women should be trained to end this violence, especially men "need to challenge other men on their patriarchal and sexist ideas/actions". Negative media coverage of sexual violence fosters this even further, for example how media coverage insists on the ways in which it will impact the sexual predator's life, not the victim's (Steunbenville case as a paradigmatic case).[4] Thus, it can be concluded that there is a certain social permissivity concerning sexual violence that is not

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[3] A classic reference is *The Creation of Patriarchy* by Gerda Lerner (1986), where she argues that male dominance is not "natural", but the result of a historical process springing from an early gender division of labor that sustained a power structure that granted men control over women in Mesopotamian society in the second millennium B. C.

[4] See "Patriarchy Dominates Media's Steunbenville Case" by Carl Gibson. 19 March 2013. http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/304-justice/16544-patriarchy-dominates-medias-steubenville-coverage (Access: 19 May 2017).

registered in other areas of gender conflict, and social media has also to be trained in detecting and preventing gender violence and erradicating negative stereotypical designation of women. In fact, social media is a key actor in this combat against gender discrimination due to its great influence in contemporary society.

And our critical attention should also be directed to how gender oppression accentuates other oppressions based on other identity factors. People who are considered as the "others" along gender, ethnic, national, religious lines are often targeted as subjects of violence, so women refugees are victimized on account of the combination of all these determining factors. It is the fear of difference coded in negative terms, and it clearly affects both men and women, but again women are visualized as different because they are forced to subject themselves to specific clothing codes (hijab, burka, etc.).

2. Objectives

Our objectives through this article are to know in general terms how women and gender are treated in social media, and particularly in Twitter. Specifically, we are interested in exploring how the image of women is viewed in the discursive context of refugee crisis. Once identified the main argumentative lines related to women or gender issues in connection with refugees (for example, if there are some topics present or absent), we are interested in going into detail about imageries, discourses and social representations spread across Twitter. What are the narratives and arguments transmitted to the audience through social media? Is there some kind of pattern? What issues are given special relevance? Do some messages distort and overload public discourses? Likewise, we want to know by means of this article the importance and orientation of these discourses in order to ascertain their polarity, if they entail emotional components, if they are positive or not for women, what dimensions they have and if these dimensions are associated with classical stereotypes of gender, etc.

Needless to say, knowing the diversity of imaginaries, social representations and discourses in the society with regard to gender and women, in this case disseminated through Twitter, and their implications, is one of the key aspects to promote integration, coexistence and the formulation of policies in the European context, as well as to help to design policies for the intervention of different actors (non-governmental organizations politicians, activists and *media).*

3. Methods

3.1 Building the Refugees Dataset: Data Collection, Filtering and Data Processing

Data for this article were extracted from Twitter, from which we collected 1,807,901 tweets about "refugees", using this word as search strings in six different languages (English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish). We mined data for this article during mid-December 2015 to mid-December 2016 with the help of NodeXL[5]. The extraction of tweets for this article began after the Paris Attacks. One complete year was covered. During that period, samples were collected every day.

Our final dataset, which did not include retweeted messages, was composed of 862,999 tweets. The initial extraction produced a very long list of tweets, including mentions and retweets (RTs), which were deleted for this analysis, considering that a retweet repeats the content for discourse analysis. Even though retweets give a better idea of the dissemination and scope of a tweet, the original tweet allows for a better identification of different and diverse discourses without this distortion (Gualda and Rebollo, 2016). In future works, more focused on the scope of tweets we will recover this information. A majority of tweets included pictures or links to URLs.

As the goals for this article are to go deeper into Gender and Women's situation in our dataset about Refugees, data were also

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[5] NodeXL: https://nodexl.codeplex.com/.

filtered in order to get the tweets that explicitly considered aspects connected to Gender or Women. This filtering process was done following several steps. First, from the refugees dataset comprising 862,999 tweets without RT, we extracted a list of different words included in the tweets. This task was done with the help of Atlas ti software[6]. A list of more than one million different words and signs was the result. This list included the number of times each word was repeated in the refugees dataset of tweets. In a first round, based on these figures, we elaborated a ranking of words, and we manually revised all the words that were repeated 50 times or more. All the words connected to Gender and Women were saved. In a second round, we looked for all their equivalents in the six languages considered, in order to check if there were some other words, or mispelled ones, repeated less than 50 times. These words were also saved. A first codebook, based on the words around Gender and Women issues included in the 862,999 dataset, was built (it was an inductive process, evolving around crucial concepts in Gender Studies about Women).

The third step, again through Atlas ti, was classifying, coding and categorizing. For this, we built a Codebook, and used the advanced *Autocoding* tools in Atlas ti, following the classical steps of Qualitative Analysis in Sociology supported by this kind of software. The main focus to organise and classify the information was thematic in order to discover the different topics and nuances that linked refugees and gender issues on Twitter. Other investigations categorize and classify tweets by using a semi-automatic coding method with a dictionary, as in Casas, Davesa y Congosto (2016).

Tweets about refugees connected to Gender were around women, girls and young women, pregnant ones, refugiadas, women as part of a family (mothers, grandmothers, daughters, sisters, wives). Other significant words sometimes directly connected to women were, for instance, rape (in general), statutory rape (sex with somebody underage), gang-rape, children rape, Cologne attacks or rapes, or violence against women. Other words in the refugees dataset also

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[6] Wordcruncher procedure, ATLAS ti: http://atlasti.com.

referred to feminism, sex, prostitution, trafficking, mistreatment or abuse. There were also others such as burka, hijab, veil or burkini, that connect with issues of religion or terrorism. Though some of these words are generic, they somehow can be referred to women. For instance, "children" or "abuse" could allude to girls and boys. For this reason, they were included in the final dataset in order to be able to analyze the connections between Gender or Women and Refugees.

Figure 1 – Refugees Dataset: Process of extraction of tweets, filtering and processing

Process	Dataset mid-Dec 2015- mid Dec-2016
Extraction of tweets. Search criteria: 6 languages	1,807,901 tweets
Filtering RTs	862,999 tweets
Extraction through Atlast ti of a list of different words included in the dataset with 862,999 tweets	More than one million words and signs
Filtering words by Gender and Women issues (manual revision)	76,919 keywords and derivatives
Classification, creation of a codebook, coding, and categorizing. Autocoding by Atlas ti	Retrieval of tweets thematically connected to Gender and Women issues

Source: Authors.

3.2 Discourses and Microdiscourses Analysis and Twitter

Discourse analysis is a method of social research based on different techniques of textual, contextual and interpretative analysis. Its general objective is to improve our understanding and knowledge about social reality, social structure and ideological constructions, analyzing the relationships between language, social and cultural context and relationships between subjects (Ruiz, 2009).

In the case of Twitter, the discourses disseminated by this social media can be considered microdiscourses by its limitation to 140 characters (Gualda, Borrero & Carpio, 2015), which forces to condense the messages but without losing their meaning, sometimes with the help of *hashtags* or with pictures and URLs that support the messages. This characteristic of Twitter makes possible a formal semiotic analysis of the text, according to the rhetorical resources it

contains: verb tenses, lexicon used, rhetorical figures (metaphors, comparisons), deictics, etc. focusing our attention on the form as well as the content (Ruiz, 2009). Tweets lack the complexity and richness of more structured messages, such as those that can be found in online blogs or forums, thanks to the well-known 140 characters constraint.

Another characteristic of Twitter that enables an analysis of contextual discourse is the development of conversations through RTs and Mentions. In this case, the conception of intertextuality defended by Foucault (1973) is very clear, which maintains that the meaning of the discourse is related to other discourses with which it dialogues, either explicitly or implicitly. In Twitter, sometimes these conversations are not direct between some subjects and others, there may be no response and it is not guaranteed that someone will read the message, but these are transmitted publicly to an audience (especially followers) and are accessible to anyone. Discourses are also constructed on both the social context of that moment and other discourses external to social media, due to the increase in use of Twitter as a backchannel to follow events developed in the real world. Other times discourses in Twitter are based on virtual participation on real events, which provides participants with a parallel communication channel to exchange comments about what is going on (Lippizi et al., 2016). Therefore, the development of these conversations not only impacts the social media, but can transcend to the general public.

At the interpretive level, these discourses are susceptible of being analyzed and interpreted as ideologies, positions, points of view, identities of the subjects, and also as sentiments, with respect to the events about which they speak. This interpretation is characteristic of Bourdieu's analysis, which takes into account past history and the position in the social structure of participants in social interaction (Martín, 1997). Discourse would reflect the subject's *habitus*, that is, its discursive competence, derived from its membership in a particular social group and from the social experience conditioned by that belonging (Bourdieu, 1991).

4. Results

4.1 Diverse Presence of Women & Refugees in Twitter

Diverse discourses, imaginaries and social representations of Gender and Women are common in the discursive context about refugees in Twitter. In terms of number of tweets, after filtering the repeated tweets (RTs), we found explicit references to Gender or Women issues in near 10 per cent of tweets out of 862,999 that were analysed. Different ideas or topics about Gender and Women emerged in the messages and conversations that we found in Twitter, some of them in the most negative side (see Figure 2).

When talking about refugees, people tend to refer to Gender issues in Twitter through different keywords. Near 60 per cent of tweets on Gender issues in our dataset allude explicitly to *women* (27,6%), *rape* (18,6%), or *sex* issues (12,1%). In the first case, it is very common to find tweets including words explicitly referred to Gender such as *women, mujeres, frau, mulher, femme, female, dona* or *donna* in connection to refugees. Additionally, women are usually depicted in the traditional roles as part of a family in many tweets: *Women as part of a family, roles* - Mother(s), madre(s), mütter, mutter, mama, mom, hija(s), daughter(s), grandma(s), grandmother(s), sisters, wife, compañera. These tweets in general reinforce traditional ideas about gender roles assigned to women and their dependent status in relation to men as authority. Especially they are regarded in their condition of mothers or about to be (pregnant women-embarazadas), or as wives or partners to men. In all cases, the emphasis is placed on how women are in need of protection by men, repeatedly insisting on their vulnerability. Thus, women are denied any kind of agency or autonomy, and they only find meaning within the conventional family structure headed by a patriarch.

Figure 2 - Number of words in tweets about refugees

Source: Authors, from Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid-December 2016).

Something similar happens with regard to the word *rape*, that is also frequently associated in our tweets with refugees. In fact, one of the most disseminated hashtags in our dataset combines the words *rape* and *refugees*, in different languages, even working as a negative motto towards refugees: *#raperefugees*. We will refer to that issue in more detail in another section, as different but complementary meanings can be found in Twitter around words like rape, rapist, etc. In the third case, there is a great variety of different meanings around the word "sex", if we consider all the words including this lemma and its derivatives. Some examples associated to rape or sexual violence are *Sexattack, Sexcrime, Sexdelikte, Sexgangster, SexGewalt,*

Sextrafficking, SexualAbuse, Sexsklaverei, etc., while in other cases it is possible to find a focus on denouncing *Sexismus* or *sessismo*[7].

4.2 Stupro, Gang-rapes, and other kinds of violence

If we revise the complete list of topics in which there is a connection between refugees and Gender in Twitter, tweets on *stupro, statutary rapes or children rapes* strongly contribute to develop very negative images about refugees. Some hashtags or words as *Kindervergewaltingung, Childrape, StopChildAbuse* or *StopChildRapeIn Turkey* work as a breeding ground to encourage fear towards refugees. In some tweets a generic use of *children* (other times *adolescents*…), etc., without a direct specification of gender (*girl, boy*) is found. Other times the tweets also contain clear references to women. Some examples follow:

- *Estupro como pagamento e arma de terror? Pode, desde que na África (ou na Europa, se feito por refugiados). Usar turbante? Não passarão*
- *"Adolescente sofre estupro coletivo em campo de refugiados na Grécia #StandWithLula #ForaTemer*
- *Si scrive #rifugiati si legge parassiti-invasori-stupratori https://t.co/2yhMitGIdw*

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

Other tweets also allude to rapes, but including other dimensions, as in the *gang-rapes* case. Though comparatively they are not very frequent, some tweets associate refugees to the idea of gangraping. We found more references in German than in other languages, through words as: *Gruppenvergewaltung; Gruppenmissbrauch, Gruppensex, Gruppenverbrecher, Massenvergewaltigung, etc*. In theory, most of the times gangrapes are referred to women, though several times words as women, girl, mädchen, niña… are not found in the tweets. Also, other ideas about raping in the refugees dataset of tweets are brought through the Cologne events, that are very

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[7] There are also other different meanings around *sex* and *refugees* that we do not have space here to explore.

recurrent in Twitter as *CologneAttacks, CologneAssaults, CologneRape, CologneSexualAttacks, Kölnattacks, etc.* In this case, we found many tweets connecting Rapes to Refugees through Cologne events, even one year afterwards. These ideas clearly do a disservice to the image of refugees.

- *WARUM les ich davon NIX in DEUTSCHEN Medien? 9 Irak Muslime Flüchtlinge gangrape deutsche Frau in Wien.Gibt ASYL?LOL https://t.co/AawjP5aoCe*
- *#swedenrapists is anyone doing anything to stop all the shit thats happening to Sweden? #Muslims #refugeecrisis #refugees #gangrape #murder*
- *Gangrape by FIVE Afghan"refugees" now on trial in Sweden. Victim was a boy. Sweden has not yet learnt to be multicultural. #svpol #migpol*

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

Apart from rapes, childrapes, sexualattacks, sexabuses, or gangrapes, other ideas about sexual violence, and abuses are common in the tweets that connect women and refugees. Again, though sometimes violence is alluded in general terms, and by the concrete words that are used, violence does not have to do explicitly with women or sex (for instance, *#violencepoliciere*), other times tweets show a clear chain of generalized arguments that may suggest that any refugee is a raper, or a potential gangraper. Fortunately, other tweets try to fight against hate to refugees or immigrants in general. In summary, talking about violence and refugees in Twitter bring us very different and opposed type of discourses and imaginaries.

- *RT @Tentuil: #Syrian #Muslim "#Refugees" Bring "Culture Of Rape And Violence" To #Germany https://t.co/brO4TCciRb #ParisAgreement https://t…*
- *Protecting female #refugees from #gender based#violence remains a complex problem*
- *https://t.co/s3Z4Q6kNlp #humanrights #womensrights*
- *#Listen to the stories of #Refugees. Refugees are fleeing violence and persecution. They want… https://t.co/UFWwEKgXmm*
- *The Other Face of #Jihad https://t.co/9JINQKEW0Q #Cologne #Germany #Refugees #Migrants #Immigration #Terrorism #SexualViolence #Islam*

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

On the other side, refugees in Twitter are also associated to prostitution, human trafficking, mistreatment and abuse, and other forms of violence, as we argued in the introduction. There is a huge quantity of tweets denouncing the vulnerability of minors. These tweets do not always distinguish gender explicitly, but gender is evidently included in them. Some hashtags are representative: *#ChildTraffickingMustStopped, #EndChildMarriage*. Others present also the terrible face of organs traficcking, sexual slavery or human trafficking. Though sometimes tweets are not completely explicit in their relationships to women, Gender studies prove that women are the main sufferers here, and especially girls, the most vulnerable group too.

RT @DailyMailUK: Fears child refugees have been trafficked into prostitution or slavery after disappearing from council care https://t.co/F…
Teen refugees in Athens turn to prostitution to survive. The report by @ArwaCNN that ripped my heart wide open: https://t.co/59w0e3S6HT
Libya's refugees: "It's what we'd call slave trading, it's forced prostitution, mass rapes." https://t.co/6M1JNa1gog"

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

There is a great amount of tweets reporting mistreatment to refugees. Texts included in the tweets normally do not have a focus specifically on women. They tend to allude to refugees in general, but pictures that accompany them are more inclined to show victimized images of women, and girls. There are also lots of them showing pictures of refugees in camps, borders, etc. explaining that refugees in general were mistreated in different countries or in concrete borders or places: Turkey, Hungary, Australia, France, Denmark, borders in Serbia, borders between Macedonia and Greece, the Center for Temporary Stay of Immigrants (CETI) in Melilla, etc. These tweets talk about the mistreatment suffered by refugees, and insist on the responsability of public authorities, pointing out a discourse around European mistreatment and abandonment of refugees. Some tweets specifically address the importance of giving special support to women and girls.

- *Los #refugiados y solicitantes de asilo en #Turquía son víctimas de maltrato y detenciones arbitrarias, denunció Amnistía Internacional.*
- *A vile act of terror which will only result in the maltreatment and abandoning of the refugees who have already lost everything. #Brussels.*

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

In the case of abuses, when they refer to *SexualAbuse* is especially used to underline the idea of some countries or authorities abusing refugees. That is the case of Turkey, as has been reported by several organizations (i.e. International Amnesty) or by other users in Twitter. We found several denunciations on Turkey's abuses at deporting refugees (*Amnesty accuses #Turkey of abusing, forcibly deporting #refugees https://t.co/6TXLRz30Ra /@HDNER*). A similar circumstance is reported about the Bulgarian or the Macedonian Border Police in Twitter, etc. (*Bulgarian Border Police Accused of Abusing #Refugees https://t.co/FdI183yUQr, RT @Fotis_Filippou: #Bulgaria govt must investigate allegations of abuse against #refugees & #migrants by police https://t.co/sC5YORObnH ht…; RT @Zarkica: Report from #balkanroute 24.12- #Macedonia police beaten up #refugees, abuse continues to #refugeesviaBulgaria https://t.co/w…*).

Other messages connecting the idea of abuse and refugees in Twitter have to do with ChildAbuse (as before), or unaccompanied children and teens abuse, and the claim of Human Rights in this area (*Rape and Child Abuse Epidemic in German Refugee Camps https://t.co/HMp5LHHdFP Muslims trash refugees #Flüchtlingsunterkunft #Flüchtlinge; RT @rjstrikers: #ChildRights #HumanRights #Refugees #ChildAbuse #auspol #ICC @UNICEF @UNrightswire @IntlCrimCourt https://t.co/x0sKgbPCoD; RT @FUBARrockchick: People fleeing war, human rights abuses No one should have to rescue babies out of cold water. #refugees*). Also, LGBTI are reported to face abuse and homophobia in some European refugee centres as well as women:

- *Sexual abuse and/or rape of female #refugees during their journey to #freedom Via @GreekAnalyst https://t.co/fodhZ6pX58.*

- *14% of #women #refugees sexually abused – report https://t.co/1FgMEG9V0I via @newvisionwire @SpeakerRyan @POTUS @SenThomTillis #refugees #immigration #WakeUpAmerica.*

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

4.3 Building the Hate to the "Others": Sexual Abuses to Girls and Burka as Representatives of Discourses against Muslims and Islam.

Some of the most frequent words connecting refugees and women in Twitter are referred to young women, especifically girls, and their equivalents *niñas, mädcken, ragazza, filles,* or*meninas.* In this case, there is an important tendency in Twitter to associate girls with rape, or sexual abuse. Social representation of refugees frequently link the religious aspects, not so common in previous words or discursive contexts. "Muslims" (refugees) appear in these discourses as responsible for the rape or sexual abuses directed to girls, as a horrible event to be avoided.

- #Germany #Rape of a young #Girl in #freiburg. #refugees rape girl in Germany. https://t.co/0FW7fBZzzo via @DMF_Info
- #Migrants sexually harass German School Girls, Mayor: "Don't provoke them!": https://t.co/aPaDNBeDAC - #Flüchtlinge #refugees
- Muslim women KNOW PRIMITIVENESS of muslim males - LOL!Refugeeswelcome idiot German girls DONT! HAHAHA! #Flüchtlinge https://t.co/1LR1dU7lhc
- Get the fuck out of my country if you want to rape girls! #rapeFugees #kiel #Fluechtlinge https://t.co/XxFeTt7cmh

Source: Refugees Dataset (mid-December 2015-mid- December 2016), from https://twitter.com/.

Another important set of tweets that connects women and refugees also ties women, refugees and religion through the *burka*, the *hijab*, the *veil*, or the *burkini*. In this case, most of the tweets that were found clearly reject these pieces of clothing associated to Islam, but also, in the Western cultures, intepreted as a privacy of freedom for women. Several tweets or hashtags completely reject refugees by

these clothes: *BanBurka, BantheBurka, Burkaverbot, Burkiniverbot,* are clear examples of this.

4.4 *Anti-refugees Rethoric and the Exaggeration of Threats: RapeRefugees*

The association between *rapes* or *rapists* and *refugees* is common in Twitter, and has international dimensions through the dissemination of the hashtag *#RapeRefugees* at international level, in tweets written in different languages that explicitly reject refugees. We found several variations of the same idea promoting hate towards refugees through other words or hashtags as, for instance, *RapeFugees, RapeEpicdemic, stoprape, stoprapefugees, swedenrapists, Rapefest, RapefugeesNotWelcome, RapeJihad,* etc.

RapeRefugees, and similar short words or hashtags, condense a mixture of meanings that go from fear of refugees as potential rapists, worry for the potential risks for girls and women, but sometimes also children (all of them vulnerable). The discourse is very simplistic, direct and pernicious. Countries of reception are in danger, and the blame is on refugees. These fears lead to the threats that refugees bring, oversized or exaggerated in the discourses, play a role in the justification of racism, and also as a justification of border controls, closure, and repatriations (*RapefugeesNotWelcome, stoprape, stoprapefugees).*

All of us, they seem to argue, have to feel fear as we are confronting a dangerous phenomenon that spreads like an epidemic. *#RapeEpidemic* clearly shows this idea. That rhethoric underlines overexaggeration.

There is also the classic discourse confronting *we* and *they*. The following argument is recurrent: We cannot welcome Muslim (under the assumption that all refugees are Muslim), because they want to rape *our* women.

Finally, apart from the promotion of hate to refugees in general oversizing the negative messages, many tweets (by anonymous users) use a very aggressive and injurious

language, over-loaded with hate to refugees and immigrants, which is clearly expressed in the emotional use of adjectives, saturated on the offensive side. In the end, the way in which rape is used in tweets function as a clear justification of racism.

Conclusions

Twitter, as a Social Platform where different people and organizations publicly interact, has become a sort of social thermometer that allows us to explore social reality, or at least a part of it. With regard to the connections described between refugees and women in Twitter, we have found a diverse reality that goes from the public support to refugees, to an agressive rejection of them. The last one unfortunately based on disproportionate generalizations and stereotypes, and unfounded and radicalised arguments, that simplifies the complexity of reality. If for international organizations refugees are forcibly displaced from home as a result of conflict or persecution (UNHCR, 2016), and need humanitarian help; for others, refugees are described as brutal to the extent that are considered responsible for different types of rapes and abuses. We have seen in tweets related to the rejection of refugees the justification of racism due to the violations of *our* women. The aim of these tweets is not to make a feminist denunciation of the violence suffered by women and of a patriarchal culture of rape that transcends borders, but to divert attention from sexual aggressions to women refugees to color, origin, class or religion of the aggressor, using gender difference to feed racism and xenophobia.

Specifically, in the case of women refugees, it is obvious that they are victims of sexual violence and abuse, especially girls and young women, thus suffering a double discrimination because of their condition as women and migrants (and even a third one because of their ethnic origin and religion). Many tweets denounce situations in which these women must face greater danger during the trip and in the camps of refugees, mainly related to the sexual abuse. Results suggest that in this unprecedented humanitarian crisis women

refugees are targeted just because of their gender. Women are constantly victimized and mistreated due to the perpetuation of a patriarchal outlook that justifies abusing women. It is about time to do definitively away with women's objectification and subordination that condemns women to so much suffering and violence. Racism and sexism as oppressive systems nurture each other.

This overall current picture of rejection and hate makes us think that there is an enormous work to accomplish in Europe and in other places in the world to promote and build pacific coexistence among people with different beliefs and cultures, always under the umbrella of the respect for norms, individual freedoms and basic human rights. In addition, it is necessary to confront the patriarchal structuring of societies that continues to foster gender discrimination, and to create alliances among individuals and organizations that fight for full equality regardless of gender or ethnicity, etc.

Nevertheless, we are not naive, and we know that this historical moment is very complicated in order to achieve such a goal, as extremist and radicalized ideologies are all over the place, which is clearly reflected in the messages of many tweets. Terrorist attacks suffered in this century decisively do not help to promote pacific coexistence as they prove difficult to understand by population. Polarization and emotions derived from such brutality contribute to the development of fears, the feelings of being under continuous threat and vulnerability, and the increase of groups and political parties that benefit from it, especially in the far right, as we are witnessing in different countries in Western Societies.

Despite the bleak picture, building a culture of peace and social justice is worth the effort. It is equally important to reinforce clear messages to people about the clear existing differences between groups such as refugees, immigrants, or terrorists, frequently distorted by racist discourses that treat refugees and immigrants as scapegoats of different problems of our societies. And finally, to challenge the patriarchal and sexist tenets of our societies to achieve full equality and to combat gender discrimination and victimization.

Acknowledgements

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Use and Abuse of History and Memory: the Istrian-Dalmatian Exodus and the Current Refugee Flows

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Abstract

After the World War II, about 300.000 Italian people abandoned Istria and Dalmatia, which were annexed by Yugoslavia, and moved to Italy. The exodus is tied to the atrocities committed by the Slavic forces, the so called *foibe* massacres. Today the memory of these events is growing, mainly in its public-institutional representations, and many initiatives are organized to remember the exiles. Knowledge and awareness of the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus, however, are limited to a minority of the population; the story is often told in an one-sided way and memory lends itself to political (and unfair) uses. The exodus is sometimes mentioned within the public discourse about the current migration flows, but, generally, memory is used to reject immigrants, and not to welcome them. Remembrance, indeed, is mainly cultivated by right-wing groups, which oppose the arrivals of foreigners. Moreover, often the associations of Istrian-Dalmatian exiles do not use the memory of their exodus to favour the reception of immigrants.

Keywords: Collective memory; *Foibe* massacres; Immigration in Italy; Istrian-Dalmatian exodus; Public use of history.

> *Let us act in such a way that collective memory may serve*
> *the liberation, and not the enslavement, of human beings*
> (Jacques Le Goff, 1977)

1. Italian refugees in the XIX and XX centuries

Memory is a powerful weapon, because it is able to forge mind, identity and opinions of citizens. Collective memory, indeed, is the basis of the beliefs of citizens, influencing their views and their *weltanschauung*. Today, as pointed out by several historians (mainly Nora, 1984, 1992, 2013), we are experiencing an "explosion" of memory, as remembrance and celebration of the past are more and more widespread. The State plays a key role in this phenomenon, trough days of memory, public celebrations, building of

monuments and other initiatives, and it is engaged in shaping a sort of official memory, negotiated (often, with harsh polemics) among political forces (on the Italian case, see De Luna, 2011). In other words, the State has an important position in establishing the *norms of remembrance* (Zerubavel, 2003, pp. 1-10) which each *mnemonic community* follows. Memory, however, lends itself to easy abuses and is used to justify hostile acts of one group against another (Todorov, 1996).

Such an "explosion" of remembrance has affected all the world, including Italy. For Italians, an important *lieu de memoire* is emigration. As is known, millions of Italians have left the country from the late XIX century to the 1970s and, consequently, emigration is engraved in the memory of individuals and families. In addition, since some decades the collective memory of emigration has been growing, mainly in its public-institutional representations, and many remembrance initiatives (construction of monuments, public celebrations, production of movies and songs, etc.) have been dedicated to emigrants.

The growth of such initiatives is tied to the arrival of large flows of immigrants, begun in the Seventies (Colucci, 2007; Sala, 2011). Memory could be useful to improve the perception of foreigners by Italian citizens, who often have stereotypical information on immigration, and to favour policies of reception. However, it is rarely used in this sense: only in few cases, indeed, memory pushes citizens and ruling class to welcome foreigners (Fonzo, 2017).

Today, the most debated issue of the migratory phenomenon is that of asylum seekers, who since 2011 have been reaching the Italian coasts in massive waves. Although being only a minority of the immigrants arriving in Italy, they provoke the sharpest polemics. In other words, the asylum seekers - black-skinned men who arrive by boat trough the Mediterranean - are more "visible" than other immigrants. Many Italians have a negative perception of them and complain about their reception.

Therefore, examining how much is the memory of Italian refugees alive and to analyze how it is connected to the present migratory phenomena can be an interesting subject within the more general analysis of the attitude of Italians towards immigrants.

First of all it must be noted that drawing a clear distinction between refugees and economic migrants – or between voluntary and forced migrations – is impossible: in general, people who escape from wars and

persecutions come from underdeveloped countries and the reasons why migrants move are more than one; all migrants, in a certain sense, are forced to leave. In this article the words refugees and exiles are used in an extensive sense, including people migrating because of wars or persecutions and migrants that apply for asylum.

In this respect, it should be noted that Italy has been affected several times by the problem of refugees and political exiles. During the *Risorgimento* many patriots were forced to escape and seek asylum abroad. The story repeated itself during the fascist dictatorship, when thousands of anti-fascist militants were forced to seek asylum in other countries.

Furthermore, in two cases Italy had to face the problem of war refugees. During the World War I many citizens moved from the area of operations to other Italian regions. The most massive flow took place in 1917, when the Italian army suffered a serious defeat in Caporetto and a wide area of national territory was occupied by the Austrian army. About 600.000 citizens, living in the occupied land and in the zone near to the battlefront, moved to other regions (Ceschin, 2006).

The other massive flow of refugees was that of Istrian and Dalmatian people, escaped after the World War II because their regions were annexed by Yugoslavia. In the wake of the annexation, the great majority of the Italian population decided to leave and move to Italy, while a minority migrated to other countries and another minority remained in the territories under Yugoslavian rule. It must be remembered that Julian Venetia and Dalmatia had been disputed between Italians and Slavs for several decades, mainly after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the relations among ethnicities were difficult. In addition, during Mussolini's dictatorship the government imposed the forced Italianization, discriminating against the Slavs (Vinci, 2011); during the different stages of the Italian-German occupation of Yugoslavia (1941-1945), many atrocities were committed against the population (Gobetti, 2007; Del Boca, 2005).

After the World War II, Istria and Dalmatia were occupied by the Yugoslavian armed forces, which, in turn, committed atrocities against Italians. The phenomenon is known as *foibe* massacres (the *foibe* are natural cavities, in which part of the corpses of the murdered people was thrown) and developed in two stages: one in September-October 1943, after the first Slavic occupation; another in the spring of 1945, after the end of the Nazi-fascist rule. It is impossible to establish the exact number of victims, which

amounts about some thousands, including those thrown in the *foibe* and those killed in concentration camps (Pupo & Spazzali, 2003; Oliva, 2002). The word *foibe*, anyway, is commonly used in a symbolic way to indicate all the victims of the Yugoslavian repression.

Because of these events, about 300.000 people – including native Italians, Italians moved in the interwar period and a group of Slavs - moved to Italy from 1947 to the late '50s. The exiles, a part of whom were hosted in refugees camps until the 1960s, had problems with integration (Miletto, 2005; Pupo, 2005, pp. 205-224). Formally, the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus was not a forced migration, as people were not expulsed by force, but, in fact, the conditions imposed them to flow.

2. *The memory of Italian refugees*

Today the memory of the Italian refugees is poor, with the partial exception of the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus.

In the case of political refugees, escaped during the *Risorgimento* and during the fascist dictatorship, the memory of exile blends in with the celebration of the heroes of unification and Resistance. Therefore, these people are not remembered as exiles, but only as fighters for the Unification or for freedom.

The refugees of Caporetto, in turn, have never been remembered by the Italian public opinion. During the fascist dictatorship, the 1917 defeat was considered a page to be forgotten and, therefore, nobody spoke of the displaced persons. Also after the collapse of dictatorship, the subject of exiles has been neglected and even the historians have been partially ignoring the event for many years.

The case of the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus, which has raised many polemics since its beginning, is different. Even today, discussing exodus and *foibe* in serenity is quite impossible and, in general, these subjects lend themselves to sharp polemics and one-sided interpretations.

The exodus, indeed, happened during the Cold War, when the Italian political scene was divided in two major blocs: one led by the party *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) and tied to the U.S.; another, tied to the USSR, led by the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI). The latter did not always welcome

the Istrian-Dalmatian refugees, considering them "fascists" who had left a communist country.

Moreover, the foreign relations of Italy did not help the exiles either. In 1948, the Marshal Tito was "excommunicated" by Stalin and, consequently, got closer to the Atlantic bloc; in 1954, with the London Memorandum, Italy and Yugoslavia found a solution, albeit temporary, for the question of Trieste (Cattaruzza, 20007, pp 283-326). Following these events, a sort of tacit agreement was reached: on the one side, Italy did not spoke of the crimes committed by Slavic forces; on the other side, Tito did not claim the delivery of Italian war criminals, provided for in the treaty of peace (Pirjevec, 2007, p. 149). The PCI, in turn, was interested in keeping silent on the events of the 1940s, because it had been in a difficult and ambiguous position, caught between the necessities of supporting Tito's socialist regime and endorsing the Italian claims on the Julian-Venetia. In other words, in Italy almost nobody wanted to damage the relations with Yugoslavia, which, in addition, was an important economic partner. Therefore, during the so-called Italian first republic, public institutions did not pay any attention to the memory of exodus and *foibe* (Apih, 2010, pp. 85-95; Pupo, 2005, pp. 17-24).

Until the 1990s, memory was only cultivated by the associations of exiles, such as the *Associazione nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia* (ANVGD), and by the right-wing parties. For the right, indeed, remembering the events happened in the Julian Venetia was logical: first of all, the victims were Italian expulsed (or killed) by foreigners, which could be enough for nationalist groups. Moreover, the persecutors were both Slavic and communist, two categories against whom the right had been fighting at least since the early XX century (Collotti, 1999).

Therefore, right-wing parties and associations of exiles often protested for the little attention reserved to their tragedy. The question also had an economic implication, as Yugoslavia confiscated the goods of refugees as war reparations and the Italian government, in change, paid the exiles an amount considered insufficient.

Only after the end of the Cold War things changed, because of several reasons: the dissolution of Yugoslavia; the collapse of the PCI, which became a more moderate party; the new framework of foreign policy and the new balance of power.

In addition, in the early '90s almost all traditional parties disappeared and a new right, able to take the power, arose[1]. This new right – which is, at least in part, a renewal of the old right - struggled for the institutionalization of the remembrance of exodus and *foibe*. The question was important also because the Italian government expected to reach an agreement about the reimbursement of the exiles' goods. Some right-wing political leaders, moreover, also requested a revision of the Treaty of Osimo, which in 1975 had established the border between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Gradually the Italian left accepted the point of view of the right about *foibe* and exodus. In the 1990s the main party born from the dissolution of the PCI, the *Partito democratico della sinistra* (later *Democratici di sinistra*) was strongly committed to demonstrate that it was far from the communist ideology and used to highlight this difference whenever possible. The events happened in the Julian Venetia were a useful argument for showing such a difference.

The attention paid to exodus and *foibe* is part of a more general reinterpretation of the recent Italian history, developed after the collapse of the so-called first republic. In the 1990s, indeed, the centrality of antifascism, emerged since the early 1960s, was questioned by political groups, newspapers and some historians, who proposed a different approach, often revaluating the fascist experience and highlighting the atrocities committed by communist regimes (De Luna, 2011).

In short, in the early 1990s time was ripe to approach the question of the Julian Venetia in a different way. Already in 1991 the Italian television broadcasted a programme about the *foibe* massacres (Pirjevec 2007, p. 201) and in November the president of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga, visited the *foiba* of Basovizza[2] (*La Stampa*, 4 November 1991). Two years later the

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[1] The *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, neo-fascist party of the Italian first republic, in 1995 transformed into a more moderate party, *Alleanza Nazionale*, and formed a coalition with a new political force, *Forza Italia*, led by Silvio Berlusconi, and with the *Lega Nord*. The coalition went to the power in 1994 (when the transformation of the *Movimento Sociale* was in progress) and, again, in 2001.

[2] The so called *foiba* of Basovizza (fraction of Trieste), is a mine, not a *foiba* in the strict sense of the term, where corpses of killed Italians were thrown in 1943 and in 1945. The mine is the most symbolic place of events happened in the Julian Venetia and in 2007 the Italian authorities inaugurated a shrine in honour of the victims.

president Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, successor of Cossiga, declared Basovizza a national monument and the Italian and Slovenian governments appointed a commission of historians charged to shed light on the events (Commissione italo slovena, 2000). Since then, Italian media have been frequently speaking of the massacres (but less of the exodus).

In addition, an important turning point came in 1998, when Gianfranco Fini, leader of the *Alleanza nazionale* party, and Luciano Violante, prominent member of the *Democratici di sinistra* and president of the Chamber, participated in a public debate in Trieste and agreed about the necessity of achieving a shared memory on the recent Italian history, including *foibe* and exodus (*La Stampa*, 15 March 1998). Some intellectuals and politicians, most of whom were close to the left, expressed their concern for the "falsification" of history and for its political use (Pirjevec, 2007, p. 225), but the path toward a "shared memory" was not interrupted.

The right-wing groups, furthermore, claimed that an official award was assigned to the victims and in 1995 some deputies presented the first parliamentary proposition (API XII, *Disegni di legge e relazioni*, session of 11 July 1995). The debate went on for several years (see API XIII, *Allegato A ai resoconti*, session of 1 March 2001; API XIV, *Discussioni*, sessions of 4 and 10 February 2004) and in 2004 the agreement was reached. With the law no. 92 of 20 March 2004 the Parliament established to assign the award, consisting of a medal with the imprinting "La Repubblica italiana ricorda", to all the "infoibati", apart from those condemned by a court for collaboration with the Nazis. The law, furthermore, established the *Giorno del ricordo* (Memorial day) in order to "preserve and renew the memory of the tragedy of Italians and of all victims of *foibe* and of the exodus of Istria, Fiume [Rijeka] and Dalmatia people". The day is celebrated each year on 10th February, anniversary of the signature of the treaty of Paris, which in 1947 left Istria and Dalmatia to Yugoslavia. The law also provided for the establishment of a museum of the Julian-Dalmatian civilization in Trieste and a Museum - historical archive of Fiume in Rome. At the Chamber almost all deputies voted in favour, with the exception of the far left (502 yes and 15 no) (API XIV, *Discussioni*, sessions of 11 February 2004). During the discussion, the major attention was reserved to the victims of the *foibe* massacres, which were the most known symbol of the events in the Julian Venetia, but not to refugees.

Many intellectuals criticized the law, arguing that the *Giorno del ricordo* was a sort of counterbalance of the *Giornata della memoria* (established in 2001 to remember the victims of the Holocaust): the celebration of 10th February would be a rightist remembrance day, established to compensate the *Giornata della memoria*, pleasing to the left.

What is certain is that the Parliament aimed to create a *mnemonic tradition*, or, at least, to extend this tradition - which until then was only known by the exiles themselves and by few other people - to the whole national community. As pointed out by many scholars (for example, Zerubavel, 2003; Ridolfi, 2003), the anniversaries play an important role in shaping the collective memory and, consequently, the identity of each community.

Since 2005, the *Giorno del ricordo* has been celebrated with a number of initiatives: schools uses to prepare special activities; public and private television broadcasts programmes dedicated to the *foibe* massacres and, less often, to the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus; local and national institutions organize specific ceremonies. The celebration also involves the presidency of the Republic. Giorgio Napolitano - a former member of the communist party, Italian president from 2006 to 2015 - used to organize a ceremony for the distribution of the medals. In 2007, this caused diplomatic problems, because Napolitano stated that the massacres were provoked by «a movement of hatred and bloody fury and an annexationist plan of Slavs, which prevailed in the treaty of peace of 1947 and which took the sinister form of an ethnic cleansing»[3]. The statement, which espoused the most extremist positions, provoked the angry reaction of Slavic media and institutions (*La Repubblica*, 13 February 2007). A clarification came in 2010, when Napolitano met the presidents of Slovenia and Croatia in Trieste for a commemoration of all the victims (*Il Piccolo*, 14 July 2010). The incumbent president of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, pays less attention to the anniversary and, generally, on 10th February only issues a statement to remember the victims.

Among other initiatives, it should be mentioned the production of a TV movie, *Il cuore nel pozzo*, by the national television in 2005. The small screen, as is known, plays a central role in shaping collective memory and identity and, in this case too, has given a great contribution to the dissemination of

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[3] Full text of the speech: http://presidenti.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=Discorso&key=930. Retrieved on 8 April 2017.

the knowledge of the events. The movie, indeed, was watched by about 10 million people, but was criticized by Slavic media and Italian left for telling the story in an one-sided and unfair way.

More recently, the singer Simone Cristicchi has written the song *Magazzino 18* (published in 2013) in honour of exiles and has realized a theatrical show, with the same title, in cooperation with the journalist Jan Bernas, author of a book on the subject (Bernas, 2010). The show was quite successful, but some leftist publicists criticized it (see, for example, *Il Manifesto*, 28 December 2013).

Another important initiative took place in 2015, when the municipality of Rome inaugurated the *Casa del ricordo*, a centre for studies dedicated to the history of the Julian Venetia.

In essence, in the last few years knowledge and awareness of the tragedies of the Julian Venetia have significantly increased. Since the 1990s, furthermore, many books have been published, including scientific studies, memorialist works and popular books.

The interpretation endorsed by the right has become a sort of "official version" of the story. Only some political groups and publicists, in general close to the far left, still contests it. It is true that the main initiatives (establishment of the *Giorno del ricordo* and production of the TV movie) were carried out when the government was in the hands of the right. (government Berlusconi II, in office from 2001 to 2006), but the institutional left, today represented by the *Partito Democratico*, has accepted the official version[4]. In essence, the memory of the events happened in the Julian Venetia is more and more widespread, mainly at the institutional level. The effort of exiles and right-wing parties has been crowned with success. The commitment of the political parties, however, is different: for the right-wing groups *foibe* and exodus are a real warhorse, while the leftist and centrist parties, in most cases, limit their engagement to the institutional occasions.

It is no coincidence, moreover, that the left-wing politicians who narrates the events happened in the Julian Venetia from the nationalist point of view, are all former members of the PCI, not only Giorgio Napolitano and Luciano Violante, but also other prominent leaders, such as

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[4] The Party was established in 2007 by the merger of *Democratici di sinistra* and some catholics groups, originating from the DC.

Walter Veltroni, former secretary of the *Partito Democratico*, who wrote the preface of Bernas' book, and Piero Fassino, former secretary of the *Democratici di sinistra*, who on several occasions expressed one-sided opinions (for example: "it was an ethnic cleansing against women and men guilty only to be Italians", *La Stampa*, 11 February 2014). Probably, they want to remark their difference from the PCI; the members of the *Partito Democratico* coming from a catholic political tradition use more measured tones (it is the case, for example, of the incumbent secretary, Matteo Renzi). The official memory of the events is also shared by the *Movimento 5 stelle*, another important party of the Italian political arena.

However, although the institution of the *Giorno del ricordo* and the other initiatives have actually increased awareness and knowledge of the events, the majority of Italian citizens continues to ignore them. Between 2008 and 2012 the ANVGD commissioned some surveys in order to evaluate how aware are Italians with the events. The last survey was carried out in 2012 and showed that Italian population has a poor knowledge about that. Only 22% of respondents, indeed, know the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus, while 15,2% states to have just heard of it, and 61% of the sample completely ignores the events. The knowledge of the *foibe* massacres is somewhat higher: 43% of the sample is able to tell what they were, 16 % states to have heard of it and 38,6 % is totally unaware of the phenomenon (Ferrari Nasi e associati, 2012).

There has not been a significant growth of familiarity with events in recent years, in spite of the remembrance initiatives: the people aware of the exodus amounted to 23,5% in 2008; 15,2% in 2010; 22,4% in 2012; for the *foibe*, the trend is 40,6% of people able to tell what they were in 2008; 37,7% in 2010; 43,7% in 2012.

The poor knowledge of such a historic event is part of a more general ignorance of history, frequently detected in Italy.

The picture that emerges, in short, is of a collective and public memory which, thanks to efforts of institutions and political groups, overlaps with the personal memory of individuals and families (exiles and their heirs) and, obviously, do not coincide with it, as the direct victims of the exodus bears the scars of the escape and keep an emotional tie with their homeland. The personal memory of exiles, in other words, is much more alive and

"concrete", as they have the strongest consciousness of the events[5]. It is, anyway, the basis for the construction of collective memory, as is demonstrated by the fact that, quite often, exiles are invited to tell their story during public celebrations. The idea of the ethnic cleansing itself is someway tied to the personal memory of exiles, who believe to have been deliberately forced to escape by Slavs. The ANVGD surveys, however, show that the operation of building a collective memory, by making the personal memory of exiles a common heritage of the country, only succeeded in part.

The history of exodus and *foibe*, in addition, is often decontexualized. Italians are considered innocent victims, while, during Mussolini's dictatorship and during the Italian-German occupation of Yugoslavia, fascist authorities and black shirts committed many atrocities against the Slavs. Obviously, memory is always selective: everybody only remember a part of the events (including the events of his own life), generally those that fit into his mental framework and are functional to determinate exigencies. Anyone who wants to commemorate the Julian Venetia events starts the narrative from the Yugoslavian occupation and cancels the fascist domination and the Italian-German occupation. In Italy, indeed, there is often a tendency to a sort of self-absolution, which drives to remove their own faults and to remember only those of the others (Focardi, 2013). Obviously, the Italian crimes do not justify the Yugoslavian reaction – characterized by atrocities and cruelty that cannot be justified under any circumstances – but help to understand the situation of the Julian Venetia and the relations among ethnic groups.

The exodus, furthermore, is often considered the consequence of a deliberate ethnic cleansing directed against Italians, while the Yugoslavian army mainly acted for political, and not ethnic, reasons (even if the Italians were the most numerous victims).

More in general, the story is often told with mistakes and unproven detail; the number of "infoibati" and exiles is frequently exaggerated; anybody who questions the official version is accused of negationism (for example, see *Il Giornale*, 10 February 2017).

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[5] On this aspect of collective memory, see Halbwachs, 1925; 1950.

3. *Memory and present refugees*

Within the public discourse about the current migration flows, usually Italian exiles are ignored.

The memory of the exiles of Caporetto, as seen above, is almost inexistent and the event is almost never mentioned within the debates about present refugees. Just in very few cases, the current humanitarian crisis has been compared to the 1917 exiles. It happened, for example, within the congress *Profughi / Rifugiati. Spostamenti di popolazioni nell'Europa della Prima guerra mondiale*, held in Rovereto (Trento) in November 2015. On the occasion, the historian Peter Gatrell argued that Europe had learned nothing from the past refugees flows and stigmatized the lack of remembrance (Ermacora, 2016). In addition, the roundtable *1915-2015. Un secolo di emergenze umanitarie*, held within the congress, discussed the refugees question in a diachronic perspective.

No other relevant initiatives have connected the exiles of the World War I and present refugees.

The Istrian-Dalmatian exodus, on the contrary, sometimes is mentioned within the debate about the arrival of immigrants. When that happens, memory is used in order to oppose, and not to favour, the reception of foreigners.

First of all, it must be remembered that political leaders often instrumentalize memory to strengthen their opinions and consider history a weapon to be used in the political debate. This use (and abuse) of history and memory often concerns the events happened in the Julian Venetia.

Sometimes, the exodus is connected with the present immigration and often, the people most engaged in remembering Istrian and Dalmatian refugees struggle against the arrival of immigrants in Italy. The memory of exodus, indeed, continues to be mostly a rightist memory because, even if the left has accepted the right-wing narrative, for nationalist groups exodus and *foibe* are a real warhorse: in their opinion, these events demonstrate the rightness of their hostility against Slavs and communists and endorse their interpretation of history.

Today, one of the most engaged political parties in commemorating the Italian victims is *Fratelli d'Italia*, resolutely opposed to receive immigrants and refugees, but strongly committed to remember the events happened in the Julian Venetia. The secretary of the party, Giorgia Meloni, and other leaders frequently issue statements to invite citizens to honour the Italians forced to escape, considering them "victims of a real ethnic cleansing"[6].

The political leader most committed to fight against immigration, Matteo Salvini, secretary of the *Lega Nord* party, also struggles for a greater remembrance of the Italians fled from Istria and Dalmatia, always underlining the difference with present refugees. In March 2016, for example, he stated: "I do not think that Julian exiles snatched, raped, assaulted, claimed breakfast, lunch and dinner" (*Il Giornale*, 1 March 2016), implying that present refugees do these things. In 2017, in addition, he participated in the official ceremony in Basovizza and argued that the Italian exiles "really were our citizens, who escaped from war, from terror and from persecution. They were exiles" (*L'Huffington post*, 10 February 2017), meaning that the current refugees are not real refugees, but only economic migrants (an idea continuously endorsed by Salvini[7]).

Quite often, the parallelism between past and present flows is explicitly rejected, by distinguishing between true refugees (the Istrian-Dalmatians) and false refugees (the present immigrants coming to Italy). In most cases these opinions only appear in web pages and online newspapers, read by a niche audience; sometimes they also reach mass media.

Many polemics were provoked in February 2016 by a statement of Roberto Spazzali, director of the Regional Institute for the History of the Movement of Liberation in Friuli Venezia Giulia (IRSML). During a conference in the town of Bondeno (Ferrara), Spazzali took a question from the audience about the relation between present and past flows of refugees and stated:

> Within the sea of people which today arrives in our country there are large numbers of young people who – it seems – accept to leave their land at the first "woof". I wonder why

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[6] See http://politica.diariodelweb.it/politica/articolo/?nid=20150210_334467. Retrieved on 19 April 2017.

[7] In the 1990s, indeed, one of the publicists most committed to bring the foibe to the attention of the public was a member of the Lega Nord, Marco Pirina, author of several studies on the matter.

this inertia. Why the inhabitants do not organize a defence of the territory? What relation the refugees have with their homeland? The exiles from Istria, Fiume and Dalmatia were forced to leave because they were not in condition of defending their homeland, also because the Communist Party, in Italy, looked with regard at the Yugoslavian communists[8].

The newspaper *Il Giornale* quoted the speech under the title "refugees are cowards", words never pronounced by Spazzali. Nevertheless, controversy immediately arose and many intellectuals and publicists strongly attacked the historian. The National Institute for the History of the Liberation Movement in Italy (INSMLI)[9] distanced itself from Spazzali and stated that accusing refugees of cowardice is "not only a historically unsustainable claim, but also an offense to the sense of justice and humanity". The president of the IRSML, Anna Maria Vinci, and many newspapers also criticized the historian's declaration.

Spazzali stated to have been misunderstood, specifying that he does not consider that the refugees are coward: «I have never thought about calling "coward" the Middle-East refugees, in opposition to those from Istria, as the title [of *Il Giornale*] makes understand»[10]. Few days later, Spazzali resigned as director of the IRSML.

Other intellectuals, political leaders and publicists have also underlined the difference between the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus and the present flows, using several arguments. First, they point out that present refugees do not escape from war, but from peaceful countries, as is demonstrated by the fact that they are only males, who leave their families at home. Giorgia Meloni, for example, stated that "the images of the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus are not as those of the boat arriving with men of working-age: if you escape from war, you do not leave wife and sons under bombs" (*Il Gazzettino*, 25 october 2015).

Moreover, many people have noted that, if refugees leave because of war, they do not try to defend their motherland before escaping; on the contrary, the Istrian-Dalmatian exiles only left because they were not in

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[8] "Foibe, Difesa è dovere", in http://www.comune.bondeno.fe.it/tutte-le-altre-notizie/1153-foibe-difesa-e-dovere. Retrieved 15 April 2017.

[9] The Insmli is the head of a network of regional and local institutes, including the IRSML. In February 2017 changed its name in "Istituto nazionale Ferruccio Parri".

[10] For the debate, see http://www.storiastoriepn.it/spazzali-ed-i-profughi-di-ieri-e-di-oggi. Retrieved 15 April 2017.

condition to fight. This argument, used by Spazzali, is also present in many articles.

Sometimes, right-wing politicians and newspapers remind us that in the past the left used to "spit on refugees" and compare this behaviour with the present attention for refugees (*Il Giornale*, 10 September 2015).

Finally, the memory of the exodus is exploited within the polemics about the accommodation of refugees, criticized by many Italians, according to whom the government is spending too much money: some newspapers and websites have noted that the Istrian-Dalmatian exiles were accommodated in camps in poor condition, while the current refugees are housed in luxurious hotels[11] (which is a common belief of the Italian public opinion, although being completely false).

Just on very rare occasions, the memory of the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus is used to demand to welcome immigrants and refugees. For example, in 2015 the president of the Chamber, Laura Boldrini, stated that history "teaches us that who escapes from wars and persecution must always be welcomed"[12].

Additionally, some newspapers highlighted the parallelism between the past and the present flows. For instance, a prominent journalist, Pierangelo Buttafuoco, expressed his scorn for the hatred for refugees, arguing that in the '40s it was raised by the left towards the Italian exiles and today is backed by the right against the migrants arriving in Italy (*Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 7 September 2015). Another publicist, Piero Sansonetti, affirmed that today "there is a foiba called the Mediterranean", with reference to the frequent shipwrecks of the migrants' boats (*Il Garantista*, 11 February 2005). Other commentators, including Gian Antonio Stella (*Corriere della Sera*, 24 January 2016) and the Swiss historian Toni Ricciardi (*Il Caffé*, 13 September 2015), endorsed similar ideas.

Catholic intellectuals and publicists also argued that history should teach the importance of welcoming foreigners. For example, Andrea

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[11] See, for example, the article by Francesco Lamendola, *Ma quando i profughi erano gli italiani dell'Istria, né la Chiesa, né i cattolici se la presero tanto calda*, 29 August 2016, www.ariannaeditrice.it; Mauro Cottarelli, *Ponti d'oro per i (falsi) profughi ma nemmeno la presenza per ricordare quelli di Istria e Dalmazia*, 9 February 2017, www.rischiocalcolato.it. Both retrieved 10 April 2017.

[12] Full text in http://www.camera.it/leg17/1131?shadow_comunicatostampa=8828. Retrieved 5 April 2017.

Riccardi, founder of the *Comunità di Sant'Egidio*, speaking of the humanitarian corridors, stated: "I believe that, in order to prepare to the future, we must not forget the past, [we must] remember, for example, the reception of many protagonists of the Julian-Dalmatian exodus. Remembering the past helps us to build the future" (*La Stampa*, 8 march 2017). The catholic newspaper *Avvenire* (11 July 2014) had expressed the same opinion.

It is relevant, furthermore, that some scientific initiatives have examined past and present flows of refugees in a comparative way. In 2016 the University of Trieste organized a series of seminars on the subject *Fare Spazio. Migranti, esuli e rifugiati di ieri e di oggi*, open to general public and held in Trieste and in Gorizia. A further congress was held at the University of Fiume[13]-

On rare occasions, this kind of initiatives involves schools (which often participate, as seen above, in the celebration of the *Giorno del ricordo*). In 2011 the Comprehensive School of Oppido Mamertina (Reggio Calabria) organized a congress titled *I diritti umani e la problematica dell'immigrazione*, about Shoah, Julian Venetia and present humanitarian crisis[14].

On this point, the position of the associations of exiles is particular: on one hand they mainly represent right-wing people, who do not like the arrival of foreigners; on the other hand, they promote the remembrance of a flow of refugees and, therefore, they cannot ignore present immigration. Sometimes, indeed, the leaders of the associations mention the current refugees in their speeches and works.

Here too, it is rare that memory pushes towards some kind of openness for refugees, and, when that happens, it is just in a partial and ambiguous way. For example, in 2013 year Lucio Toth, president of the Federation of the exiles associations (Federesuli), former president of the ANVGD (1992-2013) and former senator of the DC, stated:

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[13]   http://www.editfiume.info/lavoce/cultura/23149-i-migranti-gli-esuli-e-i-rifugiati-di-ieri-e-di-oggi-parliamone. Retrieved 5 April 2017.

[14]   http://www.unmondoditaliani.com/shoah-immigrati-ed-immigrati-ricordi-per-non-ripetere-lorrore.htm. Retrieved 5 April 2017.

The present immigrants come from other continents, other cultures and it is natural that they struggle more than us to adapt to Italian reality. Because they have been through it, Istrian-Dalmatian exiles have for them all the understanding they deserve. […]

[The exiles] would like to see, on the one hand, that the Italians remember – unlike some administrators of the Capital – the composure of the Istrian-Dalmatian people faced with their condition of refugees; on the other hand that the extra-communitarian immigrants may have some gratefulness and respect for the law of a country which, first and foremost in Europe, welcome them with the generosity of its sailors, its financiers, its volunteers[15].

Toth's statement is ambiguous, as he invokes understanding for immigrants, but, at the same time, shows to agree with the stereotypes on migrations (such as the idea that foreigners do not respect the law).

In 2015 Antonio Ballarin, successor of Toth as president of Federesuli, hoped that refugees might be welcomed, but specified that they must go back to their countries when the war will finish: "the only way to dull the pain of an exile is to make him come back to his country, because, if an exile dies far from his identity, will die sad"[16].

The incumbent president of the ANVGD, Renzo Codarin, has been even more explicit:

The oblivion of the complicated events of the Eastern border is even more disgraceful if compared with the clamour reserved to the analogous present phenomena, but, secondarily, it is opportune to highlight some differences. [...] Spazzali has rightly underlined that the present refugees are hopeful young, who leave their land and their families without trying to create a resistance or opposition movements, maybe following the mirage of the economic prosperity (*Il Friuli*, 9 February 2016).

A statement of the Angvd provincial committee of Pordenone reiterated the idea that it is not possible to compare present refugees and Istrian-Dalmatian exiles, because the latter «benefited from the State aid because it was well-deserved» (*Il Gazzettino*, 12 September 2015).

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[15] See http://www.coordinamentoadriatico.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 5379&Itemid=38. Retrieved on 19 April 2017.

[16] Full text: http://www.anvgd.it/notizie/18382-intervento-di-antonio-ballarin-presidente-federesuli-alla-presentazione-del-libro-protagonisti-senza-protagonismo--23set15-.html Retrieved 19 April 2017. See also a previous statement by Ballarin in *Difesa Adriatica*, official paper of the ANVGD, December 2013.

In short, the Istrian-Dalmatian associations always underline the difference of the present flows and hope that the refugees will go back as soon as possible.

Just in few cases, memory is the key for a better acceptance of foreigners by the Istrian-Dalmatian associations. For example Livio Dorigo, president of the *Circolo Istria* (a left-wing association) invited Italians to help migrants and protested against the barriers built against them, because "maybe we forgot when we were exiles" (*Il Piccolo*, 9 September 2015). The *Circolo Istria*, however, is not one of the most popular associations of exiles.

Other groups engaged in the remembrance of *foibe* and Istrian-Dalmatian exodus, such as *Unione degli Istriani*, *Comitato 10 febbraio* and *Lega nazionale* – all close to the political right – till now have ignored the flows of refugees towards Italy.

It is also true, on the other hand, that the main institutions and associations dealing with the refugees question, such as UNHCR and Italian Council for Refugees (CIR), never mention the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus.

It is important to point out that actually the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus and the present migrations are different events. There is not only the difference of context, due to Cold War and Italian situation in the 1940s. The refugees arriving in Italy leave their countries for a plurality of reasons: wars and persecutions, but also hunger; the Istrian-Dalmatian exiles, on the contrary, only left for the annexation of their territory. Moreover, the latter were Italians moved to Italy, so that their integration, in spite of some problems, was easier. Today the refugees come from different cultures, are unable to speak Italian and, in most cases, their relations with the native people is weak, if not inexistent.

Nevertheless, both the flows are migrations of people who seek a better life in Italy because they are forced, for different reasons, to leave their land. The memory of the Istrian-Dalmatian exiles – and, more in general, that of Italian emigration - could urge citizens to reflect on refugees question and reception of foreigners, about which many people have stereotypical and, in substance, wrong knowledge.

At present, awareness and knowledge of the Istrian-Dalmatian exodus are rising, even if they are still limited to a minority of the population. However, memory is almost never used to improve understanding and

knowledge of migrations. In other words, memory is used to reject, not to welcome: history, unfortunately, is almost never a *magistra vitae*.

History and memory cannot change the perception of migrations of the people having unambiguous ideas against the reception of foreigners; history and memory can make the average citizens think, who do not stand prejudicially against immigrants but are exposed to the alarmist messages on immigration conveyed by media. Sometimes, the Italian emigration is invoked to claim policies for the reception of foreigners, although with many limits and rarely in a fruitful way (Fonzo, 2017). In the case of Istrian-Dalmatian exodus, on the contrary, memory is almost never used in this sense.

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The Kurdish Diasporic Mobilization in France. From a Restricted Political National Frame to a Translocal Sphere of Contention? The Case of Kurds in Marseille

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Abstract

Based on a sociological case study on Kurdish mobilization in Marseille, France; this article aims to expose the intricate dynamics that affect the transformation of mobilization forms and strategies in diaspora. By conceiving the mobilization process as a career, it aims to analyze the evolution towards different situations like the host country's politics or the critical events occurred in homeland or diaspora. In addition to these cornerstones increasing the legitimization of the Kurdish movement at local and global levels, this article aims to point out the emergence of a hybrid sphere of contention, which allows the inclusion of new actors in the transnational space of mobilization such as anarchist, anti-fascist activist networks. Acting together with traditional forms of contentious practices such as rallies and petitions; these hybrid mobilization strategies contribute to the durability and extension of the scope of diasporic action.

Keywords

France; Immigration; Kurdish diaspora; Marseille; Mobilization strategies.

Introduction

The Kurdish case provides a good ground in understanding plural dynamics of diasporization[1] built on experiences of oppression, forced displacement and exile, labor migration and insecure environment. Lately, by highlighting the plurality of diaspora experiences, some researches draw attention to the roles of transnational political activities and the diaspora's relation with the

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[1] The term "diasporization" is used to emphasize the processual dimension of a diaspora's construction.

host states (Mügge, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Earlier theories used more essentialist categorizations shaped around exile and dispersion (Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1986). As Adamson (2012) and Sökefeld (2008), this article conceives diaspora as socially constructed and generated by politics and as an *imagined* transnational community[2]. It results to a mobilization process at a transnational level led by political entrepreneurs. The Kurdish diaspora has been transnationally active and efficient in both raising the awareness of the immigrants on its main claims concerning the recognition of the Kurdish identity in Turkey, and the visibility of the Kurdish issue at a European scale. Whilst remaining a military organization, the PKK[3], known as the Kurdistan Workers' Party, has evolved into a political and social movement with large transnational networks -including associations- since the 1990s (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2016). One can even argue that the party managed to relatively monopolize the Kurdish cause in Europe (Grojean and Massicard, 2005).

The politicization of Kurdish migratory space lies within a specific mobilization process. It was led by the political refugees who immigrated to Europe in the early 1980s, and coincides with the beginning of the guerilla war in 1984 conducted by the PKK. Some of the refugees, who had concrete links with either the PKK and/or the fringe parties representing Kurdish movement, evolved into the diaspora elite, due to their high position within the diasporic social hierarchy but also because they benefit from both an activist know-how and a social capital within and beyond the Kurdish immigrant group. However, the diasporization does not rely solely on the mobilization strategies and resources of the diaspora elite in order to *construct* the diaspora; it also benefits from the changing of local, national and global political landscapes.

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[2] Based on Anderson's (1983) theorization of nation as an imagined community.

[3] *PartiyaKarkerên Kurdistan* (PKK), Kurdistan Workers' Party, founded in 1974, leads the Kurdish movement and guerilla war which had its peak in 1990s. The resolution process, started in 2009, led to the declaration of a ceasefire by Öcalan in March 2013. This process had been hindered since June 2015.

Through the case of Kurdish community in Marseille[4], this article focuses on the transformation of mobilization forms and strategies as part of the diaspora politics. Therefore, the term diasporization allows considering the constant (re)construction of a diaspora. Several actors participate in this process (States, immigrants, immigrants' organizations, etc.) at varying levels and with multiple, often uneven, capacities. Indeed, within a transnational space of mobilization, plural elements can affect diaspora's repertoire of collective action in a complex way. The effectiveness of the Kurdish diasporic politics relies on the diaspora's own resources, as the strong intricacy of immigrants' social networks that enables the mobilization process. Host country's dynamics, such as providing political opportunities to the immigrants also shape the political mobilization process. Still, the restricted national political frame, as in the case of France, should be considered together with the local and international social and political contexts, as well as the actors' capabilities and strategies. This helps avoid considering the diaspora as a homogenous block, and to sociologize the issue of collective action in diaspora. In this regard, this article conceives the Kurdish diaspora's mobilization as a *career[5]*. Examining the mobilization process as being a career allows underlining the dynamism and subjectivity of diasporic experiences -based on diaspora actors' strategies, capabilities and the sense they give to their diasporic identification- and the evolution towards different situations met -like the host country's politics or the critical events occurred in homeland or diaspora.

Within this conceptual framework, this article will first expose the characteristics of French political context and of the Marseille city as scenes of Kurdish diaspora's contentious performances. Then, it will focus on the organizational structure of the mobilization, the Kurdish

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[4] The data represented in this paper is a part of the fieldwork conducted between April 2011 and December 2015 in Marseille, France, for my ongoing PhD research on the community building process in Kurdish diaspora through political engagement.

[5] This concept, first used by Becker (1963), has been re-appropriated by Filleule (2001) and Massicard (2013) in their analysis of collective action and especially of individual commitment.

cultural association, to better grasp the mobilization mechanisms between a centralized model and decentralized application. Then, the external factors of the transformation of contentious performances will be exposed. It will especially focus on the role of the extra-community links combined with the increasing legitimization of Kurdish movement and on the emergence of hybrid forms of contention between political and cultural fields.

1. Diaspora politics in an assimilationist national frame and in a de facto multicultural city

The Kurdish Institute of Paris (2014) estimates that there are over 200,000 Kurds living in France -the second biggest country of reception after Germany. Like other host countries, France categorizes Kurds as nationals of their countries of origin unless they are asylum seekers. The historical motives of Kurdish immigration from Turkey to France are entangled; starting with the bilateral convention on labor migration in 1965, it donned a more political characteristic after the military coup in 1980. In 1990s, the flow increased as the conflict between the state's armed forces and the PKK deepened. The Kurdish migratory space politicized by establishing several political organizations in Europe (e.g. FEYKA, KON-KURD) thanks to rights provided by the host countries, using their transnational network, the political entrepreneurs of diaspora could then focus on the establishment of cultural associations, media channels and publishing houses built on the diasporic identity.

The Kurdish immigration in Marseille follows the same pattern. In the Bouches-du-Rhône department, where Marseille is located, the executives of the Kurdish association estimate their number around 5,500-6,000 people[6]. This number might seem insignificant; especially for Marseille where Kurds are far from being the most populous immigrant group.[7] Still, this city is considered a vital place of pro-

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[6] Based on an interview from May 2015.

[7] According to the 2012 census, Algerian immigrants constitute 2,82% of the

Kurdish mobilization by diaspora's political entrepreneurs due to the high frequency of contentious actions. Thanks to dual nationality rights which allow practicing long-distance citizenship, Marseille is important for the vote-catching strategies of the pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey.[8] Thus, a diaspora's population-based extent is not always directly proportional to its mobilization force. A relatively small group can provide the positive conditions for the mobilization as it is not characterized by strong ideological differences (Başer, 2013). How should the political dynamism in Marseille be understood if the French political system is less open to transnational political practices of immigrants, in comparison to Sweden (Khayati, 2008) or Netherlands (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001)?

The strategies of a transnational movement are often examined by considering the political opportunities offered in different national contexts where the movement is implanted (Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Ögelman, 2003). Yet, the political opportunity structure of the host country, with its varying degrees of exclusion/inclusion of transnational political practices, is not by itself the frame that allows the realization of the mobilization. This last can occur in both cases but the strategies change. The immigrants' integration and the homeland interest in their political practices are not antagonist issues. Nell (2008) argues the same in her study on the link between the homeland-oriented politics of immigrants from Turkey and the evolution of Turkish radical left movement in Netherlands. Moreover, the state should be examined as an arbitrary structuring actor and not as a stable entity with regular policies towards all the immigrant/foreigner groups. Hence the scientific challenge is "to assess the balance between state authority and non-state autonomy" (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 779), in understanding how the immigrants' homeland oriented political practices occur.

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global population of this department, while Turkish immigrants, including Turks and Kurds, represent 0,44%.

[8] For instance, Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-president of HDP, Democratic Party of Peoples, visited Marseille besides Paris during his electoral campaign in 2015.

2. The French national context: which space for immigrants' homeland oriented politics?

In France, even though research on transnational ties and activities such as associative practices and cross-border commercial links are increasing, little is known about diasporas with a social movement dimension. The French republican political system is still strong despite the relative recognition of the French diversity in the 2000s (Simon and Amiraux, 2006). The requalification of integration policies as anti-discrimination and integration policies, following the adoption of European Union law in 2000, might offer an opportunity for the construction of minority politics, even it does not rely on identity recognition politics (Fassin et al., 2006). Yet, the multiculturalism *à la française* is practiced in the new forms of public intervention illustrated by urban policies like the territorial affirmative action mechanisms (Doytcheva, 2007).

The French civico-assimilationist model does not provide the immigrants with the necessary cultural resources for legitimizing their ethnic differences, unlike civico-pluralist models of Great Britain and Netherlands. Moreover, as in most countries in EU, the weakness of the opportunities given to collective action favor highly institutionalized actors and conventional forms of mobilization like lobbying. In this context, the popular mobilizations are not recognized to a great extent. Finally, the only way to have full access to the French political system is to obtain citizenship; a concept based on nationality. Immigrants from Turkey do not possess the right to participate in the municipal elections, unlike their EU counterparts. The host state still has a determinant role by setting boundaries of inclusion/exclusion through citizenship, immigrant/foreigner rights and limits of political mobilization forms (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Furthermore, the homeland orientation in political transnational activities is perceived negatively in the French integration discourse due to the apprehension of the foreigners' and immigrants'[9] non-identification with the national community (Kastoryano, 1997).

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[9] The INSEE defines foreigner as 'a person who resides in France and does not

In this national frame, the city of Marseille seems to crystallize the state policies between selective valorization of the multiculturality and stigmatization of immigration.

3. Kurdish activism in Marseille

Marseille is dominantly pictured for its urban anomaly widely associated with successive flows of immigration often badly managed by public authorities. The immigration phenomenon constitutes a deeply politicized issue, swinging between promoted cosmopolitanism and stigmatizing rhetoric associated with criminality. Without real multiculturalist politics, the cosmopolitanism is used in political speeches as well as cultural projects, but in a selective way. In some manner, it serves as a way-out from the integrationist system's confines (Gastaut, 2003). Yet, the presence of immigrant populations is also considered as the main factor for the stigmatization of the city in political and media speeches that tend to reduce this demographically diverse state to a factor of delinquency (Mucchielli, 2013).[10]

The stigmatization of immigrant communities influences the perception of Kurdish activism, especially when it is associated with violence including acts of the PKK. Nonetheless, the fieldwork showed that it facilitates the perpetuation of a victimhood discourse[11] used as a mobilizing strategy to strengthen the diasporic community links. Under these circumstances, political transnational practices

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possess French nationality' and immigrant as 'a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France.' In this paper, the term Kurdish immigrant is used not to exclude the ones with foreigner status but to mention a group with immigration history.

[10] Since mid-2011, the French government and most of media, have created a sort of constant alert about the unsecure environment of Marseille, based on illegal cannabis traffic and some violent actions. For more information, see: Mucchielli (2013).

[11] Many references to discriminatory and violent acts, as well as massacres Kurdish people have suffered during both Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic histories, are used in diaspora's political entrepreneurs' speeches.

and identities can emerge or consolidate as a reaction to a deficient process of fragmented integration in the host society.

However, one should not see in integrationist French policies an equitable consideration of its immigrant groups, since some recognition of ethnic-religious diversity is practically operated in local scale of governance. In case of Marseille, some scholars argue that the public authorities *invent* and *consolidate* the community notion, while still not offering equal integration policies (Mattina, 2016), and pursuing a notability-favoring logic concerning the assertion of an ethnic or identity affiliation (Peraldi et al., 2015). Whether in the framework of the vote-catching strategy based on redistribution of the resources or of the symbolic recognition, the various communities are not provided equally of this relative right to make community. Besides being statistically invisible, perception of Kurdish immigrants by local political actors alternates between a worker-migrant group and a diasporic community as illustrated by the words of a Socialist Party representative, Henri Jibrayel:

> I like this silent and hard-working community; this Kurdish community that does not come to exploit the nation, demands very little assistance from the state, and respects the French government. I support the liberty of Kurdish people.[12]

This arbitrary political position shows that when the benefits of immigrants are higher than their cost to the French state, the latter wants to welcome them. Yet, communities are not only *invented* by the political decision-makers, their self-legitimization modes are not always concomitant with the public ones. They have their own bottom-up mechanisms of *invention*, as for the political mobilization process in the diaspora context. In this regard, how the diasporic mobilization is (re)shaped between the imagination and structuration of the diasporic community by its political entrepreneurs?

To understand the intricate dynamics of the diasporic mobilezation evolution, the methodology chosen was to lead an ethnographic fieldwork. Allowing a quasi-immersed presence of the

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[12] Extract of his speech during the congress of Kurdish popular assembly in April 2012.

researcher in the field this method offers a better understanding of the processual aspect of the change within the diaspora. It also allows completing the explicit discourses of actors with the 'implicit significations' (Lichterman, 1998), i.e., the everyday meanings of individuals' activist practices such as the ways they define activism itself, practice the ideological founding principles or the ways they build social ties within the mobilization sphere. Fifty individuals participated in recorded semi-structured interviews, in addition to informal conversations. The sample included, regardless of gender and age, employers and employees in the food-service and construction industries, staff and members of Kurdish and Alevi[13] associations, non-adherent visitors of these associations, and participants of political demonstrations. The legal status of the interlocutors varied from irregular immigrants, asylum seekers, political refugees, to foreign workers and immigrants who came via family reunification. Multiple entries to the field and participant observations were vital to go beyond the formal rhetoric of Kurdish activists solicited by many researchers and journalists. In addition, to capture various levels of interactions, significant time was spent observing the participants at their workplaces (excluding the construction sites), within the aforementioned organizations and at political meetings as well as during public representations of political activism such as marches, rallies and sit-ins. The data collected from the press and media's online archives, and the Kurdish association's archives complemented the analysis[14].

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[13] Alevism is as a heterodox confession of Islam. Non-recognition of their worship and discrimination policies, led to the emergence of contentious mobilization in Turkey and Europe. The Alevi Cultural Center of Marseille, subordinated to the Federation of Alevi Unions of France which is linked to the Alevi Unions Confederation of Europe, operates as both an association and a place of worship.

[14] The association's activity reports are used to see the part of political and cultural activities regarding the general activities of the association. Data was compared with the online archives of Kurdish diaspora's and, of local and national French press and media's, to understand to what extent is the Marseille's Kurdish diasporic mobilization practices publicized.

4. *The Cultural Center of Mesopotamia as a mobilizing structure of the diasporic community building* [15]

The political entrepreneurs of diaspora work within Kurdish cultural associations established in Europe on behalf of the PKK's ideology. Their main objective is to convey a collective Kurdish identity within the diaspora context, as explained by the president of the Cultural Center of Mesopotamia (CCM):

> We aim to give a roof to Kurds who are dispersed in several countries because of the war in their territories. People who are devoid of their origins, their identities suffer from alienation. It is then complicated to control them. A good organization of the community assures the acquisition of good values, of an essence and a form that corresponds to this essence. [16]

Identity, *community* and *control* are used together to emphasize the necessity of uniting Kurds in the context of dispersion, to consolidate the *communalization*. This discourse points to the approach of political entrepreneurs who consider the whole Kurdish population -without differentiating between the individuals' ethnic, confessional and national affiliations and their self-definition of Kurdishness- as a part of the diasporic community that needs to be organized both socially and politically. To create 'coherent categories, discourses and symbols that can merge dispersed social networks under a single diasporic category' (Adamson, 2012: 33) is, for the diaspora elite, the first step towards building a diasporic community via the activation of transnationally settled immigrants with entangled social networks.

The internal organization of CCM [17], subordinates to the central model of the KCK the Union of Communities of Kurdistan [18]. The

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[15] 'Community building' is used to emphasize the processual and interactive dimension of the community to analyze the communalization (Weber, 1922) together with the socialization processes and strategies.

[16] Extract of an interview on Radio Galère with the president of Cultural Center of Mesopotamia, on 04.04.2013.

[17] The Cultural Center of Mesopotamia was founded in 2009. After its dissolution in 2014, the Kurdish Democratic Center took its place.

[18] Founded in 2005, the Union of Communities of Kurdistan is based on a self-

association is one of the committees constituting the Kurdish popular assembly in Marseille area. The association is the legal front of the political network due to the lack of legal structure in these assemblies. The configuration of popular assemblies and their committees consider the local scope of human resources/needs among the Kurdish population and vary in nature, from women's to faith, education to media and press. They show how the political entrepreneurs of diaspora aim to build a politically engaged community formalized in regarding with norms and values diffused by the PKK's ideology.

As for the relation with the host state, the association acts under the French 1901 association law and thus can benefit from state's subventions. However, the long-term observations on the association's activities show the limits of the relations with the local authorities like the General Council of Bouches-du-Rhône and the Prefecture, apart from the organization of the political demonstrations. This avoidance strategy is related to the will of creating a maneuver space far from host state's criminalizing practices. Like other pro-Kurdish establishments in Europe, CCM deals also with the host state's interventions.[19] The association undergoes quasi-regular police checks because of its financial support to the PKK. The PKK being still classified as an illegal organization[20], the diaspora's political actors cannot organize a professional fund raising campaign. The police inspections impact the legitimacy of the association by criminalizing the institution and its workers[21] which makes it impossible for Kurdish activists to involve lobbyists directly, leaving them reliant on their networking capacities with NGOs, political parties, and individuals to extend their claims.

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government model within the PKK complex, and operates through open councils, town councils, local parliaments and larger congresses.

[19] Such as the TV channels like Roj TV closed by Denmark government in 2013.

[20] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/fr/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32015D2430& qid=1457362568874&from=EN.

[21] The House of Kurdish People in Marseille was dissolved after a trial's verdict in December 2013, because of financial support to the PKK via the associative structure.

This ambiguous relation with the public institutions portrays the heterogeneity of the state's function. The state must be conceived as a set of institutions that can be in conflict (Jessop, 1990). It can apply contradictory policies simultaneously, such as partial recognition and discrimination. Yet, these constraining state maneuvers are not absolute barriers for the Kurdish activism. The insufficiency of institutions offering services oriented to immigrants in Marseille[22] helps CCM strengthen its representative and intermediary roles within the host society. On this issue, Wahlbeck (2007: 467) also underlined the role played by Kurdish organizations in helping newly arrived refugees within the host countries that mainly depend on charities and NGOs concerning the resettlement of refugees. Similar to immigrants' homeland associations' function, CCM is a sociability place for Kurdish immigrants. The association combines 'hot nationalism' practices such as political demonstrations with 'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1995) that implies everyday political representations, through daily use of the association premises.

CCM structure carries out the politicization of the Kurdish migratory space but, it does not own a strict authority and holistic functioning. The various affiliations (kinship, homeland, confessional and ideological), the different social trajectories of individual actors, lastly their socialization within and beyond the community, influence and process the so-called homogeneous mobilization forms in a complex way. The impact of intra-community dynamics on the evolution of the diasporization process is another major issue which will not be developed in this article This last instead focuses on the articulation between the Kurdish diasporic mobilization and the local, national and global political frames, for a better understanding of the socialization role of diaspora politics in the migratory career of a specific group.

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[22] There are few establishments of this kind, except the reception centers for asylum seekers (*Centre d'Accueil pour Demandeurs d'Asile*), an office of CIMADE *(Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des Evacués)* which offer a service of solidarity specialized in immigrants' and refugees' rights, and a couple of translation / interpreting offices.

5. Diaspora politics as a socialization factor

Even though the discriminatory politics of the French state can hamper Kurds' transborder citizenship and long-distance nationalism practices, the restricted national political framing can be bypassed by the extra-community cooperation, allowing the immigrant group access to the local activist and associative patterns. How can the extra-community factors widen the scale of diasporic activities? This scale jumping, referring to its conception by Gambetti (2009), implies the expansion of spaces of visibility, and mobilization of the Kurdish movement in Marseille, while building or consolidating its place in the local, national and transnational political and activist fields. The scale jumping process of the Kurdish mobilization has been accelerated by the war in Syria and Kobane resistance. These critical turns can be referred to as 'bifurcations'[23] in the activist career of Kurdish diaspora.

The emergence of the second generation within the activist career of Kurds in Marseille - having lived different political socialization processes - plays a major role on this evolution**.** The term generation is not used here as a biographic phase of the life cycle, but to mention a socially constructed group. This is not in strict parallel with the ages of immigration, even if it intersects for some of actors, as there is already the third generation of immigration from Turkey in Marseille. It is conceived here as the second dynamic within the Kurdish activist career and differs from the first generation, by its larger networking capacities and relations with the local, national and transnational spaces of mobilization that become vital mobilizing resources within the scale jumping process. This second generation activism does not render invalid the first one that has more direct links to the PKK network and adopts more traditional strategies; but it offers, a *third space,* as in Bhabha (1996), of contention that includes more networking with external actors and more *hybrid* strategies capable of opening a space of negotiation. In

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[23] A bifurcation implies an action sequence on micro level has more consequences than others. These consequences concern the macro level (Bessin et al., 2010).

this perspective, how and to what extent do certain events turn around diaspora's activist career?

6. Jumping scales: the Kobane impact

Critical events become efficient tools for the diasporization process only when they are articulated by mobilization actors with 'new forms of action, discourse and ways of conceptualizing the world' (Sökefeld: 2006: 275). The increasing recognition and legitimization of the Kurdish movement on the international level might change the marginal position of Kurds in the eyes of both politicians and social scientists.

In a national scale, the war between the YPG[24] and ISIL produced a partial recognition of the Kurdish movement by the French state.[25] In April 2015, a delegation of the PYD was received by the then-president François Hollande. Together with the increasing publicization of the Kurdish issue in the national media, it improved the effectiveness of the Kurdish mobilization in France. However, it is imperative to mark the influence of diplomatic relations between home and host states in the way the latter perceives and recognizes certain aspects of diaspora and its claims. For instance, whilst France recognized the Kurdish delegation, they continue considering PKK as a terrorist organization. In that sense, the diasporic community feels the need to walk a tightrope; on one side, they carry the heritage claims and on the other, they need to deal with international political developments. To resolve this fragmented recognition of the Kurdish movement, the Kurdish associations in Europe amplified the work towards the removal of the PKK from the list of terrorist organizations with the solidarity of non-Kurdish associative and political actors.[26]

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[24] The YPG (People's Protection Units) is the military section of the PYD (the Democratic Union Party).

[25] Founded in 2003 and ideologically affiliated to the PKK, the PYD controls the Kurdish zones of the North Syria since 2011.

[26] In Marseille, the Amazigh associations, the Collective 13 for Women Rights, the

The most relevant example of the impacts of pro-Kobane resistance mobilization was triggered by a conflict between Kurdish activities and local authorities. During September 2014, the CCM organized several marches and gatherings, and occupied a part of the Vieux-Port, the most central and touristic area of the city, during one week throughout the day and night, despite being permitted only for the day hours. This legislative and spatial transgression shows how the activist groups try to transform the public spaces into their advantage, while the state tries to control them. The spatial transgressions have a symbolic dimension as they challenge the social order. The space being normatively constructed by the public authorities tends to exclude the *others*, in terms of social class, race, gender, ethnicity, etc. (Bourdieu, 1993). Yet, these social constructions are not static; they are continually contested and transgressed by the others who have been excluded. Indeed, the sub-prefect's words were revealing the limits on political participation practices when the spatial public order is violated:

> You have your sisters and brothers there [in Kobane], you must help them one way or another. It's not by acting like idiots under the Ombrière [a big parasol located in Vieux-Port] that you will help them. (…) The people from Marseille don't give a damn, French people, generally speaking, have other worries, people don't give a damn. (…) Don't take us for fools, Mister who is not French."[27]

The foreigner status of the activists is accentuated to mark the legitimacy concerns around homeland oriented activist practices though there is no legal restriction on foreigners' political demonstration rights. Considering these grey zones between legality and legitimacy, the host state tries to keep its stakeholder role in its populations' political involvement, especially when this engagement is homeland oriented. However, bifurcations such as violent actions on Kurds in Kurdistan(s) or in diaspora are capable of raising awareness among both the Kurdish community and the host society.

Communist Party, among others, participated in these demonstrations.

[27] A Kurdish activist has recorded their dialogue that was diffused online on local and national presses' websites.

Another example of the multiplying effect of a particularly violent event on mobilizations (Oberschall, 2007) was the assassination of three Kurdish activist women in Paris in 2013.[28] Indeed, the conflict with local authorities during pro-Kobane mobilizations passed on a national scale with its publicization through media channels. At this point, one could say that the 'Kobane event' generally contributed to the increasing recognition of perceiving Kurdish movement as an efficient warrior against the Islamist radicalism in the Middle-East.

The role of women in the Kurdish movement has made itself a place in feminist activist networks and rhetoric too, as seen in the starting of the "World March of Women" from Rojava, in 2015, an international feminist action movement that declared solidarity with Kurdish women's fight. For the International Journey for Women's Rights, several French TV channels diffused, in 2016, documentaries and debates about the Kurdish fighters against ISIL and Sakine Cansız, the emblematic female leader of the PKK, assassinated in Paris.[29] This was conceived as an 'opportunity to seize' by the Kurdish female activists, 'in order to transform this publicization to a durable mobilization resource'[30]. Indeed, the committee in charge of social and cultural activities for the emancipation of Kurdish women became an assembly in 2014 and established an association named 'Arin Mirkan Center of Kurdish Women' in 2015.[31]

At the same time, this specific conflict has multiplied the interactions between the Kurdish activist sphere and the host society's space of mobilization. Non-Kurdish activist establishments like 'SOS Racisme'[32] or 'La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme'[33] showing

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[28] A march was organized in Marseille with the participation of twenty-five political and associative organizations, from left-wing political parties such as French Communist Party to associations like Collectif Solidarite Maghreb, Collectif 13 Droits des Femmes.

[29] The documentary "Femmes contre Daesh" diffused on LCP, the parliamentary channel, and the "Kurdistan, la guerre des filles" diffused on Arte TV, a franco-german channel.

[30] Interview done in April 2015.

[31] The transformation of a committee into an assembly implies certain autonomy in the decisive and executive processes.

[32] Founded in 1984, these associations aim to fight racism, anti-Semitism and all

solidarity with Kurdish activists might help them in long run to access more legitimate national spheres of activism.[34] These solidarity forms might encourage the evolution of the Kurdish mobilization in diaspora from a homeland oriented mobilization to a new form of transnationalism, defined by more universalistic ideologies and human rights issues (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). These opening strategies approach the Kurdish mobilization to new contentious movements that do not just oppose one actor (the Turkish state), but also question the framing logic of their collective action as seen in the case of altermondialist movement in France (Sommier, 2006).

This change being recent, it is difficult to see how the Kurdish activist rhetoric and mobilization strategies would evolve in long term, and influence the non-Kurdish activist sphere in Marseille. Still, the increasing new collaborations produce a certain self-validation sense among the activists, in particular among the women for whom the political engagement operates as self-emancipation instrument. In other words, the growing collective integration to the local field of mobilization contributes to the individual integration of immigrants, while producing a positive identification process within the diasporic context.

These new extra-community links also gives rise to a hybrid sphere of contention, hybrid not only because of its actors but also thanks to the politico-cultural performances of contention.

7. Towards a hybrid sphere of contention?

The extra-community links refer to interactions between some Kurdish activists and actors from other activist and/or cultural networks in Marseille. A recent cooperation of this kind is the

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forms of discrimination within the French society.

[33] This association, founded in 1898, aims to defend and promote the human rights within the public sphere in France.

'Collective Rojava-Marseille', built with the initiative of the anarchist activist network and of some second generation Kurdish activists. This collective organizes debates, demonstrations and cultural activities with the aim of raising awareness on the Kurdish struggle in Syria. They also lead charity projects like a library foundation in Rojava, thus, transnationalize their sphere of action. The main information diffusion channel remains online, reminding how the informational activism practices allow a reinterpretation of the symbolic management of conflict by giving new instruments to those who are mobilized (Granjon, 2001).

At this point, it is not surprising to observe that the Kurdish actors in question have a good knowledge in French; they are actual university students or graduates in Turkey or in France. This explains their ability to diversify their extra-community links. They define themselves more integrated to the host country, yet with strong pro-Kurdish identity claims. Indeed, as indicated by Başer and Mügge, the integration does not spirit away the ethnic identity nor the political mobilization related to that. This second generation of activists has lived their first activist socialization in the host territories, within the Kurdish associations. On the other hand, their second socialization happens within the local activist spheres. They are also mobilized for other causes such as rights for irregular immigrants, bi-national couples, LGBT or volunteering for other political groups like left-wing political parties or anarchist groups. The extra-community activist relations are not absent in the first generation either; there are cooperations and links with activist or political actors such as Amazigh Cultural Association[35], French Communist Party or feminist groups like Collectif 13. However, the second group opens themselves to more heterodox groups. In the case of United Kingdom, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 773) mentions also 'surprising coalitions' emerged between local political organizations and immigrants' organizations seeking for legitimization, like the exchange between the Welsh Independence

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[35] This association promotes cultural diversity and aims to facilitate the integration of Marseille's Franco-Berber community.

Party and a German-based pro-PKK Kurdish organization. Lastly, and perhaps more importantly; the new hybrid organizational structures allow a better integration within the local sphere of political and/or cultural contentious mobilizations.

Regarding the reception of these new links by the local diaspora elite, mainly formed by first generation of activists, one should notice a consolidation strategy of these ties in the absence of formalized collective projects. The Kurdish actors taking these extroversive initiatives are also members of committees; which facilitates the relative control on their external activities. Even so, the choice of external partners or the contents of the collaboration sometimes lead to interpersonal conflicts within the political network. 'Our objective has to be to integrate the political parties to have a voice within the National Assembly; not to collaborate with the marginal groups. After all, we are being marginalized ourselves; we must be able to connect more with major groups', say for instance a member of Marseille's popular assembly.[36] This latent conflict could hint at a potential challenge by these emerging links of the existing strong ones and diaspora elite's ideological monopoly.

On the extra-community organizational structures, one should finally notice that similar structures to 'Collective Rojava-Marseille' have emerged in other countries of Europe, witnessing their transnational implantation.[37] Several Facebook groups, websites and online blogs have been founded around the world in such sense to build a transnational network of mobilization. At this point, one should note that cooperations with anarchist and anti-fascist groups were already present in Germany in 1980 and 1990's (Grojean, 2008). Nonetheless, the Rojava and Kobane events had a multiplier effect on this effervescence. Yet, these cooperations are still new; it is not possible to say if it might produce a new radicalism in Kurdish repertoire of collective action.

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[36] Interview done in May 2014.

[37] In Spain for example, committees of solidarity with Rojava have been established in several cities such as Madrid and Granada.

Conclusion

The mobilization is a multilevel process depending on political events in the homeland, the diasporic political entrepreneurs' mobilization activities, and the individuals' migratory experiences in the host land. In this perspective, this article sought to question the plural dynamics affecting diaspora politics in an exclusive national frame of political opportunities for immigrants and foreigners. The article showed that the restricted national political framing can be bypassed by the global communication -reinforced by technological tools- of critical events that may result or strengthen the diasporization process. This contributes to the scale jumping of the mobilization, as seen in the example of Kobane resistance on the increasing effectiveness of the Kurdish diasporic projects in the host land. In addition to these bifurcations, this article pointed out the role of the second generation of activists who rely on higher networking capacities with local and transnational activist fields and on ability of multiplying different mobilization forms and strategies. These hybrid strategies of mobilization, act together with traditional forms of contentious practices such as rallies and petitions; in such sense that they extend the scope of diasporic action. This transformation being an ongoing process, pursuing this analysis with a specific focus on the new strategies deployed by the second generation activists, would allow better understanding if the translocal space of contention in diaspora context, by reaching beyond geographic or national boundaries, will lead to new sources of identification and action, depending on both local and global reference systems.

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Europe / Mediterranean: Media Treatment of the Immigrant

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Abstract

People define their own behaviour on the basis of their perception of Others, as well as of the expectations they have towards them, paying particular attention to the socio-cultural context of belonging and the reference values they ascribe to the other party and to the relationship existing between them. These dynamics are strongly influenced by the information conveyed by mass media in their dual role as both mediators of reality and opinion leaders, often becoming a "distorted reflection" of reality. In support of the above, the present paper aims at illustrating, as an example, a comparison of the "representations" offered by some of the main European national newspapers of two events associated with the phenomenon of migration: the "immigrant march" of Belgrade on January 2017, and the shooting at the Munich shopping center on July, 2016.

Keywords: Europe; Media; Mediterranean; Migrant; Social representation

1. The theoretical framework

Social representations are formed, consolidated and disseminated in the texture of social life. They do not stem from single individuals, but are rather socially generated: they involve social objects or social phenomena and they are shared by all members of a group. As the extensive literature has shown (Jodelet, 1984; Moscovici, 1984; Duveen & Lloyd, 1998) in the study of social representations, we must analyse the relationship between complex cognitive systems of each subject and the existing symbolic relations systems of social actors (individuals and groups). These representations are cognitive processing of reality that guide individual *sense making* processes: although they are not produced by the individual

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* Both authors contributed to the whole paper. However, Emiliana Mangone has specifically composed the first section and Emanuela Pece has developed the analysis in the second and third sections.

actor, they are constantly re-thought, re-named, re-presented at a microgenetic level. The representations systems existing in a given culture are transmitted to us, and they are the product of a whole sequence of elaborations and changes occurring through time (Laszlo, 1997).

From a "structural" point of view, social representations consist of two dimensions: the iconic one (image) and the symbolic one (meaning), they are interdependent on each other (Abric, 2001; Guimelli, 1994). The representation of an event, a phenomenon or an object corresponds an image to an idea, and an idea to an image. Underlying this process is the need to re-build the "common sense" or the form of understanding of social events that creates the ground layer of images and meanings without which no community could operate. Indeed, society could not function without having formed those social representations – based on a more or less structured set of theories, ideologies, "worldviews" – that constitute the symbolic and cultural humus allowing for the interaction between people (Moliner, 1996). One of the prerogatives of social representations is that it allows for the transformation of ideas into collective experiences and of interactions into behaviours. Unlike sciences, that are the instruments through which to understand the "reified" universe, they concern the "consensual" universe. They restore the collective consciousness by giving it form, explaining objects and events in order to make them accessible to all and to make them coincide with our immediate interests. It seems therefore obvious that the purpose of all representations is to turn something unusual, or unknown, into something familiar (Moscovici, 1984). Unfamiliar things attract and intrigues the community, alerts the individuals, forces them to explicit the implicit assumptions at the basis of consensus.

The act of representation is a way to transfer what disturbs us, what threatens our universe, from the outside to the inside, from a distant place to a space closer to us. When theories, information and events multiply, they must be reproduced at a closer and more approachable level; they must be transferred to the consensual universe, defined and re-presented. In order to convey a familiar feel, we need to activate two thinking mechanisms. The first mechanism (anchoring), strives to anchor unusual ideas, to reduce them to ordinary categories and images, placing them in a familiar context. The purpose of the second mechanism (objectification) is, instead, to objectify these ideas, i.e., to transform something abstract into

something almost tangible. This mechanism turns the unusual into usual by making it manifest, accessible, concrete and, consequently, more controllable. We thus move from the abstraction of an idea to the reality of an image. When an idea enters common (that is, everyday life's) knowledge, it tends to become reality. As Moscovici (1961; 2000) has shown, the image of the concept ceases to be an indication and becomes a replica of reality: what is perceived takes the place of what is conceived and the images become real factors rather than though-related factors: thus the distance between the represented object and its representation is compensated.

It follows that attitudes towards people depend largely on the idea that we build about them, from their interpretations of their past and present actions, and from the predictions about what they will do in the future (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Attitudes (positive or negative orientation) towards something or someone are driven by the perception that we have of them (Mangone & Marsico, 2011): social reality stems not only from social meaning, but also from the products of the subjective world of individuals. When an individual or a group places the responsibility of its critical condition and/or suffering upon another individual or group, it creates a situation where it attaches false guilt to a person or a group recognized as an *enemy* (Girard, 1987), which then becomes the scapegoat.

2. Social representations and moral panics

The allocations of responsibility suggest solutions to social problems, while the rules determining the veracity of explanations can both contain and increase violence and/or control the social order.

The latter aspect is important when considering the media's ability to offer the public social representations on which to base and restructure their interactions and social actions. A concrete example are the news stories involving immigrants (the problem of immigration has been in the European as well as in the Mediterranean basin political agenda for several years) that act as a sounding board for some themes and social issues related to crime and the protection of people and society. It may happen that isolated

episodes, that are nevertheless the object of detailed and extensive media coverage, become a *social problem* giving rise to situations that Cohen (2002) defines as *moral panics, i.e., generalized alarm*, also due to the fact that the information is disseminated globally but appropriated at a local level (Thompson, 1995) differentiating the actions/re-actions. The media has the ability to convey images and information that may reduce socio-cultural distances, or extend them by reproducing representations that reinforce in the people oppositional attitude towards immigrants. The latter are represented according to different interpretations and depending on the proximity to the phenomenon (the problem of migration is dealt differently in the southern European countries than in the continental or Nordic ones): they are *illegal immigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, criminals*.

The media select episodes that, if inserted within their production processes, are "transformed" into news, *news-making* (Wolf, 2001). It is equally true that in daily affairs there are events (and problems) claiming their uniqueness and importance within the social context. In this sense, the media have the ability to represent certain sections of reality for which people do not have direct knowledge (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and, in some cases, can contribute to the formation of typified images of *another culture / a different culture* through their information role – such as when, for example, they spread news regarding other countries, or facts involving a foreign national residing in a certain reality (Gili, 2009).

In any case, the attitudes we adopt towards *others* are related to the perception we have of them within a given relationship. In cases where this relationship is perceived as confrontational, we may perceive the *other* as a threat to our security and to our cultural system of reference. In general, *realistic* and *symbolic threats* (Stephan & Stephan, 1996) are related to the perception of a danger to the safety and the cultural system caused by groups of people who have different interests (economic, political and material) and lifestyles. These situations can be influenced (and amplified) by the media helping to trigger *moral panic*, i.e. the perception of a widespread climate of concern, mistrust and social alarm associated with groups that are represented as deviant or socially dangerous, or as a threat to the security and the values of a society (Maneri, 2001). Moral panic, moreover, can be considered as the result of media overexposure of some real facts and problems into social ones.

Many studies, therefore, associate the creation of a *social problem* in what Griswold (1994) calls cultural object. In other words, in order to create a *cultural object* and then define it as a *social problem*, it must be articulated with a set of ideas and institutions intersecting each other. This also explains how "public issues" and "risks" (Barbieri & Mangone, 2015) are usually constructed in a specific way rather than in equally possible other ways. On these dynamics, Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) consider civil society as a real arena hosting a competition between situations that can be defined as social problems that comply with specific characteristics.

In this way, the media perform a dual function: on one hand, they have the ability to "reduce" the distances between the members of different cultural groups; on the other hand, they may tend to overexpose some facts (or social phenomena) compared to their real effects, thus favouring a distorted representation of reality (Gerbner *et al*., 2002). The media representation of immigrants is thus an example of how the process of personification operated by the media swings between two poles. An emblematic case is when some *real problems* (integration and social cohesion, the landings' emergency and illegal immigration) may be perceived as *social problems* that generate conflicting feelings in the local public opinion – and beyond.

The dual mode with which people "see" the immigrant can thus be influenced by the way in which the news is presented, the type of language that the media choose for the construction and the representation of an event, and the keys provided for its interpretation to the general public, that are able to reproduce stereotypical images of "otherness", or to provide extreme generalizations. The immigrant is either the perpetrator of criminal acts, or starring in events with dramatic implications. However, we can associate various "positions" to this interpretive dichotomy of the media in the discussion and presentation of a story to their target audience. If, for example, we consider *contextualization strategies* (Wolf, 2001), each media acts on the basis of *hierarchical* criteria, conferring a precise importance to each episode. The events are therefore organized according to their exposure, length of the news, more or less detailed nature of the text and according to the variety of languages used to enrich the written text (photographs, images, videos, graphics). This means that placing a

news story on the front page or an inside page, on the top or bottom of the page, adding comments, interviews and photographs is in itself a judgement.

3. Media treatment of the immigrant

Based on the above, as an example, we aim to present a comparison between two cases in the news: what we will call the "immigrants' march" in Belgrade on January 2017 and the shooting at the Munich shopping centre on July 22, 2016 .

The corpus consists of representative newspapers of some European countries: *La Repubblica* and Il *Corriere della Sera* (Italy), *El Pais* and *El Mundo* (Spain) and *The Guardian* (England). The selection was made through a database search of the historical archives of the official websites of each newspaper (online) and of websites dedicated to press reviews of printed newspapers[1]. We choose not to include German newspapers – so as to avoid potential distortions – as one of the episodes happened in Germany. For both cases we selected the pages referring to the day when the news was published by the press.

The analysis takes into consideration three aspects: 1) the way in which the news is constructed: space devoted to the event (centre, side or bottom of the page) and presence (or not) of in-depth information boxes; 2) the presence of photographs; 3) the way in which headlines are constructed.

The "march of the immigrants" stuck in the Serbian territory was published between 10 and 17 January by Italian and foreign newspapers, who gave wide coverage to the story, who employed the evocative power of photographs as their main way of recounting the facts. The publication of several shots testifying the living conditions of immigrants in those days, exacerbated by the scarcity of food and the extreme conditions, attracted strong interest from the media and emotionally shook the general public. From a first comparison between the newspapers, it appears that the story has been mainly told via the photos that could *independently* represent the

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[1] See http://www.internationalwebpost.org and googlenews.

news (Papuzzi, 2010), followed by brief, essential captions. On the basis of this specificity, it was possible to divide the images into three groups.

The first group includes photos in which the people are arranged in a line, wrapped in coats and blankets, waiting to cross the Syrian border. These shots seem to attest, with a kind of objectivity, what was happening (Fig. 1- *La Repubblica* and *El Pais*).

Fig.1 – *La Repubblica* and *El Pais*

The second group consists of those images with a strong emotional charge in which shots not only tell a specific moment of the event, but they seem to go beyond a "neutral" meaning of the images by capturing other aspects. This case is a clear example of an image intended as a pause: the picture is accompanied by a short caption, illustrating just the essentials.

Fig. 2 – *El Pais* and *La Repubblica*

In this way, the newspapers seem to want to direct public opinion not so much towards what the photo shows, but rather to what the picture

represents, namely, a real problem (the barriers and borders of some European countries and the management of migration flows) that requires interventions and actions by a common front (Europe). In these photos, for example, we can read: "problem is borders"; "We are human" (Fig. 2 – *El Pais* and *La Repubblica*).

Fig. 3 – *El Pais, La Repubblica*

The last group is composed of images recalling moments of everyday life, such as eating and bathing, for which readers can perceive a "common feeling" with their daily lives. However, the dramatic element of each image evokes the idea *of social disorganization*: indeed, the interest of the media appears to be directed towards the inadequacy of the social system and the political world (especially European), and an inability to offer decent living conditions and protections for migrants (Fig. 3 – *El Pais* and *La Repubblica*).

This story appears, therefore, expression of a *social problem*, but also testimony of the dramatic human condition experienced by migrants. Once inserted in the media circuit, it can elicit emotional reactions in public opinion, but at the the same time, it can draw attention to issues of more general interest (*e.g.*, asylum applications, reception policies, etc.).

The reading perspectives proposed by newspapers are part of two opposing interpretive frames. On the one hand, the media representation of the *Other* is entrusted to a "common understanding" with the reading public that seems to shorten the "us/them" distance, revealing a perspective based on positive attitudes and an idea of welcome and social inclusion. On the other hand, however, this story becomes the symbol of a "complaint" (more or less explicit) to a socio-political system unable to cope with the emergency, demonstrating the fragmentation and lack of homogeneity of European reception policies.

If in this case the newspapers have preferred to report the news through the evocative power of photographs, for the shooting incident in Munich on July 22, 2016, text has reinforced the images.

For what concerns the methods of construction of this story, we must take into account two fundamental aspects: first, the *form*, *i.e.*, the manner of presentation and placement of the news on the front page of the newspaper; second, the lexical aspect, that played an important role in the definition and interpretation of the story.

The shooting that took place in Munich thus rests within a double "frame": on the one hand, there is the narration of the event, that refers to the issue of security in European cities, the phenomenon of terrorism able to hit those places (in our case, the mall and fast-food) that the public opinion is more likely to recognize and perceive as familiar. On the other hand, the use of expressions such as *attack, bomber, terror*, may have helped in creating a rather similar interpretation among the newspapers, suggesting the idea that the event could be linked to a terrorist act, fuelling a climate of fear and insecurity and, more generally, a sense of mistrust towards others in itself already present due to previous terrorist incidents.

The rather fixed, almost stereotyped, interpretative frames proposed by the various newspapers are recognizable in the opening titles of the news: *"Giorno di terrore a Monaco"* (Il Corriere della Sera); *"Terror en Munich"* (El Mundo); *"Varios muertos en el ataque a un centro comercial de Munich"* (El Pais); *"Europe stunned again by multiple shootings in Munich"* (The Guardian), also because, just like a German policeman says: "If a man with a gun in a shopping centre opens fire and eight people are dead, we have to work on the assumption that this was not a normal crime and was a terrorist act" (TheGuardian.it, July 23, 2016).

The "march of immigrants" and the shooting at the Munich shopping centre offer examples of a media representation of the immigrants which includes both a positive outlook, based on the concept of inclusion, acceptance and integration of the *Other*, and an approach that, instead, consolidates stereotyped and negative images, based on the juxtaposition "immigrant-criminal", towards whom public opinion holds hostile and "closed" feelings because it creates moral panics.

This case study shows a consistent media coverage (especially for the "march of immigrants"), and a general conformity on the interpretation of the event in Munich. The way in which these episodes were addressed by the media confirms, once again, that there is no single communication binding Europe and the Mediterranean, but rather a communication differentiated on the basis of the territorial realities – first of all for what concerns the phenomenon of migrants. This does not only determines the definition of the political agendas of different countries – creating disparities on the basis of their proximity to the problem – but also promotes stereotypes in public opinion leading to value orientations that do not always translate into positive actions towards the other.

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A Grounded Theory for Unaccompanied Foreign Minors in Italy: the Case Study of Egyptian Minors

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Abstract

The article suggests to share a research first emerging categories according to methodological universe of the "Grounded Theory" based on a mental construction / orientation process. The main target is to investigate in the educational relationship between an unaccompanied minor (MSNA) and his educator, and so has also to consider the progressive changes in the learning of the language and the corresponding humanization of the same, so well the continued definition and shared construction of the intercultural practice. At this stage of doctoral research, some categories are emerging that are particularly pertinent to the Egyptian participants in the study. The Egyptians are the main nationality present in the Italian system of host. The theory which is emerging will be a scratch theory and does not have a validation target of preconceived hypothesis.

Keywords: Educational relationship; Egyptians unaccompanied; Foreign minors in Italy, Grounded theory; Refugee children.

MSNA (Unaccompanied Foreign Minors) is the real emergency for Italy starting from April 2011, as it became the input border for Europe.

Behind the acronym MSNA we can discover a complex, difficult, multidimensional world.

This phenomenon regarding different competence areas of several fields: juridical, pedagocical, sociological and psychological.

The theorical sampling recommended by Grounded Theory method, has been made between December 2015 and January 2016 on the whole Italian territory.

Starting from 2014 the main presence of minors of Egyptian nationality was recorded, such following data have been supplied by "Ministry of Labour and Social Policy" on Oct.31st 2015.

After one year, unaccompanied foreign minors living on the Italian territory as of 30/11/2016 are recorded 17245, always mainly Egyptians.

Regarding the personal experience of educator and researcher, they gathered data concerning Egyptian minors through reception talks and on intensive interviews data, elaborating of "PEI" (individual plan of education) and also the social and educational relations from 2011 to 2016 (the biographical interviews in reception are over 300, while the intensive research interview are approx 20)

At this stage of doctoral research, some categories are emerging that are particularly pertinent to the Egyptian participants in the study and that can be grouped in the following macro-areas:

- migratory pathways;
- relationship with (female) educators;
- socio-cultural backgrounds.

According to the report (MSNA) issued by Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (data on 30/11/2016) the Egyptian minors are the largest community of unaccompanied minors in Italy (16% 2801 living and recording and 1513 untraceable).

Minors coming from the countryside are often illiterate also in native language, and often agree to arrange journey with their family, for them arranging the journey is the only possibility to emancipate themselves from poverty.

Regarding minors coming from average extraction families, often their parents are informed of many deaths that occur during the sea crossing, hence they try to discourage or prohibit the journey.

In every case, traffickers are skilled and persistent by proposing journey to an "imaginary garden" in Europe.

The media play a central role in the production of imaginative places where the "civilized Europe" is easily reachable thanks to Italian border and another consideration is our minor protection law.

Generally, it is not true that minors escape from poverty and wars: they flee from Egypt with the hope of finding a work and for the myth of sea crossing.

In my town they had left all, all for Italy[1].

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[1] Elho Interview 17 years Egypt (middle class family - his mother works in a telephone company

> They say that in Italy you are fine, also me....I wanted to go myself.....if they did.....
> they sent me photos on facebook, they have all, in Italy they can do everything[2]

This is an initiation rite, an emancipated excitement which often does not correspond to an equal awareness.

The idea of Italy as "cash cow" is stronger, in case the Egyptian minors already have an uncle, a cousin, or a family friend, and/or network of fellow countrymen who run businesses, in this case the good result of the educational project is almost doomed to fail.

At this purpose I make reference to a reflection and a happy metaphor that came out during an interview c/o Office MSNA of Rome:

> More that unaccompanied minors, for Egyptian it should say ill-accompanied foreign minors. Working mainly with foreign minors of Egyptian nationality, which present approx. 90% of the received minors... I can realize that a big limit is represented by the occult presence of the family of these boys... or rather there is a strong family mission which requires boys to come to Italy to work and maintaining the family. Often family agreed to send their son to Italy for working and this was collected by the stories of the boys that are made to cultural mediators, at last to have a dowry for her sister's wedding... and feel no reasons! and upstream there is a debt incurred by the family to come to Italy and this debt must be paid, how?
> with their work, whatever the cost... for which the law that allows the protection and the regularization, obviously not allow the child labor... and this will not accepted by the minor, and by his family.
> We do interviews with the mediators, which boys etc. and often we call families taking advantages of the aid of the mediator to explain how things work in Italy... because they must understand that it is not the boy goes out and finds the money or there is also the possibility that he can find money doing little lawful activities.
> This is for us a great frustration reason, as the minor does not recognize the authority of the adult figure that performs the educational task, while what matters to him is the family. So often, it is, as I often say, of minors "unaccompanied", but they are minors accompanied hurt or badly recommended.

Egypt is a state mainly militarized and deprived. The stories of boys shows that there are great social injustices, arbitrary army and heavy police. Another thing to underline is the great percentage of people who own weapons and firearms, but everyone knows how to use them.

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[2] M.Sa. Interview Egypt "Average poor family but educated. travel attempts interrupted by detention in Scanderia town. He tried to leave 4 times before leaving.

They compare Italy as a Country where the rules are less strict and also the corresponding punishments and have a certain envy towards civilized Europe.

Here below I mention an except of interview with T. coordinator of 2 family-homes in Rome:

> Regarding compliance with the rules.... sometimes it is necessary to impose oneself, as minor have the predisposition not to listen, a bit they slam the rules.
> This is a predisposition of almost all adolescents ... more must think that these adolescents have grown in some particular contexts, rules are less, and they begin to work already by small... and in my opinion do not respect the rules is specific to the countries where exists military regime, i.e. Egypt....the rules are respected only by force.

Oral aggression and preening.

We can observe that Egyptian boys have a lively spoken, sometimes quarrelsome with highest voice tone and aggressive behavior

The educator in order to restrain this behavior must adopt a range of energies and strategies.

The aggression takes over nothing, if it angers his mother responded with the use of force.

Bad language is common and invests the family environment with great ease.

Utilizing physicality and violence (also for game) represents custom; to better explain I'm quoting two excepts of interview with Elho and Na.

> Elho: Learned the language (smiles....) and do not be silly
> I: Interesting! Please try to explain me better
> Elho: I have done so many bad things, I joked too with the other boys and they get angry. But for me life without joke, is nothing!
> And even about violence:
> Na: I changed myself so much ... When I was in Egypt, if someone told me a dirty word, I hit him but in my country is another thing in Italy is forbidden to beating. In Egypt there are also people which are strolling with weapons, normal people, like you and me, but strolling with weapons. In Italy this is not possible when I was in Egypt I had weapon
> Interviewer: Which type of weapon?
> Na: Weapon ... made so, also one big

I: But knives or guns?
Na: Guns
I: But you were not afraid?
Na: No, I was not afraid as there are some moments if you haven't these ones...
I: I understand you had to protect yourself but do you know the use?
Na: My brother taught me how to use it
I: and you never used the gun?
Na: Yes, I used a small gun... the big guns I can not use them

Talking about migratory warrant - reason of departure, we underline that in the period starting from the end of 2014 to May 2016 there have been openings of many fruit shops run by young Egyptian migrants in the urban territories of Rome: according the UPVAD Datas Confcommercio Roma - in the Roman province there are 1414 activities in the fruit and vegetable sector.

Following the traces of neo-Egyptian order just out of the protective circuit of the hospitality centers, a great number of ex-minors work in these fruit shops, and the foreign minors work as well.

What happens in these places? How many hours of work? What knowledge of their rights and duties does these young migrants have?

On average they must work 12 hours daily, and must unload truck boxes at 5,00 euro.

A high percentage of unauthorized departures are based on need to find a work.

The family house or the center is not able to work and defend the rights of minor, observing and trying to understand the bases of legislation: so in this way the operators become the enemy who prevents from achieving the objective.

In this case a minor has identified an uncle or cousin who has a commercial activity, the educational project becomes an obstacle which deteriorate relations among families. The educators feel flogged and have wasted his/her energy.

Lavinia Bianchi

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Review of Esodi e frontiere di celluloide. Il cinema italiano racconta le migrazioni. *Edited by L. Trapassi and L. Garosi. Florence: Franco Cesati, 2016.*

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Abstract
Review of the book *Esodi e frontiere di celluloide. Il cinema italiano racconta le migrazioni.*

Keywords: Cinema and migrations; Immigration in Italy; Interculturality; Italian emigration; Migrations.

The book edited by Leonarda Trapassi and Linda Garosi seems to use the techniques of the art to which it is dedicated. The subject of migration alternately focuses on the arrivals and on the departures from Italy, almost creating a sort of cinematographic flashback. The book examines, through the cinema, the history of the transformation of Italy from country of emigration to platform in the middle of the Mediterranean, first shore for hundreds of thousands of desperate people seeking a better life in the European continent.

The three parts of the book reconstruct a story of two centuries, based on the trace proposed by Leonarda Trapassi in her introduction: «L'indagine è rivolta alle strategie sia formali sia tematiche nella narrazione cinematografica dei destini dei migranti e di esodi o frontiere tra le culture e tocca soprattutto questioni come conflitti di civiltà, processi di accoglienza e integrazione che caratterizzano i flussi migratori – anche quelli italiani dei secoli scorsi – senza trascurare lo sguardo critico dei registi sulle varie forme di convivenza sociale nell'Italia di oggi» (p. 10). This perspective outlines a complex panorama of history, personal stories and great social changes: challenges that the migrations towards Europe, in this beginning of the new millennium, pose to politics, civil society and individual consciences.

The first part of the book assumes the concept of insularity as a synonymous to border, but also – in an apparently paradoxical way – of "contamination": the routes which intertwine in the Mediterranean connect different worlds, each of them with the pace of its structures (Braudel), in that "immobile world", described by Carlo Levi about the Lucania of the '30s, which even history has denied. Nevertheless, the sea connects those solitudes, put them in contact, mix their features, reverse the relation rulers/ruled, like in the movie "Mediterraneo", directed by Gabriele Salvatores: «la cultura che doveva essere sottomessa, in questo caso, si rivela, in certa maniera, dominante rispetto a quella che pretendeva di sottometterla» (p. 23). *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit.*

The second part of the book is dedicated to the transformation of Italy from country of emigration to place of immigration. The article of Barbara Galeandro starts from the concept of otherness and examines how the representation of the Other has been built by strengthening the image of the extra-Community citizen as a man who scares, who nobody wants to know and everyone removes. On the other hand, the author show how arbitrary concepts of identity, to be opposed to the fear of the different, have been built. Concepts of identity/difference that, according to the needs, are applied to the foreigner of any origin (p. 40). And the Other? The foreigner is suspended between two worlds, two cultures, two languages, representing an hybrid culture (p. 49). He does not belong to the country of destination nor to that of origin: a sort of double strangeness.

In the same section, Daniela Bisello Antonucci proposes, through a reading of Carlo Mazzacurati's "La giusta distanza", an idea of the fear of the Other, which rises from prejudice and silently accepts that the foreigner is accused of horrendous crimes and even that, not standing an unfair condemnation, he commits suicides. The silence of those who believe to be innocent, as well as the silence of those who claim a tranquillity undermined by many "Others"; the silence of the "old little bourgeoisie" sung by Claudio Lolli, which is happy if a thief dies.

The last article of this section, dedicated by Anna Nencioni to the movies of Andrea Segre, considers migrations as a concept which defines the present world, a sort of extreme representation of it. It poses, therefore, a problem about the interpretation of the notion of border: an ambiguous concept, based on the contradiction between splitting and connecting,

between barrier and passage, which always has a temporal dimension: «è la forma dell'avvenire e, forse, della speranza» (p. 64). The border, indeed, within the poetics of Segre continues to move in search of new contaminations.

In such a way the Italian border - from far place, from challenge to face in order to improve their own condition and that of their family – in last decades has become the boundary of a too small country, scared by an invasion of poorness and desperateness, worried to preserve its "cultural identity" and its "root".

The third part addresses the topic of Italian emigration through cinema and literature, going back to the beginning of the Italian Diaspora, to the time when the foreigner, the stranger, the Other, was the illiterate Italian described by De Amicis or Pirandello – protagonists of two articles of this part – as well as by Dino Campana, Italo De Vincentiis, Vicente Gerbasi, only to mention some of them. Homéro Manzi – author of extraordinary lyrics of tango – called them los «hijos nuevos de la patria vieja», referring to the Italian migration to Argentina.

Rethinking the stories of Pirandello, on which the plot of the movie "Kaos", directed by the Taviani brothers, is based, it is not difficult to imagine that the scenes of desperation for the travel are the same under both the burning sun of Sicily, and under that of Senegal and Nigeria, of Ethiopia or of the other places from which the crowd of desperation and sorrow moves.

In the same way, the blob which comes on board of the ship in Genoa, narrated by Edmondo De Amicis, has the same sore humanity of the chock-full boats crossing the Mediterranean to arrive on the coasts where, hundred years ago, the protagonists of the Pirandello's novels left.

In conclusion, two reflections. First, the myth of the travel, of the voluntary or forced moving, is much more ancient than cinema. Since millennia it has been telling the desire of discovery, the hope for future or for coming back, but also the fear of terrible shipwrecks. Oral and, later, written traditions have transmitted the most extraordinary cinematographic subject dedicated to migrating before the invention of the camera: the Odyssey. The peregrination of Odysseus intersects the routes of the present desperation, meets its places, anticipates its outcomes, until the accomplishing of the destiny of everybody.

The book retraces, without mentioning it, the travel of the king of Ithaca through the Mediterranean, using the evocative ability of the cinematographic images, speaking of migrants and of the desperation that, for almost two centuries, have first left the Italian ports and then have reached the coasts of the *Magna Graecia*.

Here starts the second reflection.

Much has been said about the evocative ability of the cinematographic images, about their ability to overcome the difficulties of the interpretation of the written text and to use an universal language. The XX century, in some cases, has been defined as the century of the image and it is argued that the image is the paradigm of the contemporary history, the most adequate interpretative key to understand the complexity of the present world. Actually, the photography, and later the cinema, have represented a real torsion of the reality which narrates itself and, moreover, of history that tries to understand its development.

The book represents a play of mirrors, in which the written word describes the images which narrate departures and arrivals. This is a typical form of the cinematographic narration: think, for example, to the extraordinary interpretation of Julie Andrews in "Victor Victoria", a woman who pretended to be a man who pretended to be a woman. In the book, indeed, sometimes the word is to the language, sometimes to the image, and sometimes the one take the place of the other.

The run of the words revolves around the thematic core indicated by Leonarda Trapassi: the destiny of migrants, the conflict among civilizations, the processes of integration, the ability of reciprocal contamination.

An image, coming from a movie analyzed in the book, encloses the deepest sense of this collective work: the *Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio*, a multi-ethnic band which uses a common and universal language, that of music, contaminating it thanks to the many cultures of the individuals musicians. The unity and the harmony of sound are the fruit of the "regulated" union of differences. Probably, a lesson to be learned.

Report on Cultural Psychology: A new science of the human nature, *Yokohama 2016*

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Abstract

This is a review of the symposium "Cultural Psychology: A new science of the human nature", which took place at the International Conference of Psychology (ICP) in Yokohama in 2016. The symposium was a collaborative effort of the editors and authors of the "Yokohama Manifesto" and its main goal was to make the ideas in this Manifesto known to a wider audience. There were five groups of authors and co-authors who presented their findings in different areas of the developing field of cultural psychology in short talks, and five discussants commenting on their respective findings.

Keywords : Cultural psychology; Human nature; Yokohama Manifesto.

The symposium was organized by Jaan Valsiner and Giuseppina Marsico, who are also two of the five editors of the integrated anthology *Psychology as the Science of Human Being - The Yokohama Manifesto*. This book was accurately described in the opening remarks of the symposium by Valsiner as "an international collective effort to make the study of specifically human ways of being the centre of psychological science". To further enhance this effort Valsiner and Marsico invited various groups of co-authors who contributed to that book (disclosure: the author of this review was one of them) to present their latest findings, ideas and research related to the ideas put forth in the book, in a short talk at the ICP 2016. Five other contributors served as discussants of these wide varied talks. As is obvious from the subtitle of the book, one central goal of the symposium was to promote this "Manifesto of Cultural Psychology" and to explore the future directions in this field. Cultural psychology starts from the basic premise that an individual human being's experience and behaviour is rooted in and an expression of the diverse cultural traditions and contexts this individual is living with(in). The Manifesto seems to enrich this general

concept by stressing the higher level organisational processes and activities of human beings, which are understood as hierarchically organised open systems trying to determine and develop themselves the best they can in their respective environments and in relationship with their fellow beings. This holistic systems theoretical outlook is the methodological grounds on which these higher level psychological, specifically human ways of being are deemed as having their own irreducible nature, different from purely biological, i.e. physiological, genetic or neurological facts of the matter.

The sheer number of active participants, quite exceptional even for a symposium, in itself was proof of the vitality of the relatively young field and served to show the multiple, but interconnected ideas cultural psychologists are currently working on. The symposium was also well visited, drawing an audience of over fifty interested listeners. Probably this was also due to the fact that the Manifesto book had already been published in Springer's book series "Annals of Theoretical Psychology" before the conference. However, this definitely made it easier for interested listeners in the audience to delve deeper into the various subjects right after the event, simply by acquiring the book. The presentations were reiterations as well as enhancements of the main ideas in some of the many different chapters of the Manifesto book and were about the following topics:

1) Importance of history of psychology: From Ganzheit to new theoretical horizons. (Brady Wagoner, Hroar Klempe, and Sergio Salvatore)

2) Unity of the real and the non-real: Imagination in action and talk. (Luca Tateo and Lene Tanggaard)

3) Understanding Human Being Within the Framework of William Stern's Critical Personalism: Teleology, Holism, and Valuation. (Kolja Lehmann-Muriithi, James Lamiell, and Carolina de Resende Damas Cardoso)

4) Psychology and art: Conceptual and methodological intersections. (Olga Lehmann, Vlad Petre Glaveanu, Svend Brinkmann, and Mark Freeman)

5) Variety of love: Multiverses in a localism aesthetic (Koji Komatsu and Maria Elisa Molina Pavez)

The discussants were Tatsuya Sato, Kevin Carriere, Rebekka Mai Eckerdal, Jensine Ingerslev Nedergaard, and Yasuhiro Omi, who each shared their thoughts on these five talks immediately after the last presentation.

As can be seen from the titles, the talks were quite diverse in the scope of their topics. One focal point was the reactivation of the historical theoretical concept of "Ganzheit" or whole in 1) - where wholes were characterized as feeling based, developing totalities of experience, and demonstrated in relation to how objects come to be perceived as real and to the construction of memories - and in 3) – where William Stern's teleologic holistic thinking was historically situated, with particular emphasis on the compatibility of his views with humanistic thinking more generally and with the investigative methods of phenomenology. Other core areas were the behavioural and methodological role of imaginative processes as the mediating psychological force between what is and what might be (in 2), interdisciplinary research into the relationship of art and psychology, with an understanding of the latter as an aesthetic normative science (in 4), and looks into the roles the experience of a loving relationship (5) and the process of valuing (3) play in human behaviour. While this diversity still wasn't exhaustive of all the contributions to the Manifesto, considering that these talks represented only a (sizeable) fraction of the topics covered therein, at least it was representative of its multi-pronged approach and spirit of open-mindedness.

It is really not easy to boil what was said in these two hours down into a couple of paragraphs. I even guess every participant would tell a quite unique story on what it was all about. And, paradoxical as it may seem, this is probably part of the essence of what it was all about, since the participants themselves were a quite international crowd from different research traditions and cultural backgrounds. And one of the core tenets of cultural psychology is the premise, that psychological and behavioural facts are rooted and embodied in cultural practices. So, one of the core challenges in cultural psychological research is to account not only for the general uniformity of human behaviour but also its culturally coloured and sometimes downright idiosyncratic particularities. My own personal story

and reason to attend the conference was influenced by this reasoning: this symposium was, besides the obvious effort to make the Manifesto and the various proponents' research findings known to a wider audience, an attempt to re-enthuse the psychological community for research into individual human qualities and meanings, in short: human ways of being, by way of qualitative methods looking into their higher level psychological organisation. Of course, quantitative methods have their place and eligibility in cultural psychology, too. But the methods employed in the kind of research looking into the specifics and idiosyncrasies of an experiencing and valuing individual's orientation in his or her personal lifeworld must have an appropriate place in today's psychology's methodology, too, if we want to "make the study of specifically human ways of being the centre of psychological science", as cultural psychology as understood in the Yokohama Manifesto sets out to do. After all, psychology is generally understood to be the science of human thinking, experiencing and behaviour, and all of these processes only - or at least first and foremost - take place with and within individuals.

But my impression was that all the topics treated highlighted important practical and/or theoretical aspects of what it means to develop a new science of the human nature that is based on considerations of the - sometimes very personal - conditions of its cultural embeddedness, and trying to "restore the role of higher psychological functions as the central object of psychological science" (Valsiner, 2016, p. vi) in the process. There seemed to be a common understanding that a certain kind of intellectual integrity, cautiousness, and humility towards the topics, methods and "objects" (which are rather deemed subjects) of cultural psychological research is a necessary precondition for the attainment of this goal. Let me give an example. In the past, research findings from quantitative studies with relatively small groups of participants from a defined subset of people (which are all too often pretty homogeneous in light of the worldwide diversity of human beings), were often all too readily accepted as objective truths and thus generalized, either to a certain type of human beings, who are thought to be represented by the sample, or even to all humans on the planet. This methodological mistake is probably not completely gone for good. In cultural psychology as understood by the Yokohama Manifesto group, however, such an attitude seems to have no place, thankfully. The

focus of cultural psychological research rather lies on the fundamental role of the specifically human ways of being - processes taking place in individual human beings: perception, feeling, imagining, valuing, reasoning, deciding - whereas the processes in question are conceived of as neither random nor predetermined things happening to a person, but much rather as a person's active and purposive doings.

The presentations also hinted at and made me think about the various directions where these undertakings can and most likely will lead to in the next future: the research into the role of imaginative processes in human behaviour, for example, could become solid proof and promise that these processes are not only reproducing the same old ways of being in the world, but can rather serve as the foundation of counterfactual, dialectical reasoning, and the judgement and evaluation of what is real in light of what is not, but might be. It may also be of therapeutic value for individuals and even society as a whole, since intentional behaviour is on the one hand steeped in cultural traditions, but on the other hand can also sometimes be transformed and transcended into new dimensions by non-conforming, imaginative individuals, who challenge themselves and their social surroundings to not only judge what is (reality) in light of what might be (potentiality), but to actually turn some desirable aspect of the latter into the former.

More generally speaking, I am convinced that the considerations in the Manifesto are of interest to not just cultural psychologist, but theoretical psychologists, methodologists, personality psychologists, therapists, pedagogues and many more - since any psychologist's and person-related professional's view of the human nature and, consequentially, of how to best explore and understand human ways of being has a profound effect on what questions they ask, on how they deal with their clients and/or research subjects, and, eventually, on how helpful, empathetic, and truthful they are.

After the vibrant presentations and thoughtful comments by the discussants, that highlighted some of the common threads binding the different aspects of cultural psychological research together into one scientific field, there was some time for a couple of questions from the audience, which was made good use of.

The symposium was complemented and rounded off with - partly social, partly professional - culinary get-togethers, where all presenters could intensify their collaboration and discussions and also had the chance of getting in touch with some of the publishers working with the Centre for Cultural Psychology at Aalborg University in Denmark.

To conclude: I think the symposium gave an impressive overview of the blossoming field of cultural psychology and was a nice opportunity for the participants to get to know their international collaborators. I am optimistic for the further development of the ideas in the Manifesto and the field of cultural psychology in general, which may very well have some bearing on the wider field of psychology.

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